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ABSTRACT
The Nuclear Powers have been conducting negotia-
tions on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests almost
continuously since July 1, 1958, when the Conference of
Experts convened
•
Why then have the Nuclear Powers been in almost con-
tinuous session for over five years and no agreement
reached? "To Test or Not to Test" is an attempt to answer
that question.
The evolution of the respective positions of the
United States and the Soviet Union is traced through a
historical analysis of the negotiations with a view to
trying to determine where these negotiations will lead*
The main emphasis of the investigation was on the
negotiations during the period of July 1, 1958 through
June 21, 1963.
The conclusion reached was that an agreement was
possible if a common ground for negotiation could be found.
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The Nuclear Powers have been conducting negotiations
on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests almost con-
tinuously since July 1, 1958, when the Conference of
Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations
of a Possible Agreenient on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests
was convened.
Why then have the Nuclear Powers been in almost con-
tinuous session for over five years and no agreement has
been reached? "To Test or Not to Test," the title of this
paper, is an attempt to answer that question.
The evolution of the respective positions of the
United States and the Soviet Union will be traced through
a historical analysis of the negotiations with a view to
trying to determine where these negotiations will lead.
If they lead to agreement, what mutual benefits will be
derived by the Nuclear Powers will also be explored.
The main emphasis of the investigation will be on
the negotiations. Starting with the Conference of Experts
from July 1, 1958 to August 21, 1958; followed by the
Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests,
from October 31, 1958 to January 29, 1962; and concluding




2Conference and its Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Dis-
continuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests from March 14, 1962 to
June 21, 1963. Thus, the period that will be covered will
be from July 1, 1958 to June 21, 1963.
From these negotiations has evolved the United
States and the Soviet Union's position in reference to the
cessation of nuclear weapons tests* A chapter will be
spent in putting forth these latest positions as of the
first of July, 1963. The purpose of this chapter will be
to set forth in concise terms Just where the two positions
stand in relation to each other.
The next chapter will be a review of the major argu-
ments for the continuation of the nuclear weapons test ban
negotiations and their role in the continuation of the
negotiations.
The final and concluding chapter will attempt to
summarize the coxjurse of the paper and in conclusion attempt
to predict the future course of the negotiations and nuclear
testing, based on the latest positions of the Nuclear
Powers and the background of the negotiations.
The major source of information for this investiga-
tion will be the verbatim records of the three conferences
and their attached documents. Additional sources will be
the various publications of documents in the field of dis-
armament put out by the Department of State and the United
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
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CHAPTER II
CONFERENCE OF EXPERTS TO STUDY THE POSSIBILITY
OF DETECTING VIOLATIONS OF A POSSIBLE
AGREEMENT ON THE SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR
TESTS JULY 1, 1958 to AUGUST 21, 1958
I. BACKGROUND
With the breakdown of the disarraaraent negotiations
through the United Nations Disarmament Commission in the
fall of 1957, a search was begun for other means to con-
tinue negotiations.
In January 1958, President Eisenhower sent a letter
to Marshal Bulganin in which he proposed that various
aspects of disarmament, including the control of a test
ban, be studied by technical grcaips. He included a state-
ment that "these technical studies could, if you wish, be
undertaken without commitment as to ultimate acceptance,
or to the interdependence, of the propositions involved."
This small step indicated a change in the United States
position to discuss partial measures of disarmament and
established the seed out of which grew the negotiations on
a nuclear weapons test ban agreement*
An exchange of letters followed between President
Eisenhower and the Soviet Premier, First Marshal Bulganin,






4and later Nikita Khrushchev who succeeded him# The Soviet
Union continued to press for an iBunediate suspension of
nuclear weapons tests and unilaterally declared the dis-
continuing of all nuclear weapons tests on March 31, 1958,
2following an extensive tests series* The United States
did not accept the Soviet proposal for immediate suspen-
sion of nuclear tests but continued to press for a confer-
ence of technicians to study the problem of control.
However, the United States continued to view the limitation
or suspension of testing as a part of a broad disarmament
agreement.
3
On May 9, 1958, in a letter to President Eisenhower,
Premier Khrushchev, after expressing concern that a tech-
nical study would delay suspension of tests, agreed "to
having both sides designate experts who would immediately
begin a study of methods of detecting possible violations
4
of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests."
In President Eisenhower's letter to Premier
Khrushchev on May 24, 1958, he replied, "experts on our
side would be prepared to meet in Geneva with experts from
the Soviet side to study methods for detecting possible
violations of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear
tests."
Premier Khrushchev in his letter to President
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his regrets that a technical study would delay a possible
agreement, agreed to a meeting at Geneva.
President Eisenhower in his letter to Premier
Khrushchev on June 10, 1958, confirmed the site of the
meeting and recommended that the conference convene on or
about July 1, 1958.^
After a further exchange of correspondence, it was
finally agreed to convene the conference of experts in
Geneva on or about July 1, 1958, with experts from the
United States, the United Kingdom, Franca, Canada, the
Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania to study
methods for detecting possible violations of an agreement
8
on the cessation of nuclear tests*
II. THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF EXPERTS
Introduction
The experts met in Geneva from July 1 to August 21,
1958. They held thirty formal sessions plus several in-
formal meetings at which detailed technical questions were
discussed.
In the communique issued at the close of the con-
ference, the group stated that it had come to several
agreed conclusions. First,
... that the methods of detecting nuclear
explosions available at the present time-
namely, the collection of samples of radioactive
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6debris, the recording of seismic, acoustic and
hydro-acoustic waves, and the radio signal method,
together with the use of on-site inspection of
unidentified events ..hich might be suspected of
being nuclear explosions—make it possible, within
certain limits, to detect and identify nuclear
explosions, and it recommends the use of these
methods in a control system.
Second
,
• • • that it is technically feasible to set up, with
certain capabilities and limitations, a workable and
effective control system for the detection of viola-
tions of a possible agreement on the worldwide
cessation of nuclear weapons tests.
Third
,
• • • that the control system should be under the
direction of an international control organ which
would ensure the co-ordination of the activities
of the control system and the functioning of the
system in such a way that it would satisfy the
necessary technical requirements.^
Following the issuance of the communique, the final
report of the conference was issued. This report was
divided into four sections: general background informa-
tion, the basic methods of detection and identification of
nuclear explosions, the technical equipment of the control
system, and the control system.
Background Information
The first order of business after the conference
convened was the selection of an agenda. On July 4tt, the
following agenda was adopted:
1. Exchange of opinions on the problem of the
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various methods for detecting atomic explo-
sions and on other general problems of the
Conference deliberations,
2« Determination of a list of basic methods of
systematic observations for phenomena indica-
tive of an explosion,
3, A system for controlling the observance of an
agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests,
4, Drawing up a report of experts to the govern-
ments of those countries represented at the
Conference, with conclusions and suggestions
regarding a system of controlling the ob-
servance of an agreement on the cessation of
nucleer tests ,10
In reaching their conclusions, the experts consid-
ered the natural phenomena which accompany nuclear explo-
sions. These phenomena (such as, acoustic waves occur when
there are explosions in air and in water; seismic oscilla-
tions that occur when there are explosions on the ground,
under the ground, and under water; the radio pulses that
are produced when there are explosions in the atmosphere;
and the optical and gamma radiation when propagated over
long distances), they said, "serve to indicate explosions
and to estimate their time and place," Further, they con-
tinued, that when nuclear explosions occur in the atmos-
phere, radioactive debris is formed which mixes in the
atmosphere and is dispersed over great distances. If a
nuclear explosion is set off in the ocean or in th«
earth's crust, the radioactive debris will remain con-
centrated close to the place of the explosion for a
considerable time. Because of these phenomena, they
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8nuclear explosions at considerable distances* Therefore,
they contended, that explosions of high yield which are
set off on the surface of the earth and in the lower atmos-
phere can be detected without difficulty at points remote
from the site of the explosions. However, they added, that
explosions of low yield can only be detected with good re-
liability if a specially set up control system is estab-
lished.
As to this special problem of detecting small
explosions, they said, this was so because of the many
natiiral phenomena, earthquakes and thunder storms, which
give similar signals or hinder the detection of the sig-
nals. They added that it was possible to discriminate
between signals of natural events and explosions by care-
ful analysis of the data from several stations. Those that
remained unidentified "which could be suspected as being
nuclear explosions might be resolved by inspection of the
site.""*-^
The Conference considered the methods of detecting
nuclear explosions by acoustic, hydro-acoustic, seismic
oscillations, electro-magnetic oscillations and radio-
active debris. Each of these methods was examined for its
effectiveness and limitations. Following this, the Con-












of the control system and the question of the control
system as a whole.
Basic Methods of Detection and Identification of
Nuclear Explosions
The experts analyzed the capabilities of five
methods of detecting nuclear explosions.
Acoustic Waves . Nuclear explosions in air cause
strong acoustic waves which propagate over large distances.
The experts stated that the existing apparatus could detect
an air wave from a 1-kiloton explosion at relatively large
distances—downwind at a distance of 2,000 to 3,000 kilo-
meters and upwind at 500 kilometers. Records from three
stations would, they believed, make it possible to deter-
mine the location of the explosion with an accuracy of
better than 100 kilometers. These methods were considered
reliable at heights up to 30 kilometers and possibly even
50 kilometers. Deep underground and underwater explosions
would not produce air waves "sufficiently intense for de-
tection purposes." The hydro-acoustic waves produced by
underwater explosions in oceans, however, could be de-
tected at distances of about 10,000 kilometers.
Radioactive debris . Nuclear explosions in the air
up to 10 kilometers produces radioactive debris which is
carried by the wind to great distances. The experts be-
lieved that the most convenient conditions for the taking
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of samples of the debris would prevail between the fifth
and the twentieth day atfter an explosion, when control
posts at distances of 2,000 to 3,000 kilometers should be
able to detect a 1-kiloton explosion "with a high degree
of reliability." They added, however, that this method
was less reliable for underground or underwater explosions.
They also considered that aircraft would be useful, both in
collecting samples of the air and in search for radioactive
clouds that would be produced by nuclear explosions.
Seismic waves . Underground or underwater nuclear
explosions produce waves that are propagated through the
earth's crust. The experts recognized the difficulty of
distinguishing seismic waves produced by nuclear explo-
sions from those caused by earthquakes. Under conditions
analogous to those of the United States Rainer shot, they
believed that longitudinal seismic waves caused by an
underground nuclear explosion of 1 kiloton could be de-
tected, and the direction of the first motion (explosions
cause the first movement of the earth to be in a direction
away from the source, while earthquakes can often cause
the first movement of the earth to be in a direction
toward the source) could be determined, at stations con-
siderably more quiet than average and under favorable
noise conditions, at distances of 1,000 kilometers and
also at 2,000 and 3,500 kilometers. At the same stations
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but under noisy conditions, however, this method would be
effective only for 5-kiloton explosions. The experts
thought that 90 per cent of the earthquakes could be "dis-
tinguished from explosions with a high degree of relia-
bility if the direction of first motion of the longitudinal
wave is clearly registered at five or more seismic stations
on various bearings from the epicentre" and under specified
conditions that the area within which an epicenter was
localized could be assessed as approximately 100-200 square
kilometers, "For those cases which remain unidentified,"
they said, "inspection of the region will be necessary."
By this, they meant that inspectors would have to make on-
site investigation of the area where an unidentified event
occurred in order to make a positive identification of it.
They noted that methods of detecting underground nuclear
explosions might be improved in the future by perfecting
the technical equipment involved.
Radio signals . Atmospheric nuclear explosions give
rise to powerful electromagnetic radiations. The experts
stated that a 1-kiloton explosion could be detected by
means of radio signals at distances exceeding 6,000
kilometers "assuming that in the neighbourhood of the re-
ceiving stations there is no high noise level from local
thunderstorms or other sources." The similarity of sig-
nals from lightning flashes to those resulting fro*u
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nuclear explosions, however, made this method unreliable
at great distances. The experts recommended further re-
search on this subject*
High-altitude explosions . Nuclear explosions at
altitudes higher than 30-50 kilometers present special
problems. Theoretically and on the basis of preliminar
data, the experts considered that ganuna rays and neutrons
produced by nuclear explosions at high altitides could be
registered with "properly instrumented" earth satellites.
They also stated that it could be considered possible "to
use the recording of ionospheric phenomena, using appro-
priate radio techniques, and of optical phenomena for the
detection of nuclear explosions at high altitudes," They
did not consider the problem of detecting nuclear explo-
sions at distances of millions of kilometers from the
earth, ^^
The Technical Equipment of the Control System
After this discussion of the methods of detection
of nuclear explosions in various environments, the experts
described the technical equipment needed at the control
posts. They recommended that control posts on continents
be equipped with apparatus "for the detection of explo-
sions by the acoustic and seismic methods and also by the
methods of recording radio signals and of collecting radio-
active debris," Posts on islands or coastal areas should
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also, in addition to the equipment for the methods above,
be equipped with hydro-acoustic apparatus for detecting
underwater explosions. Posts on ships should be equipped
with apparatus for collecting radioactive debris and with
hydro-acoustic equipment.
The apparatus installed at posts, they said, must
be uniform, satisfy basic technical requirements and be
designed for reliable continuous operation.
They further recommended that improved apparatus
and techniques be actively developed and incorporated into
the control system "for the purpose of continuously im-
13proving the effectiveness" of the system.
The Control System
The experts concluded that it is technically fea-
sible to establish a workable and effective control system
with certain capabilities and limitations which would
detect violations of an agreement to suspend nuclear
weapons tests.
The control system, they said, should be under the
direction of an international control organ which would
perform the following functions:
1. The development, testing and acceptance of the
technical equipment and stating the criteria
for the siting of the control posts.
2. Making continuous and effective observations at
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3, Establishment of reliable communications, using
existing channels were suitable, between the
control organ and the posts and air bases.
4, Arrange for means of transport for control post
personnel and the staff of the international
control organ,
5, Timely analysis and processing of data received
from the control posts.
6. Timely inspection of unidentified events "which
could be suspected of being nuclear explo~
sions,"
7. Staffing the control system with qualified
specialists*
8. Assist in a scientific research program with the
"aim of raising the scientific standard of the
system."
Control posts network . The experts recommended a
network of 170-180 control posts including 160-170 land
control posts and 10 shipborne posts. About 100-110 posts
would be situated in continents, 20 on large islands and 40
on small islands. Continental posts in aseismic areas (low
earthquake occurrence areas) should be spaced at about
1,700 kilometers and in seismic areas (high earthquake
occurrence areas) at about 1,000 kilometers. Oceanic
posts would normally be spaced at 2,000 to 3,000 kilometers
but the spacing between island posts in seismic areas
would be about 1,000 kilometers. This would lead to the
following distribution of control posts around the world:
North America 24, Europe 6, Asia 37, Australia 7, South




islands and about 10 ships, for a total of 180 control
posts.
Each control post would require about thirty spe-
cialists and some auxiliary personnel to staff and operate
it. Their duties would include ensuring normal operation
of the apparatus, preliminary processing of data and
forwarding of this data to the control organization and
the government of the host country.
In addition to the control posts, the experts con-
cluded, that there would be regular aircraft flights over
the oceans to check on radioactivity in the atmosphere.
Additionally, in some cases there would be special flights
over the territories of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union to collect air samples for
checking on data obtained by other methods.
Additionally, the experts concluded, that when an
event is detected which ccuinot be identified by the inter-
national control organ and which is suspected "of being a
nuclear explosion" the international organ "can send an
inspection group to the site of the event in order to
determine whether a nuclear explosion had taken place or
not .
"
Effectiveness of the control system . The experts
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!• Good probability of detecting and identifying
nuclear explosions of yields down to about 1
kiloton, taking place on the surface of the
earth, and up to 10 kilometers altitude, and
good probability of detecting, but not always
of identifying, explosions taking place at
altitudes from 10 to 50 kilometers.
2* Good probeibility of detecting nuclear explo-
sions of 1-kiloton yield set off deep in the
open ocean.
3» Good probability of recording seismic signals
from deep underground nuclear explosions iii
continents equivalent to 1 kiloton anci above.
The capability of the control system to identify under-
ground nuclear explosions of 1-5 kiloton yield depends on:
the small fraction of earthquakes that can be identified on
the basis of data obtained from the control posts alone;
the fraction of earthquakes that can be identified with
the aid of suppleraentaxy data obtained from existing
seismic stations; and the fraction of events still left
unidentified which could be suspected of being nuclear ex-
plosions and for which the international control organ
would carry out on-site Inspections. They estimated on
the basis of existing data that the number of earthquakes
which would be undistinguishable on the basis of their
seismic signals from deep underground nuclear explosions
of about 5-kiloton yield could be in continental areas
frcMO 20 to 100 a year. The experts concluded that the con-
trol system would have great difficulty in obtaining
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underground explosion but there would always be a possl-
14bility of detection of such a violation by inspection.
Summary
The Conference of Experts had studied the capabili-
ties and limitations of the various methods of detecting
and identifying nuclear explosions in the various elements*
They reviewed and recommended the technical apparatus that
should be used in the various control posts. They studied
and recoramended the type of control system that should be
established. The general conclusion reached by the ex-
perts was that it is technically feasible to set up, with
certain capabilities and limitations, a workable and
effective control system for the detection of violations
of a possible agreement on the cessation of nuclear
weapons tests.
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CONFERENCE ON THE DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR TESTS
OCTOBER 31, 1958 - JANUARY 29, 1962
I . BACKGROUND
Immediately following the successful conclusion of
the Conference of Experts on August 22, 1958, President
Eisenhower and the British Government issued statements
calling for further negotiations for an agreement with
other nations which have tested nuclear weapons for the
suspension of nuclear weapons tests and the actual estab**
lishment of an international control system on the basis
of the experts* report. As part of the agreement to be
negotiated, they said, the United States and the United
Kingdom were prepared to suspend testing on a year-by-
year basis subject to a determination at the beginning of
each year that: the agreed inspection system is installed
and working effectively; and satisfactory progress is
being made in reaching agreement on and implementing major
and substantial arms control measures. The statements
declared that Western negotiators would be ready to open
negotiations on October 31, 1958, in Geneva.
On August 30, 1958, the Soviet Union agreed to
commence negotiations with the United States and the









United Kingdom on October 31, 1958, in Geneva and that the
2
conference be fixed for a period of two to three weeks*
In a note to the Soviet Union on September 10, 1958,
the United States agreed to hold the conference at Geneva
on October 31, 1958; but because of the importance of the
negotiations , they should be continued for whatever time




As part of their statements on August 22, 1958, the
United States and the United Kingdom agreed to stop testing
of nuclear weapons for a period of one year from the begin-
ning of the negotiations. On November 1 and 3, after the
Conference had convened, the Soviet Union exploded nuclear
devices. President Eisenhower in a statement on November
7, 1958, declared that this action by the Soviet Union had
relieved the United States from its voluntary obligations
not to test. However, he added: "we shall continue sus-
pension of such tests for the time being, and we understand
the United Kingdom will do likewise. We hope that the
4Soviet Union will also do so." No more Soviet atmospheric
tests were held and the voluntary moratorium was observed
by the Muclear Powers until August 30, 1961, when the
Soviet Union resumed testing.
xs
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Procedure
For purposes of analysis, the Conference on the
Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests is broken down into
ten natural periods. There were 353 formal sessions held
in private session. The agreed articles of a treaty
relating to the prohibition of nuclear weapons test ex-
plosions are included in Appendix A, All meetings were
held at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, Switzerland.
II. THE FIRST PERIOD OCTOBER 31, 1958 -
DECEMBER 19, 1958
Introduction
The Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear
Weapon Tests convened on October 31, 1958, in Geneva,
Switzerland, with the United States, the United Kingdom,
and the Soviet Union represented. Twenty--eight formal
meetings were held in private session.
The major issues discussed by the Conference during
this period were: the agenda; Western views on effective
control; the Soviet position on control; the control
organization; and the discussion and adoption of several
articles for a treaty relating to the prohibition of
nuclear weapons tests.
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At the first meeting, the Soviet representative
introduced a short draft agreement providing for the imme-
diate discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests but which
included only a statement that a control system would be
5
established on the basis of the experts' report.
The Western representatives rejected this proposal
and proposed that the Conference begin with an examination
of the control organization.
Thus, two opposing agendas were suggested: the
Soviet Union wanted agreement on suspension of tests first
followed by negotiation on a control system; the West
wanted to spell out the control system first to be included
in the agreement*
Debate on the selection of an agenda occupied the
first fifteen meetings and was finally broken when the
United States representative suggested that "the best way
to move forward from this point is to try to focus our dis-
cussion more clearly through consideration of texts of
suggested treaty articles which clearly embody the posi-
7tions which we think are essential*"
During the agenda debate in addition to the Soviet
draft agreement, the United States submitted a working
paper on a treaty on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon
Tests, including est€iblishment of an effective
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ginternational control organization. The United Kingdom
submitted two papers! one on some of the initial points
requiring consideration in the setting up of an effective
international control organization for supervising the
observance of an agreement on the discontinuance of
nuclear weapons tests, and one on some points not covered
in the conclusions of the Conference of Experts requiring
consideration in the setting up of an effective inter-
9
national control organization.
Initially, the Soviet Union argued for two separate
agreements: one on the discontinuance of testing, and
another on the establishment of the control organization*
Finally, on November 29, 1958, at the ISti meeting they
declared, in spite of their continuing preference for a
test ban agreement with a separate protocol on control,
the Soviet Union was willing to include the control pro-
visions in the agreement on the cessation of tests.
However, they continued to attack the Western position
calling for a year-by-year agreement linked to progress in
general disarmament.
Thus with the Soviet acceptance of one all-inclusive
agreement and the United States representative's suggestion
on procedure, the deadlock on an agenda was broken by
proceeding without one to consideration of individual
articles of a comprehensive treaty.
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Western Views on Effective Control
At the 17tb meeting, the United States representa-
tive outlined the Western views on the type of control
organisation which should be set up to implement the system
recommended by the experts.
First, the organization should be responsible to a
commission or board made up of representatives of the three
Powers plus a small number of other States participating
in the organization. This commission should be responsible
for establishing the necessary procedures for the installa-
tion, operation, and improvement of the data-gathering
facilities in accordance with the agreen^nt. Further, they
would also maintain a continuous review of the functioning
of the system and the analysis of the data collected by
it. It would authorize nuclear detonations for peaceful
purposes and make findings on violations of the agreement.
It would appoint an administrator who would direct the
system. This commission would operate as a permanent body
on continuous call.
Second, there should be a conference of parties
which would periodically review the general operation of
the system.
Third, an administrator appointed by the commission
and responsible to the commission would be the chief execu-
tive officer of the system. He would be responsible for
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implementing the procedures established by the commission
for the system and for the analysis of the data which it
collects in order to determine whether or not violations
of the agreement have occurred. To this end, the adminis-
trator and his staff would determine, subject to the
approval of the commission, the equipment, construction
and location of control posts and other facilities; select
and train personnel for the manning of such facilities, and
for inspection groups; make technical findings from the
data so collected; dispatch inspection groups and special
flights; and analyze the results which they obtain.
Fourth, a headquarters must be established to pro-
vide the administrator with a mechanism to direct an ef-
fective overall operation of the system. This would also
include a data analysis center and a central laboratory.
Further, because the administrative and logistic problems
would be too great, there would be ten regional offices
which would provide support for ten or twenty controls
posts and aircraft facilities. The organization would have
the right to maintain an independent radio network, operated
by its own staff, connecting the headquarters with indivi-
dual control posts, inspection groups and air facilities.
Soviet Position on Control
At the 21st meeting on December 8, 1958, the Soviet
Union clarified its position on control. It stipulated
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that the Commission would make decisions on all important
questions by unanimous agreement among the United States,
the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. Further, the staff
of each control post was to be recruited from the nationals
of the territory on which it was located; and the director
of the post would be a representative of the host country;
and a chief control officer would represent the other side*
On aircraft sampling flights, one control officer would go
along from the other nuclear side. Special flights would
be made to collect air samples over the territory of
States with the participation of a representative of the
Commission, by decision of the Commission in aircraft of
such States along routes determined in advance and agreed
12
upon with the governments of such States,
The Control Organization
Western principles on the control organization . At
the 23rd meeting on December lltt, the United States repre-
sentative explained that the control organization must be
built on three basic principles:
First, "operation on the basis of majority vote in
the Control Organization." He said that the utilization
of the Soviet idea of requiring a unanimous vote of the
three powers in the Commission would have tie effect of a
veto provision.
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Second, "international rather than national opera-
tion of the detection and identification system." The
Soviet proposal for national operation imposes more rather
than less opportunity for partiality and possible obstruc-
tion than would be the case with a true international
staff, added the United States representative.
Third, "minimization of the number of political
decisions required in the day-to-day operation of the
control organization." By this he explained that the
United States meant that the basic political decisions
would be incorporated in the treaty itself. He continued
that
... now is the time, to reach and record as fully
as we can practicably do the fundamental decisions
as to how this organization should operate. When
it is in operation it should be on a basis of timely
operation, and timely operation requires that points
within the process at which new political decisions
are required should be minimized. ^^
Soviet view on the control organization . At the
24tl» meeting on December 12ti>, the Soviet representative
rebutted the United States statement of basic principles
and denied that the Soviet proposals would obstruct the
control organization. He stated that the Soviet pro-
posals were based on the concept of cooperation: firstly,
between the States taking part in the control system; and
secondly, between the control organization and each State
party to the agreement. The control organization, he
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continued, cannot function without substantial day-to-day
assistance of each State party to the agreement and active
collaboration on the part of States. He further added
that, because the possibility of a violation of a treaty
is so serious, no part of the organization should make the
final decision except the highest organ, the Control Cora-
mission. Further, he continued, the Commission must give
thorough examination to evidence submitted by the suspected
State to clear itself.
In relation to international staffing, he said,
that the Western proposals were based not on technical con-
14
siderations but on political considerations.
United States submits draft articles on the control
organization . At the 25tl) meeting on December 15 , the
United States representative submitted for consideration
of the Conference draft articles on ttie duties, functions,
and responsibilities of the control organization. These
articles (Article VI on the Control Commission, Article
VII on the Conference of Parties, Article VIII on the
Detection and Identification System, and Article IX on the
Administrator and his staff) incorporated the views of the
United States which had been set forth in the Conference.
At the 26tb meeting on December 16, the United
States representative submitted for consideration of the
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Conference, a draft Annex I on the Installation, Operation
and Improvement of the Detection and Identification System,
Adoption of Treaty Articles
Article 1 > At the 20ih meeting on December 6 , Ar-
ticle 1 was adopted. It was adopted from the Soviet draft
agreement proposal and the United States draft treaty
working paper proposal. It prohibited the parties from
carrying out nuclear tests and to refrain from causing,
encouraging or in any way participating in nuclear tests
15
anywhere.
Article 2 , At the 21st meeting on December 8,
Article 2 for a treaty relating to the prohibition of
nuclear weapons tests was adopted by the Conference, It
was adopted from the Soviet draft agreement proposal and
the United States treaty working paper proposal. The
article established a control organization and obligated
the Parties to the treaty to cooperate "promptly and fully
with the control organization" in the carrying out of its
16duties in accordance with the provisions of the treaty.
Article 3 . At the 24U) meeting on December 12
,
Article 3 for the proposed treaty prohibiting nuclear
weapon tests was adopted by the Conference, This article
v/as adopted from the United States draft treaty working
paper proposal. It established the control organization
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IdeiKtification System; and Administrator; and a Conference
17
of Parties.
Article 4 « At the 27tt meeting on December 17,
Article 4 for the proposed treaty was adop-ed. The article
was proposed by the United Kingdom at the 19tb meeting.
The article set forth the composition of the Commission.
It provided that the Commission would consist of one repre-
sentative from the United States, the United Kingdom, and
the Soviet Union as permanent members, plus four other
members elected by the Conference of Parties for two year
terms.
Summary
The problem of the agenda which presented the Con-
ference with an initial deadlock was solved by proceeding
without one. Four treaty articles were adopted without
too much debate. The initial debate on the control organi-
zation which was held during this period brought out major
disagreement over voting procedures in the Commission,
duties and powers of the Administrator, staffing, and in-
spection.
The United States continued to press for a year-by-
year agreement tied to progress in the field of disarmament,
whereas the Soviet Union wanted an unlimited agreement com-
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Some progress had been made, but the differences in
the two positions brought out in this initial period in-
dicated a great deal of negotiation would be necessary
before they could be brought close enough to reAch agree-
ment*
III. THE SECOND PERIOD JANUARY 5, 1959 -
MARCH 20, 1959
Introduction
The second period conunenced on January 5, 1959, and
covered forty-four formal meetings. Three minor draft
articles were adopted during this period. Discussion cen-
tered around several general topics: new data on under-
ground explosions submitted by the United States; on-site
inspection and inspection groups; control post and head-
quarters staffing; the Soviet veto list; nuclear detona-
tions for peaceful purposes; and elective positions on the
Control Commission.
Submission of New Data on Underground Testing
At the first meeting of this period on January 5,
1959, the 29tt meeting of the Conference, the United States
representative circulated as a Conference document a
working paper on new seismic data stating the preliminary
results of United States tests held in October 1958. This
new data, he said, failed to confirm the conclusions of
'li-





the Geneva Conference of Experts in relation to the detec-
tion of underground tests. Referring to the preliminary
report of President Eisenhower's Science Advisory Committee
which analyzed the new data received from the October
tests, he declared, they concluded that the method recom-
mended by the Geneva experts for distinguishing earthquakes
from explosions, the direction of the first motion of the
seismic signal as observed by several stations, was less
effective than the experts believed. Further, the new
data also showed that the seismic signals produced by
underground explosions would be smaller than had been
anticipated and that there weire, therefore, about twice as
many natural earthquakes equivalent to an underground ex-
plosion of a given yield as had been estimated by the
Conference of Experts. The Committee concluded, he con-
tinued, that the total number of unidentified seismic
events with energy equivalents larger than 5 kilotons might
be increased 10 times over the number estimated by the
experts.
Based on the preliminary findings of this new data,
the United States representative requested a working group
of experts of the three Powers be established by the Con-
19ference to study and analyze this new data.
Soviet views on new scientific data . The initial
Soviet reaction to the introduction of this new scientific
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data was one of suspicion. They viewed it as a Western
trick to get "inspection group after inspection group
20
roaming all over a country."
At the meeting on January 7, the Soviet representa-
tive gave a fuller critique on the new scientific data
submitted by the United States. He refused to accept it as
the basis for further technical discussion by the Confer-
ence, and reaffirmed their view that the technical basis
for the Conference was adequately covered by the conclu-
sions and recommendations of the Conference of Experts.
However, he said, they did agree that additional data
which was derived by experimentation should be submitted
to the control organization to be established by the
treaty. He concluded, that the stage of technical study
was behind and the main task at the present time was to
21
work out a political agreement.
Continuing debate . On January 23 at the 41st meet-
ing, the United States representative reviewed the Soviet
position on the new data and said that he could not accept
the premise that new scientific information should be
deferred for consideration by the control organization
22
when it is established.
The Soviet Union still refused to consider the new
data by a technical working group. The United States did
not continue to press for a technical working group during




t ,:->30fi ioii bi.iio;j swi iAiii bias .tisb wsn SNli cio uoUXtoq^
won drii 1 od oj bsai r.l:^« noinU ;J9J:voe
35
this period, but held the proposal for future considera-
tion.
Western Powers Drop Disarmament Tie
At the 37Ui meeting on January 19, 1959, the United
States and the United Kingdom made a major move toward
reaching agreement. They agreed to drop their insistence
that "the duration of the treaty be made conditional upon
progress in other fields of disarmament." However, they
still retained the condition that the continuation of the
agreement would be dependent on the effective operation of
23the control organization.
Qn-Site Inspections and Inspection Groups
The question of on-site inspections and inspection
groups was given extensive debate during this period.
Western views on on-site inspections and inspection
groups . The Western position on on-site inspection was
for permanent inspection teams or groups that would be
promptly dispatched on the basis of pre-determined criteria
and were an essential element of the control system to
deter a potential violator of the agreement. Further, on-
site inspections were recommended by the Conference of
Experts in order to establish the origin or nature of
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On January 28tiJ at the 44tt meeting, the United
States representative outlined the United States position
on inspections and inspection groups. He said:
We believe in international staffing and we be-
lieve that no nationals of the State within which
an inspection group will operate should be included
as a member of the regular operating inspection
staff. We believe that the required number of in-
spection groups, fortified with the necessary pro-
fessionally trained personnel and their own technical
equipment, their own transportation, and their own
communication facilities, would strengthen the sci-
entific and technical capability of the group. We
believe that these groups should be formed on a
permanent basis and based so as to be immediately
available for dispatch to the sites of incidents
which could be suspected of being nuclear origin as
soon as possible when it is determined they are
required. We would like to have the permanently
established inspection groups authorized to initiate
prompt inspections when the research and analysis
center of the headquarters of the system concludes
that an event meets the criteria laid down in the
treaty and its annexes as constituting a requirement
for inspection. We believe that such prompt action
is the only possible way to implement the conclusions
of the Geneva experts* report which recommends timely
inspection of unidentified events which could be
suspected of being nuclear explosions. 24
The United States representative concluded by
saying the United States could not accept the Soviet pro-
posal for staffing the groups with nationals of the host
country with some "controllers" assigned by the control
organization. Further, it could not accept the Soviet
contention for groups to be established on an ad hoc basis
nor the procedures outlined by the Soviet Union for the
25dispatching of the teams.
Soviet critique of Western position . The Soviet














reply to this United States declaration centered around
the argument that the sending out of inspection groups was
a serious political decision that could not be taken auto-
matically. Further, they said, the reply of the country
being questioned must be considered before action is taken
and it would be "naive" to consider that an inspection
group would be able to go to the suspected place without
26permission of the suspected State.
Soviet views on inspection and inspection groups .
At the 45tu meeting on January 29, 1959, the Soviet repre-
sentative put forth the Soviet views on inspection and
inspection groups. He declared that inspectors should be
chosen from lists of names registered with the Control
Commission by each country and include foreigners as well
as nationals of the host country; most of the equipment,
except for some specialized equipment, would be furnished
by the country on whose territory the inspection was being
carried out; and an equal number of nationals should ac-
company the inspect: on group to represent the country
being inspected
.
The Soviet represented these views on inspection
groups was guided by two basic principles. First, the
individual character of each inspection; and second, the







with the government or authorities of the State on whose
27
territory the inspection is being carried out.
At the 48tt meeting on February 3, the Soviet repre-
sentative continued that the Soviet Union did not fear
inspection but demanded a veto over dispatch of inspection
groups because:
the fact is that, if decisions are reached by the
Control Commission without agreement between the
nuclear Powers, the despatch of inspecti: n teams
mi^ht be transformed into an instrument of the cold
war, a means of collecting intelligence data, and
therefore a source of danger to the interests of
national security. 28
Continuing debate . The debate continued but no
amount of Western discussion could change the Soviet view
that the reporting of an unidentified event was a political
accusation against the State on whose territory the event
occurred. Therefore, the Soviets contended, only the
Control Commission could dispatch an inspection team and
that agreement among the three Powers was necessary to
prevent abuse of the powers of the Commission.
The Western representatives considered on-site in-
spection to be a key factor of the control system to deter
or uncover would-be violators of the treaty. Therefore,
they considered that no nation should have the means of
obstructing the timely dispatch of inspection teams to
determine if a violation had occurred. They said, this
fact was concurred in by the Conference of Experts in their
conclusions and recommendations.
-^A.|.' J.^







However, although on-site inspection and inspection
groups were the topic of a great deal of discussion, not
much progress was made and the initial differences re-
mained at the end of this period.
Control Posts and Headquarters Staffing
The problem of staffing was also given a great deal
of discussion. The different positions were aired and
clarified, but wide differences on various aspects of
staffing were brought to light.
The Western Position . The initial position of the
West was that control posts be internationally staffed and
that no nationals of the host country could serve in a
technical or supervisory capacity.
At the 38tb meeting, the United States representa-
tive clarified the Western position when he said that
personnel at the control posts could come from any country
except the host country and that the restriction on na-
tionals only applied to the technical personnel. He
further stated the t the Western position on international
staffing was guided by three principles. First, that selec-
tion should be on the basis of technical qualifications and
skill. Second, on the widest basis of geographical dis-
tribution. Third, selection of candidates should come
from those countries which have the greatest interest,
this meant major selection from the three nuclear powers.
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As to actual selection, he said this should be done by the
Administrator within guidelines established by the Control
Commission. He added that the major nuclear powers might
be given the opportunity to satisfy themselves that the
operation of a control f)ost was in accordance with the
treaty by the use of observers.
On January 26ii3 at the 42nd meeting, the United
Kingdom representative submitted tables showing how dif-
ferent kinds of control posts might be staffed under the
Western proposals. The approximate formula used by the
United Kingdom in drawing up the tables was that one-half
of the technical personnel of the control post would be
from either side of the Nuclear Powers, depending on the
location of the control post. The other half would be
filled by other countries' nationals, except nationals of
the host country. Additionally, each post would have one
commxinication post filled by the Nuclear Powers and the
seven other communication posts would be filled by na-
tionals of other countries except nationals of the host
country. The twenty-one administrative and service posi-
tions would be filled by the host country. In countries
other thein the three Nuclear Powers, the distribution of
technical positions would be on the basis of thirds: one-
third for the United States or United Kingdom, one-third
























for the Soviet Union and the other third for other coun-
30tries other than the host coimtry.
The Soviet Position . The initial Soviet position
on staffing of control posts was that all nersonnel at the
control posts should be nationals of the host country
except for one "controller" to represent the other side.
The Soviet Union would not agree to having the ad-
ministrator select the staff and expressed the thought
that he could not be so fair minded so as to look after
31
the interests of all parties to the treaty.
The Soviet reaction to the proposed Western staff-
ing tables was that they would be half Western and half
international and this meant that it would be to the
advantage of the West. The Soviet representative at the
42nd meeting argued that
how was the host country to know that data was used
honestly or not fabricated for provocative pur-
poses.
However, he did propose, that the number of "controllers"
32
could be increased from one or tw© to four or five.
On February 2, 1959, at the 47t!» meeting, the Soviet
Union introduced their own staffing table. This table
showed that out of a total of thirty personnel at a control
post, there would be ten or eleven senior specialists, of
these four or five would be foreigners. The remaining
nineteen or twenty would be "technicians, operators or
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mech'inics." The Soviet representative remarked on the
basis of the Soviet staffing tables,
under our latest proposal 50 percent or nearly 50
percent of the highly qualified engineering personnel
who would act as controllers at each post would be
representatives of the other side - in other words
,
international or foreign personnel?^
Headquarters staffing . At the 46ti3 meeting on
January 30, 1959, the Soviet Union outlined its views for
the recruitment of technical personnel for the technical
set-up of the Control Commission. Recruitment, they said,
should be on the basis of parity,
namely, the staff of the technical set-up of the
Control Commission should be recruited from among a
number of specialists possessing the necessary
technical qualifications, so that half the positions
in each section of the technical set-up will be
filled with specialists recommended to the Control
Commission by the Soviet Union, while the other half
of the positions will be filled by specialists recom-
mended by the United States and United Kingdom. 34
They added that personnel recommended did not have to be
nationals of the sponsoring State.
On March 5, 1959, at the 58kb meeting, the United
States representative proposed tl.at the principle of intCi.-
national staffing could be applied by the Administrator to
appoint one-third of the staff from Soviet Union nationals,
one-third would be nationals of the United States or the
United Kingdom, and the remaining one-third "should be
international in character, exclusive of nationals of the
three nuclear powers." Further, he added that if a
xa
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supervisor in an important position were to be a national
35
of one side, the deputy could be a national of the other.
The Soviet Union rejected this Western proposal
after the United States declared that the last third would
be appointed strictly on the basis of technical competence
and geographical distribution. The Soviet representative
declared that this proposal would thus provide a means of
gaining control of the control organization by the Western
Powers and, therefore, the Soviet Union could not accept
Continuing Disagreement , The controversy continued
and the differences boiled down to disagreement over the
role of the staff in the control organization. The West
was primarily concerned with the obstruction or suppres-
sion of data if the posts were manned by nationals and the
means to build confidence in the system as much as possible,
The Soviet Union was concerned that if the posts were
staffed by primarily foreigners, they could fabricate or
misinterpret evidence detrimental to the host country and
in insuring equal representation on the headquarters staff
to prevent domination by one side or the other.
The Soviet Veto List
A controversy had arisen in the debate over Article
5 of the treaty which defined the procedural methods of
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the Control Coraraission, The Soviet Union wanted the Com-
mission to take action on substantive matters only with the
concurring vote of the three Nuclear Powers. The Western
Powers would not accept this in such general terms.
On January 30, 1959, the representative of the
Soviet Union submitted to the Conference for consideration
a draft amendment to the draft Article 5 on the procedures
of the Control Conunission* This amendment which became
known as the Soviet veto list read as follows:
Decisions of the Commission shall be made by not
less than four affirmative votes of the members of
the Commission, including the affirmative votes of
the original parties to the Treaty - the USSR, the
USA and the United Kingdom - on the following
matters
:
(a) revision of the Treaty and its annexes, and
adoption of amendments thereto;
(b) any accusation against a State of a violation
of the Treaty, and other matters relating to viola-
tions of the Treaty;
(c) appointments of the Administrator, defini-
tion or alteration of his terms of reference, recruit-
ment of the main engineering and technical personnel
of the Control Organization's headquarters, con-
trollers and inspection groups;
(d) adoption of a decision to dispatch inspection
groups for on-site investigation of an event sus-
pected of being a nuclear explosion, and adoption
of decisions on the basis of the results of such
investigation
;
(e) revision of existing methods and approval of
new methods of observation and types of apparatus
in the control system;
(f
)
determination of location sites of the control
posts and of the routes for control aircraft flights;
(g) budgetary, financial, administrative and
economic matters connected with the Control Organi-
zation's activities, including matters relating to
the recruitment and dismissal of the supporting and
auxiliary personnel.
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Decisions of the Commission on procedural matters
shall be made by a majority vote of the members of
the Commission.
37
Each maaaber of the Commission shall have one vote.
Western reaction . The initial Western reaction was
put forth by the United States representative when he said,
"I am sorry to have to say that many of our understandings
and misgivings about how the Soviet delegation would pro-
38pose to have the system work have been confirmed."
Soviet reply . The Soviet rebuttal to the initial
Western response was
that the Soviet Union has insisted ... that any
decision on the question of control must ensure
equality for the Soviet Union within the control
organization and equal possibilities for the Soviet
Union in regard to the implementation of control
through the organization which is to be set up.^^
Western critique of Soviet veto list . At the 49ai
meeting on February 5, the United Kingdom representative
made a detailed analysis of the Soviet veto proposal. He
indicated that the Western Powers recognized the possible
unanimous agreement on certain items on the list; namely,
revision or amendments of the treaty; revision of existing
methods and equipment; and determination of location sites
and routes of aircraft flights. However, he was very
explicit in rejecting the veto over treaty violations, on-
40
site inspections, and staffing.
Continuing debate . A great deal of debate followed
the introduction of the Soviet veto list and brought the
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negotiations to the first major crisis. This view was
clearly indicated by the United States representative on
February 5 when he said,
the issue is clear. That issue is whether the Soviet
Government is prepared to enter into a safeguarded
agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon
tests. If the Soviet Government continues to insist
on a voting formula in the commission which would
render the control organization utterly impotent,
then indeed we cannot see a successful outcome of
our negotiations .^-^
On March 2 at the 65tb meeting, the United Kingdom rep-
resentative summarized the Western position in reference
to the Soviet veto list. He said:
We agree with the Soviet delegation that the
unanimous consent of the three original parties should
be required for the entry into force of amendments to
the treaty and its annexes, including amendments af-
fecting the terms of reference of the administrator
as laid down in the treaty and also amendments which
would alter the actual treaty provisions on techniques
of control. But we do not agree that there should
be a vote in the commission on these subjects ...
should be covered by our draft article on amendments
to the treaty.
Secondly, we are prepared, siibject to certain
conditions which I have stated, to give the original
parties a veto on the appointment of the administra-
tor and on siting of control posts and routing of
aircraft flights.
Thirdly, we do not agree at all with the rest of
the Soviet list. In particular, we are absolutely
opposed to the provision ... relating to violations
of the treaty and to on-site inspection. On these
subjects we do not wish to possess the right of veto
ourselves. We want neither an individual right of
veto nor an automatic majority in the commission
which would give the United States and the United
Kingdom jointly a voting power equivalent to a veto.
We do not want that. IJtsither do we agree that the
Soviet Union should possess the unilateral right of
veto and thus have the unilateral right of imposing
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The Soviet Union replied on March 4 that they
agreed with some elements of the United Kingdom's statement
on March 2 and that there might be some basis for discus-
sion whereby the comprehensive list put forth by the Soviet
43Union would not be necessary*
With the introduction of the Soviet veto list, the
differences of positions in relation to the concept of the
organization, functions and duties of the control organiza-
tion became apparent between the two sides.
Nuclear Detonations for Peaceful Purposes
On January SOtb at the 46to meeting, the United
States representative introduced a draft treaty article
titled "Detonations for Peaceful Purposes," which outlined
the means to be incorporated into the treaty to permit
peaceful nuclear detonations under appropriate control
safeguards. Under this proposal, the nuclear devices to
be used in peaceful uses explosions would be placed in a
depository on or before the date of entry into force of
the treaty and then be kept under continuous surveillance
by representatives of the control organization until detona-
tion. The control representative could inspect any parts
that were replaced during the surveillance period, but they
would not be permitted to inspect the internal design of
the device. The proposal also provided that other devices
could be used, but that the party exploding the device
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must in this case permit full internal and external exami-
nation of the device by representatives of the other
44
original parties.
Soviet response to peaceful detonation proposal .
The initial Soviet response to the draft article on peace-
ful detonations of nuclear explosions was that they pre-
ferred to prohibit absolutely the explosion of nuclear
devices for any purposes whatsoever because the results of
any explosions, can be used in any case for further in-
creasing the destructive force of atomic and hydrogen
weapons. The Soviet representative further stipulated
that if the West demanded the right for peaceful explo-
sions then the Soviet Union would demand equal right to
the same number that the United States and the United
45Kingdom together detonate.
On February 23, the Soviet representative made a
formal reply to the proposal. He declared that the draft
article provides a loophole for a country to continue
nuclear weapons tests under the guise of nuclear explo-
sions for peaceful purposes. This could be accomplished,
he said, because the draft article does not allow internal
inspection of the mechanism; thus, external inspection
will not give the inspectors any guarantee that a new
nuclear device is being exploded in an old outward form.
The Soviet representative then introduced a Soviet draft
8^
-<,:•./-, fir- "-.diB i!t^'3fo arid- o-:^ o£'f.r3c:'"3:?:t islvo?. If-Jtrt.fcni *:•. i.-
» '^ a tj'^
-..-'-4




.m~i< JO bio nn ni br^bolqv: ^Xr^un
49
article concerning nuclear explosions for peaceful pur-
poses. This article proposed a limited and mutually
agreed number of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.
Such explosions to be carried out on a cne^for-one basis.
The following conditions would also have to be met: sub-
rait beforehand to the other original parties to the treaty
a complete description and the blueprints of the construc-
tion of the device to be exploded; permit the inspection
of the internal ?nd external construction of the device to
be exploded; carry out strict international control on the
site of the explosion with the mandatory participation of
representatives of all the States, original parties to the
treaty; submit all data obtained as a result of the explo-
46
sion to the original parties.
No further action on these two draft articles on
peaceful detonations of nuclear explosions.
Composition of the Control Commission
It had been previously agreed with the adoption of
Article 4 of the proposed treaty that the Control Commis-
sion would consist of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union,
and the United States, plus four other States chosen by
the Conference of Parties. At the 52nd meeting on February
11, the Soviet Union proposed that the four other seats be
distributed to give each side equal representation. They
recommended a 3-3-1 representation. By this formula the
;»^*^ » ;r.v.',' .^ s-t...
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Soviet Union would get three seats, the United States and
the United Kingdom three seats, and the last seat would be
47given to a neutral mutually acceptable to both sides.
Debate over this proposal . The Western answer to
this proposal was that the Western Powers v^ould be pre-
pared to discuss a mutually acceptable formula for composi-
tion of the Commission which would guarantee that neither
side would be able to dominate the Commission if the Soviet
Union would agree to drop the veto. The Western Powers
then proposed that the four seats be allotted, one to a
Soviet ally and one to a Western ally, and the other two
48
seats to countries not committed to either side.
The Soviet representative rejected this Western
proposal because it would give the West more seats than
the Soviet bloc. He reaffirmed the Soviet position that
the control organization should be organized on equal rep-
resentation or parity for the two sides. Therefore, he
said, the Soviet 3-3-1 proposal would be a more representa-
tive body to enjoy the appropriate authority in our inter-
49
national relations.
Thus, the Conference had two counter proposals on
the composition of the control Cc»nmission also.
Adoption of Draft Treaty Articles
On March 19tt at w..a 72nd meeting, the Conference
formally adopted three articles for the treaty on the
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prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. The article on
duration, the article on periodic review of the system,
50
and the article on registration of the treaty. These
articles were all procedural articles and did not consti-
tute any area of disagreement but they did add to the
growing list of treaty articles adopted by the Conference
as it moved closer to agreement.
Summary
At the close of this period, various elements of a
Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests were
beginning to take shape. Many draft articles had been put
before the Conference for consideration; some had already
been adopted without substantial disagreement. However,
the basic differences on the elements of control con-
tinued to keep the Conference from reaching full agreement
on a Treaty. Some progress had been made} many of the
differences had been brought out into the light j but many
of the issues were fundamental, and a great deal of nego-
tiation would be required to bring the positions closer so
that agreement could be reached.
IV. THE THIRD PERIOD APRIL 13, 1959 - MAY 8, 1959
Introduction
The third period commenced on April 13, 1959, after






vbsfsi/it h jDfi^^iainoj lawdii 6:xo^9<i
3il3
!?,li
;cyi .;V.>.U.r.^.-; . r-xr^v .^^
'.t T •--'*. "i -W.T
52
recessed on May 8tt, they held seventeen formal meetings.
The main topics of discussion during this period were the
phased treaty proposal submitted by the United States, the
Soviet annual quota of on-site inspections proposal, con-
tinuing debate on staffing, and the axscussion and adoption
of many minor articles of the proposed treaty.
Phased Agreement Proposal
At the 73rd meeting on April 13ti, the United States
representative reviewed the major obstacles to reaching an
agreement. He stated these as:
first, there is the issue of whether there will be
effective procedures to govern on-site inspection;
secondly, there is the general problem of voting
procedures in the control commission j and thirdly,
there is the problem of staffing of control posts.
As a means out of the impasse on the above issues, the
United States representative proposed:
(a) That we agree in principle that a total agreed
and inspected ban on nuclear tests will go into
effect in phases as agreement is reached in these
negotiations or in the control commission on the
relevant control mechanisms and as such agreements
are incorporated in the treaty.
(b) That the first phase, on which we could reach
early agreement, could consist of a cessation of
tests in the atmosphere, and if the USSR is willing,
under water.
(c) That we should continue here to try to re-
solve the political and technical problems ...
which must be solved if we are to have an effective
system for the detection of tests underground and at
very high altitudes.
(d) That joint studies, research and negotiation,
including such joint experiments as may be deemed
useful, should begin immediately. 51
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Soviet Reaction to phased agreeroent proposal . The
initial Soviet reaction to the United States phased agree-
ment proposal was to reject it because It would not stop
but allow testing in outer space ar^ underground. The
Soviet Union continued to press for a comprehensive
treaty.
At the 83rd meeting on April 27, the Soviet repre-
sentative read into the records of the Conference a letter
from Premier Khrushchev to President Eisenhower which
formally rejected the United States proposal for a phased
agreement and continued to emphasize the Soviet desire for
53
a comprehensive ban on all nuclear weapons tests.
Soviet Proposal of Annual Quota of On-Site Inspections
As a way out of the impasse over the dispatching of in-
spection teams and on-site inspections, the Soviet Union
introduced a proposal at the 83rd meeting on April 27 for
an cuinual quota of on-site Inspections. The Soviet rep-
resentative proposed that
we should agree to conduct each year a pre-determined
number of inspections, on the territory of the Soviet
Union and on that of the United States and Great
Britain and their possessions. The despatch of in-
spection groups must be based on objective readings
of instruments in the control posts indicating the
occurrence of events which may be suspected to be
nuclear explosions. ^"^
v/estern reaction . The Western reaction to this
proposal was that it was too general and did not clearly
eriT
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show the relationship to the Soviet request for a veto on
inspections and dispatching of on-site inspection teams.
However, it did offer possibilities, they said, if the
Soviet Union would drop its insistence on a veto on the
decision that inspection was justified or on the dispatch
of the inspection group. Further, they added, both the
nature of the criteria and the nijunber of inspections to be
required must depend upon the evaluation of the scientific
evidence available regarding detection of underground
tests
.
Soviet reply . On April 28, 1959, at the 84th meeting
the Soviet representative answered the questions posed by
the Western representatives in relation to the proposal.
He stated in relation to criteria, "the fixed number of
inspections we agree upon must be carried out on the basis
of instrument and equipment readir. ](S—in other words—on
the basis of technical criteria." On the question of voting
procedures in the control commission, he stated that,
once we agree on a specific number of inspections
per year for each side, the role of the control
commission will be very simple as regards the
despatching an inspection team .... We do not
in this case insist on the principle of unanimous
decision being applied in every single case as
betv;een the three nuclear powers.
In regards to the relationship between the events that can
be inspected and the quota in order to define this quota,
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political compromise, because any attempt to deal with
this question on purely technical lines would lead us down
a blind alley. "^^
'Vestern counter -reply . On May 8tb at the 89tfc meeting,
the United States representative made a formal reply to the
Soviet quota proposal. He made this general observation:
we do not yet have sufficient information on the
precise details of this Soviet proposal, either as
to its technical reliability or as to the relia-
bility of organizational arrangements for the over-
all control system, to enable us to judge whether
it would ensure effectiveness of control.
He reaffirmed the Western position that the level of in-
spection to take place must bear an appropriate relation-
ship to scientific facts and to the detection capabilities
of the control system, and that inspection would be under-
taken only for the purpose of identifying an unidentified
57disturbance which could be a nuclear explosion.
Continuing Discussion on Staffing
The discussions on staffing of control posts con-
tinued during this period, and the Soviet representative
clarified the Soviet position on this question during the
75ti5 meeting on April 15, 1959. He stated the Soviet posi-
tion on staffing was: first, that the foreign specialists
would have routine operational duties whicn depended on
the posts they occupied and for which they would be respon-
sible to the chief of post; second, that the foreign spe-







would, according to the positions they occupied, have
direct operational responsibility for functioning of in-
struments and reading of records ajid reporting on these;
third, that foreign specialists according to the position
they held, would be entitled to issue orders and instruc-
tions to the appropriate operators 2uid maintenance staff
at the control posts; fourth, that one of the senior
foreign specialists who holds the appropriate position
will be entitled to communicate directly with the control
commission if he has some individual view and disagrees
with conclusions or proposals of the chief of post; fifth,
on the question of the nationality of the head of the post,
he must be a national of the country in whose territory
58the post is situated.
Although views did clarify the Soviet position
somewhat , there was no appreciable headway toward reaching
agreement on this subject during this period. Nor did the
West submit any new proposals.
Adoption of Treaty Articles
The following treaty articles were adopted during
this period:
14 April - article on amendments
16 April - article on relationships with other
international organizations
17 April - preamble for the treaty.
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21 April - article on annexes
24 April - article on parties to the treaty
27 April - article on undertakings concerning co-
operation with the system
29 April - article on authentic texts
4 May - article on signature, ratification, accept-
ance and entry into force.
6 May -* article on privileges and invaunities
8 Hay - article on installation and operation of
the system in Parties territories
598 May - article on the Conference.
Summary
The adoption of the many above articles was a major
step forward, but they were all technical or procedural
articles over which there was very little disagreement.
With the adoption of these articles it narrowed down the
area of disagreement to the control organisation where the
major differences were .^'^volved.
At the request of the United States, the Conference
was recessed on May 8, to be reconvened at a date and time
60to be agreed upoi by the three delegations.
V. THE FOURTH PERIOD ^wi::: 8, 1959 - AUGUST 26, 1959
Introduction
The Conference reconvened on June 8, 1959, after a
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recess from May 8, 1959 • Discussion followed through
thirty-eight formal meetings before the Conference was
recessed on August 26, 1959, Primary discussion revolved
around the establishment and report of the Technical
Working Group on high altitude tests; new seismic data
submitted by the United States; the Soviet quota proposal;
Western staffing proposal; the budget and the veto; and
the preparatory commission proposal
•
Establishment and Report of the Technical Working Group I
During the recess, Premier Khrushchev on May 14,
1959, in a letter to President Eisenhower finally agreed
to the setting up of a Technical Working Group to make
recommendations on the detecting of nuclear explosions
61
above 30-50 kilometers.
At the 95to meeting on June 15, the Conference
formally agreed to establish a Technical Working Group of
experts from the three Nuclear Powers to study questions
relating to the detection of high altitude nuclear explo-
sions. Their term of reference was:
The Technical Working Group should assess the
capabilities and limitations of possible techniques
for the detection and identification of nuclear
explosions at high altitudes (More them 30-50 kilo-
meters) above the earth and, on the basis of the
discussions and conclusions of the Geneva Conference
of Experts, recommend techniques and instrumenta-
tion for consideration by the Conference for incor-
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Report of the Technical Working Group * The group
that was established was formally called Technical Working
Group I and submitted its report to the Conference at its
109tt meeting on July 10.
The report of the Group stated that they concluded
that the detection of high altitude nuclear explosions was
technically feasible. They made the following recommenda-
tions on techniques and instrumentation for the detection
and identification of nuclear explosions at high altitudes
above the Earth for consideration by the Conference for
incorporation in the detection and identification system,
1. A system should be established consisting of 5-6
earth satellites placed in orbits at altitudes of more than
30,000 kilometers. They should be equipped for the detec-
tion of gamma rays, delayed gamma rays, neutrons, and soft
X-rays
•
2. For a low altitude earth satellite system two
systems were recommended:
a. A system of 6-10 satellites appropriately
placed in near circular orbits at altitudes of 500-700
kilometers. This would assure surveillance below an alti-
tude of 2,000 kilometers and would be equipped for the
same detection as the high altitude system.
b. A system of 2-4 satellites appropriately
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kilometers. This would assure surveillance below an alti<-
tude of 10,000 kilometers. They would be equipped for the
same detection as the high altitude system.
3. A satellite should be placed into an appropri-
ate elliptical orbit around the earth to provide maximum
coverage of the region in the earth's magnetic field in
which electron trappings occur.
4. To extend the system to provide increased cover-
age of the regions behind the moon and the sun away from
the earth, a system of four satellites should be placed in
appropriate solar orbits, of radius approximating that of
the earth around the sun, when the state of the technology
permits.
5. Each satellite should carry instrumentation to
achieve the maximum reliability and range of detection of
nuclear explosions in space and carry apparatus for check-
ing the performance of the equipment of the satellite.
All required data, including levels of background, signals,
and performance data should be transruitted to a suitable
number of control posts. Suitable equipment for receiving
and analyzing data should be installed in these control
posts in order to ensure the rapid and reliable analysis
of signals received from the satellite.
6. Additionally, the following techniques and
instrumentation should be installed at ground posts:
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a« Multiple channel optical detectors.
b* Optical equipment suitable for observing
fluorescence in the upper atmosphere.
c. Equipment suitable for measuring the ab-
sorption of cosmic radio noise in the ionosphere.




Acceptance of the findings of the Group by the
Conference . At the I2lst meeting on August 10, the Soviet
representative stated that the Soviet Government "agrees
to the inclusion of the methods and instrumentation recom-
mended in the report of the experts ... in the system of
64
control over the cessation of nuclear tests."
The representative of the United Kingdom stated that
the United Kingdom accepts the report of the high-
altitude Working Group as a correct technical assess-
ment of possible techniques for the detection and
identification of high-altitude nuclear explosions
in the light of scientific knowledge available at
the time of the Working Group's session.
Further, he stated that the United Kingdom was "prepared
to take part in discussions regarding the embodiment in
the treaty of provisions on high-aititude controls, in the
65light of the recommendations contained in the report."
On August 26tb at the 127tb meeting, the United States
representative stated that
the United States accepts the report as a correct
technical assessiuent of the capabilities and limi-












identification of high-altitude nuclear explosions
in the light £f presently available scientific
knowledge. /Further, he sa,Ld7 the United States is
now considerTng the complex problems of the timing
and scope of the high-altitude detection system to
be established on the basis of the aforesaid report,
problems which are brought into focus in translating
into specific treaty language the results of the
broad technical survey of feasibilities and alterna-
tives contained in the report. ^^
Although the report of the experts was accepted by
the Conference no further action was taken during this
period except that the United States said that it would be
incorporated into Annex I on the Detection and Identifica-
tion System which was proposed by the United States on
December 16, 1958.^^
New Seismic Data Submitted by the United States
The discussion of new seismic data was again rein-
troduced into the meetings when on June 12, 1959, at the
94tb meeting, the United States representative introduced
the findings of the Berkner Panel. This panel of United
States experts was established by President Eisenhower's
Special Assistant for Science and Technology under the
chairmanship of Dr. Berkner. The panel was to study the
possibility of improving the Geneva system within existing
technology and through a program of seismological research.
They would also investigate the possibility that under-
ground tests might be successfully concealed. The report










research programs in seismology. They concluded that this
program could improve the detection and identification
system to bring the system to the capability as was origi-
nally estimated by the 1958 Conference of Experts. On the
basis of this report, the United States representative
proposed that the Conference establish a technical study
group to review the identification and detection system in
68
the light of the new data,
Soviet reaction . The Soviet representative comment-
ing on the new data said, "we take an unfavourable view of
the question of revising the experts recommendations on
69
underground nuclear explosions,"
On June 17ts, the Soviet representative formally
replied to the United States proposal for the establishment
of a technical study group to consider the new data. He
said "the only purpose that can be served by the Western
insistence on a technical study group to study new data
was to drag out the negotiations," Further he stated that
the Soviet Union recognized that there will always be
means of improving the system in the future and that is
why they adopted the article providing that the mechanism
of detection and identification of nuclear explosions
shall be revised every two years. He concluded by saying
that the Soviet Union wishes to reach an agreement, "and
Id
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that is why we axe insisting on the conclusion of a treaty
70based on the data already agreed between our governments,"
Soviet Qn-'Site Inspection Quota Proposal
On July S^
.
the Soviet representative introduced a
draft article incorporating its views it had put forward
on April 27, 1959. It read as follows:
For the purpose of preventing possible violations
by States of their obligations under this treaty,
there shall, in addition to the network of control
posts, be carried out on-site inspection of uniden-
tified events suspected of being nuclear weapon
explosions*
1. In order to carry out on-site inspection of
such unidentified events on the basis of criteria
set forth in Article , there may be made in each
year on the territory of each of the original parties
not more than
^___^
inspections at any place where,
according to readings of instruments at control posts,
an unidentified event suspected of being a nuclear
weapon explosion has occurred.
2. Inspections under paragraph 1 of this article
shall be carried out -
(a) on territories under the j iirisdiction or
control of the United States or the United Kingdcwi,
at the request of the Soviet Union;
(b) on territories of the Soviet Union, at the
request of the United States or the United Kingdom.
Inspection groups within the specified quota shall
be despatched by the Commission without delay, and
agreement between the original parties to the treaty
shall not be required. 71
No further action was taken on this Soviet proposal
during this period.
Staffing Proposals
Discussion of the problem of the Soviet veto over
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the Soviet position in reference to the veto, when on June
16tt he said, "it would depend to a considerable degree on
the kind of agreement we reach on the staffing of control
72posts."
United States introduces new proposal . At the June
22nd meeting, the United States representative stated that
the United states was prepared to consider any proposal
the Soviet Union might make for the inclusion of a strictly
limited number of host country personnel in the staffs of
control posts, "perhaps one operator for each of the four
73principal methods would be reasonable."
The Soviet representative rejected this proposal
because it would still make the majority of the technical
staff on a control posts foreigners. He added that , in an
effort to reach agreement on this question, the Soviet
Union was prepared to increase the number of foreign
specialists in its proposal, to six or seven at each ccn-
74trol post.
United Kingdom submits new Western proposal . On
July 20tb at the 113tb meeting, the representative from the
United Kingdom introduced a new Western proposal on staff-
ing of control posts. He said, "the Western delegations
are prepared to settle the question of technical staffing
at control posts in the territories of the original parties
on the basis of an equal division among the three elements
involved." By this proposal he said, one-third of the
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personnel would be from the Soviet Union, one-third from
the United States and the United Kingdom, and one-third
from countries other than the original parties. Further,
he said, the head of the control post would be from one of
75
the original parties except the host country.
The United States representative added, in replying
to a Soviet question about the third-third, that the only
restriction on the third-third would be that they could
76
not come from one of the three original parties.
Soviet Union submits new staffing proposal . On
July 24S1> the Soviet representative said that the Soviet
Union was prepared to increase the number of foreign
specialists at control posts to ten to agree with the
number recommended in the Western proposal for the "other
side." He added that the Soviet Union could not accept
the use of non-original states for one-third representa-
tion on control posts. He said that the non-nuclear
States, "are not demanding at all to be included as staff
members of control posts situated on the territory of the
three nuclear powers." However, he did agree that two or
three neutrals could be included in the ten foreign
77
specialists proposed by the Soviet Union.
Although these counter-proposals did narrow the
differences, it did not bring about agreement on this
question during this period.
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Preparatory Commission
On July 27tb at the lX5ti> meeting, the United States
representative introduced a draft Annex III for the treaty
on the functions of the Preparatory Commission, The pro-
posal stated that the preparatory commission will consist
of one representative from each of the original parties to
the treaty and will come into existence the day after the
treaty has been signed by the original parties. The com-
mission will function until the control commission has been
established in accordance with the treaty. Further, once
certificates of ratification have been deposited by the
three original parties, the preparatory commission should
be enlarged by adding four other States to be chosen by
the original parties from the States that have ratified the
treaty. Once the preparatory commission has been enlarged
after ratification, the commission should take on the
powers of the control commission as specified in the treaty.
An executive secretary for the preparatory commission will
be appointed by the three original parties and would act
in a similar capacity as the administrator once the treaty
has been ratified and the preparatory commission was en-
larged. The preparatory commission would end when the
Conference of Parties met and elected the four non-
78permanent members of the Commission.




the draft Annex III, no decision was taken on it during
this period.
Status of the Soviet Veto List
On July 6tJ) at the 107tb meeting, the representative
from the United Kingdom made a detailed analysis of the
present status of the Soviet veto list which had been
introduced as an amendment to Article 5 of the treaty on
79January 30t^* He stated that item (a) on amendments had
been dropped after adoption of the article on amendments.
Item (b) on treaty violations had presumably been dropped
after the Soviet representative's statement on June 30tt when
he said that he was ready to eliminate that item on the
understanding that he correctly interpreted the Western
position regarding the functions of the control organiza-
tion. He said he interpreted this as
the function of the control system and its organs
is not to make accusations against States but to
bring forward facts, or the scientific evaluation
of facts, which might establish whether a clandes-
tine nuclear explosion has taken place somewhere .SO
Item (c) the representative from the United Kingdom con-
tinued, which dealt with the Administrator and his staff,
was still unsettled, but it had heen agreed that the Admin-
istrator should be selected by agreement among the three
81
original parties. Item (d) which dealt with on-site
inspections was still unsettled} however, acceptance of
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the Soviet quota proposal would settle this item. Item
(e) which dealt with revision of control methods and tech-
nical problems had apparently been settled with adoption
of the amendment article. Item (f ) which concerned sites
6f control posts and special aircraft routes was appar-
ently in agreement that the host country should have a
veto over sites and routes but that acceptable alternates
should be offered. Item (g) was a general item which
dealt with budgetary, financial, and administrative and
economic matters, including matters dealing with recruit-
ment and dismissal of auxiliary and support personnel was
also apparently in agreement. The Western powers inter-
preted the Soviet position as seeking a veto for the
original parties in the commission as regards the budget
as a whole, the scale of contributions, the acceptance of
contributions in kind, and loans contracted by the organi-
zation. Further, he said, they interpreted that the words
"administrative and economic matters" referred to the same
items
.
Soviet critique of status of the veto list . On
July 17tt at the 112tl> meeting, the Soviet representative
commented on the representative of the United Kingdom's
analysis of the status of the Soviet veto list. He stated
that "the position of the Soviet Union is that all basic
questions concerning the work of the control organization
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should be settled by agreement between the three nuclear
Powers negotiating here at the present times the Soviet
Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. This
agreement must either be manifested in the control com-
mission during the operational work of the control organi-
zation, or written explicitly into the treaty which we are
drafting here." He continued that the analysis was cor-
rect in relation to items (a), (b), (d), (e), and (f). As
to the two remaining items (c) and (g), he reaffirmed the
Soviet position on these items. Under item (c), he agreed
with the West that the Administrator should be appointed
by the unanimous consent of the three original parties.
As to the selection of the staff of all components of the
control organization, the Soviet Union was willing to drop
its veto if the staff of the organization was distributed
according to quotas or to some kind of proportional per-
centage. In relation to item (g) which concerned budgetary,
financial, administrative and economic matters, he declared,
that the Soviet Union is ready to eliminate from this item
matters relating to the recruitment and dismissal of the
supporting and auxiliary personnel if the treaty lays
down that they shall be nationals of the country on whose
territory a control post is located or an inspection group
will operate. In regards to matters of financial respon-
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the original parties to the treaty, he said, they must be
settled by agreement between the three original parties to
83the treaty.
Summary
This period did see a narrowing of the issues sepa-
rating the negotiators, but it also brought these issues
into sharper focus* It also emphasized the major obstacles
to reaching an agreement.
On August 11, 1959, at the 122nd meeting, the Con-
ference adopted an amendment to draft Article 3, which
dealt with the Control Organization, providing for the
location of the headquarters of the control organization
84to be located at Vienna, Austria.
On August 26tb after the 127tt meeting, the Conference
recessed to enable the delegations to take part in the
forthcoming Fourteenth General Assembly meeting of the
United Nations , and it was agreed to resume negotiations
on October 12, 1959.
VI. THE FIFTH PERIOD OCTOBER 27, 1959 -
DECEMBER 19, 1959
Introduction
On October 27, 1959, the Conference reconvened
following a recess from August 26tb. Twenty-three formal
S,.-* ,^s
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meetings were held during this period until the Conference
recessed for the holidays on December 19tt, The major
topics discussed were: the establishment of and report of
the Technical Working Group II; functions of the commis-
sion and the administrator; the Soviet package proposal;
and the adoption of the draft annex on the preparatory
commission.
Technical Working Group II
At the 128tt meeting on October 27, the United
States representative placed the failure of the Conference
to reach agreement on the issue of effective control. He
stated
,
in particular we want to know how we can gain as-
sursmce as to the reliability of methods for the
detection and identification of disturbances below
the earth's surface so as to determine which are
natural seismic events and which may be nuclear
explosions*
He continued, "no party to the treaty can be allowed to
have a veto over the operation of the machinery, because
this would vitiate the chances of effective control," The
United States representative then set forth what the
United States believes are at least three requirements for
effective control:
1. The system of control roust be capable of
detecting nuclear explosions prohibited by the
treaty.
2. All events which cannot be identified as
natural by the system must be eligible for
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inspection even though all unidentified events
will not in fact be inspected.
3. The number of inspections roust be related
to the number of unidentified events. The inspec-
tion bridge, must vary in length with the gap
between events detected and events identified.
He concluded his remarks by putting forward another
appeal to the Soviet Union to agree to full exploration of
All the available technical information and studies, and
of their implications for the effectiveness of the control
system.
Soviet reaction . The initial Soviet reaction was a
renewed appea. for acceptance of its quota system of in-
spection basec on a small previously agreed niimber.
On October 29ti>, the Soviet representative stated in
reference to effective control "that you can never reach
the absolute point where each and every explosion under
any conditions cam be detected." He went on to say that
"this means that there has to be some kind of political
agreement here on the cessation of tests." Further, he
said, that the proper place to review new data was by the
preparatory commission and the control organization which
would be established after the treaty was signed.
However, after extended discussion, the Soviet
Union finally did agree to convene a technical working
group at the 137tb meeting on November 29, 1959. The term
of reference agreed upon for the technical working group
was:
t\
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The Technical Working Group of experts shall
consider the question of the use of objective in-
strument readings in connection with the selection
of an event which cannot be identified by the in-
ternational control organ and which could be suspected
of being a nuclear explosion, in order to determine
a basis for initiating on-site inspections. As part
of their work, the experts, proceeding from the dis-
cussions and the conclusions of the Geneva Conference
of Experts, shall consider all data and studies
relevant to the detection and identification of
seismic events and shall consider possible improve-
ments of the techniques and instrumentation.
The Group will meet in Geneva on 25 November and
report to the conference by 11 December 1959.87
Report of the Technical Working Group II . On
December 19, 1959, at the 150ti meeting, the Group submitted
its report to the Conference. Their report stated that
there was "disagreement regarding the interpretation of
the new data from the Hardtack experiments and regarding
the question of de-coupling." Agreement was reached on
possible improvements of technique and instrumentation.
There was also disagreement concerning the objective in-
strument readings in connection with the selection of an
event which cannot be identified by the international con-
trol organ and which could be suspected of being nuclear
explosion, in order to determine a basis for initiating
88
on-site inspections.
The Soviet representative of the Technical Working
Group II read a long statement to explain the Soviet posi-
tion in the disagreement over the new data from the
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were submitted by the United States. He downgraded the
reliability of the data and concluded that after extensive
analysis of the data and supporting evidence, that it did
not change the conclusions reached by the 1958 Geneva
Conference of Experts and had, in fact, supported them.
Further, he declared, it showed that there were less un-
identified events than the Conference of Experts had
estimated. He concluded that because of this disagreement
over the new data submitted by the United States, the Group
was unable to reach agreement over the criteria to be used
for the sele ;tion of an unidentified event for on-site
89inspection.
The United States representative rebutted the state-
ment of the Soviet representative and defended the United
States argument that the use of the first motion for
identification of an underground nuclear explosion was not
as reliable as the Conference of Experts of 1958 had con-
cluded and the Soviet experts still contended was true and
supported by the United States data. He further defended
the United States conclusion that there would be about
15,000 earthquakes of 1 kiloton or more per ye^o: and about
2,000 of about 20 kilotons. On the matter of criteria he
said, "that the Soviet proposal would have classified such
events as the recent United States underground nuclear
test explosions, which ranged up to 19 kilotons in yield,
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as natural esorthquakes • " He concluded his statement by
saying that
the problem of formulation of criteria is a strictly
technical problem. If technical knowledge permits
one to identify a large fraction of seismic events
as earthquakes, then it is clearly on advantage to
the control system. If technical knowledge does not
permit this, then seismic events must remain eligible
for inspection. Determination of the means of se-
lecting events to be inspected must be Igft for
further consideration of the Conference ."^
Thus the long-awaited technical study of the control
problem which was so actively pushed by the West ended
without agreement and instead of solving the problem on
technical grounds, it put it back in the hands of the
Conference to try to reach a political settlement.
Functions of the Control Commission and the Administrator .
The discussion also revolved around draft articles VI, on
the functions of the control commission, and IX on the
functions of the Administrator and his staff. These arti-
cles had been proposed by the United States on December 15,
1959, and revised on July 1, 1959.^"^
On December 1, 1959, the Soviet representative sub-
mitted an amended proposal for draft article VI on the
functions of the Commission. This proposal provided for,
the appointment of two deputy administrators in addition
to the administrator, one from each side, and they and
the administrator would be appointed by the Commission by
a majority vote including the affirmative votes of the
3^
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three original parties; decisions of the Commission on the
location of elements of the System and on the determina-
tion of specific routes of special aircraft flights for
the collection of air samples shall be taken with the
agreement of the government concerned} the commission in
accordance with "Article " shall instruct the Adminis-
trator as to the dispatch of inspection teams for the veri-
fication of events suspected of being nuclear explosions}
and the Commission shall establish procedures in accord-
ance with "Article " for the surveillance and observa-
92tion of nuclear detonations for peaceful purposes.
At tne 142nd meeting on December 3, the Soviet
representative introduced an amended proposal for Article
IX on the functions of the Administrator and his staff.
The proposal set forth that: the Administrator shall be
responsible to the Commission and is directly subordi-
nated to it in all his acts; the Deputy Administrators
appointed under Article VI would assist the Administrator
in his day-to-day work and they shall be entitled to
equally participate in questions for decision by the
Administrator; the Administrator is authorized to develop
research programs and make recommendations to the Com-
mission for improvement of the system; and authorizes the
Administrator, upon instruction and under procedures
approved by the Commission, to take the necessary steps to
TV
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dispatch inspection teams and to carry out special air-
craft flights in accordance with Annex I (the detection
93
and identification system).
Western reaction . On December 4U>, the United States
representative made a preliminciry review of the Soviet
proposals. He said his general reaction was that the pro-
posals change quite drastically the initial Western pro-
posals. In relation to the functions of the Administrator,
he commented that
it seeks to place the administrator in the rather
menial position of a person closely akin to a servant
of the controo- commission who could act solely to
carry out a constant flow of directives which it
seems would be issued by the commission on a day-to-
day basis.
He added that the United States feels that this adminis-
trator "must be given a certain amount of latitude in
carrying out his vital functions , and that is why we have
given him sepsirate terms of reference in Article IX," He
continued
,
we do not deny, nor shall we, that the control com-
mission will occupy the predominant place in the
organization, but we do not feel that the supervisory
functions exercised by the control commission require
that the administrator be held in such close daily
check.
In regards to the need for the two deputies, he said, "he
strongly questions the need to put the appointment of the
two deputies into the treaty," On the question of special
aircraft flights, he said that "we do not think that
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matters of on-site inspections and special flights should
be treated together." Fiirther, the administrator should
handle the dispatch of aircraft flights without separate
and specific control commission action, through procedures
94
set up by the Control Commission,
Soviet Union modifies proposal on function of the
Commission . On December lOtb at the 146tb meeting, the
Soviet representative amended its proposal on the selec-
tion of sites and aircraft flights which were to be taken
with the agreement of the government concerned to read:
The Commission shall decide on the location of
elements of the System and on the determination of
definite flight patterns for special air sampling
flights. Before so deciding, the Commission shall
agree upon the location of elements of the System
or upon the flight pattern for the special flight
with the government of the country concerned, which
shall have an opportunity either to approve the
proposal of the Commission for such location or
flight pattern or to propose another location or
flight pattern satisfying the scientific and tech-
nical requirements. ^5
The United States representative commenting on this
amendment of the functions of the control commission,
repeated his previous request that the question of special
aircraft flights should be treated separately from the
location of control posts.
Agreement on certain paragraphs of articles VI and
IX. On December lltli at the 14 7tb meeting, the Conference
provisionally approved certain paragraphs of draft articles
VI and IX on the functions of the Commission and the
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Administrator. The paragraphs approved were:
Paragraph 1 of Article IX~Punctions of the Admin-
istrator and his Staff—which read:
The administrator shall be the chief executive
officer of the system and the head of the staff of
the control organization. He shall be responsible
to the comiriission and under its supervision shall
carry out its policies and directives. He shall
have executive responsibility for the installation
and operation of the system under procedures and
standards established by the commission. He shall
provide to the commission such advice, reports and
assistance as the commission may request.
Paragraph 5 of Article IX, which read:
The administrator shall develop and arrange for
the execution of a programme of research and de-
velopment .
Paragraph 9 of Article VI~Functions of the Control
Commission—which read:
The Commission shall establish procedures for the
implementation of article on detonations for
peaceful purposes .^^
Soviet Package Proposal
On December 14tii at the 148tb meeting, the Soviet
Union submitted a proposal to settle the four major ob-
stacles to agreement. The Soviet representative stated
these were: inspection, staffing of control posts, the
composition of the commission, and voting procedures in
the commission on budgetary and financial questions. He
declared that the Soviet Union was prepared to maice major
concessions on other issues if the West would accept the
08
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Soviet proposal of 3-3-1 composition of the Conunission.
Specifically, he said that the Soviet Union would be pre-
pared to accept the United States proposal for staffing by
thirds, one-third of the specialists made up of the coun-
try on v>?hose territory the post was located, one-third of
the specialists from the other side and one-third of the
specialists from non-nuclear powers. As to the distribu-
tion of the last third, he proposed that this be dis-
tributed by one-third to countries allied to the Soviet
Union, one-third to countries allied to the United States
and the United Kingdom, and one-third to neutral States,
Further, he said, the Soviet Union would agree to have
decisions on an itemized budget made by a two-thirds
majority of the Commission, providing that the treaty laid
down the share of contributions to be borne by the three
97
original parties to the treaty.
Western Comments on the proposal . The United King-
dom representative asked the Soviet representative whether
there was any change in the Soviet position on the na-
tionality of the head of the control post. The Soviet
representative replied that he must be a national of the
98
country within which the post is located.
The United States representative only commented that
the Soviet proposal of 3-3-1 composition of the control
commission would make the two-thirds vote on the budget an
ro
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"academic question" because if one side disagrees with the
budget, then that is an automatic veto, "since three from
seven leave four." Further, he said, in reference to con-
tributions that he interpreted this to mean it would be
99
written as a percentage rather than a flat sum.
There was no further discussion on this proposal
during this period.
Draft Annex on the Preparatory Commission
On November 30tb at the 140ti meeting, the conference
adopted the draf L: annex III submitted by the United States
on July 27, 1959, without any m.i^or modifications.
Annex III set forth the composition and functions of the
preparatory commission.
Summary
During this period very little progress was made
towards reaching agreement. The failure of the Technical
Working Group II to reach agreement on criteria for
selecting an event for on-site inspections impeded the
progress of the Conference. Although there was agreement
on certain paragraphs of the articles in relation to the
functions of the Commission and the Administrator, there
still remained many elements of disagreement in these
articles. The adoption of Annex III on the preparatory
commission did progress the Conference somewhat. However,
with the adoption of articles and annexes on which there
S8
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was little or no disagreement, it narrowed the remaining
issues dovm to fundamental principles on which there was
not much agreement since the negotiations began*
The Conference recessed on December 19 fox' the
holidays to be reconvened on January 12, 1960
•
VII. THS SIXTH PERIOD JANUARY 12, 1960 -
APRIL 14, 1960
Introduction
The sixth period commenced in Gcmeva when the Con-
ference reconvened on January 12, I960. Forty-eight
sieetings were held until the Conference again recessed for
Saster on April 14, I960. Discussion during these meetings
revolved aroiond the technical system, the United States
proposal for a phased treaty, inspection criteria, seismic
research program, and special aircraft sampling flights.
Dispute over the Technical System
At the opening meeting on January 12tb, the United
States representative concentrated his remarks to discus-
sion of the technical system. He said that the Conference
had heen confronted with two different catagories of
issues: one technical and the other political. He con-
tinued that for the past year the Conference had concen-
trated its attention on the political issues and a great
amount of progress had been made. He added that in the
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area of the technical system there has developed a real
impasse* Further » he said that United States scientists
could no longer accept the conclusion of the 1958 Con-
ference of Z- perts to the effect "that 90 percent of all
seismic events above an equivalent yield of 5 kilotons
could be identified by the technique of using the sign of
the first motion*'* The United States scientists he said,
concluded "that the number of seismic events of various
equivalent yield ranges with which the control system will
have to deal on a worldwide basis is 50 to 100 percent
larger than appeared to be the case at the 1958 Geneva
Conference of Experts." He added, r. /ever,
th&t; the niamber of events is not in itself crucial
for our work* Our problem is to find some means
of sifting through the maxe of seismic events to
identify as many as possible as earthquakes, so
that only a residue will remain unidentified and
hence subject to suspicion as possible nuclear ex-
plosions*
He continued that the device for achieving some measure of
identification has been called either "objective instru-
ment readings" or "criteria" and the failure of the Tech-
nical Working Group II to reach agreement in this respect
"threatens to have the most discouraging consequences for
the completion of our work here." He concluded by saying
a Treaty which purports to control a prohibition
on all underground nuclear weapon tests must rest
on a basis of agreement regarding criteria or ob-
jective instrument readings. It must establish














when on*-site inspections should i>^ initiated and
how they should be carried out.^0^
Soviet Proposal on the Technical Problem * On
January 13 at the 152nd meeting, the Soviet representative
put forth a proposal as a means out of the technical system
impasse* He proposed that the control commission, which
is the main supervising organ of the control organization,
will have the opportunity of organizing fxirther research
aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the laethods of
identification and of the sensitivity of the instruments
and equipment. He continued that
the Control Cc^nnission could also be entrusted with
the further study of controversial scientific tech-
nological questions on which agreement has not yet
been reached between our experts and on which the
views of the United States and Soviet experts differ*
AM far as relating inspections to unidentified events, the
Soviet representative stated "that there should be inspec«»
tions, that they should be carried out,'* but the question
must be solved politically because a technical approach
would lead us to a deadlock* He further c<»!«iented that
the difficulties over criteria are artificially
created owing to the differences of approach in
this matter* If we reach an agreement on a quota
of inspections then, of course, no special difficul-
ties will arise in our negotiations on the question
of criteria* We shall quickly be able to find the
approach, or define the criteria, which will have
to be used in order that each of the sides may carry
out the agreed inspection quotas* ^02
United States Proposal for a Phased Treaty
On February 11, 1960, at the 170tt meeting, the
..r..£r -Jji-.
»rti tpft' "^ i'
86
Iftiltttd States representative introduced a new phased
treaty proposal. He proposed a phased agreement on the
cessation of nuclear tests
t
the first phase of the agreement should provide
for the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests in
the earths atmosphere, in the oceans, and in outer
space up to the greatest height with respect to
which agreement can be reached on the installation
of effective control.
This phase would also include provision for the cessation
of underground nuclear tests down to the "Imprest limit of
sise, or threshold," for v4iich adequate control is now
feasible* This **threshold** would be defined in terms of
the magnitude of seismic events detected by the control
system. He said,
there wculd be a direct relationship between the
number of on<-site inspections of detected but
unidentified seismic events of magnitudes greater
than the threshold magnitude and the number of
such events which occur.
Therefore, he continued,
within the limits of the technical capability of the
agreed control system, the selection of the threshold
will depend upon the level of inspection acceptable
to the three original parties*
He further stated that the treaty would provide for the
evolutionary and progressive lowering of the threshold
magnitude as the detection and identification capabilities
of the system were improved through the utilization of






Further, he proposed that a program of joint research be
Instituted as rapidly as can be agreed upon* As for cri-
teria, he proposed that the criteria proposed by the
experts of the United States at the Technical Working
Group II be used as an initial criteria* He continued
that, if this was not agreeable, then "the agreed level of
inspection be expressed simply as a percentage of all
seismic events above the agreed threshold magnitude which
are located by the system*" He added that the question of
whether the level of inspection should be expressed as a
percentage or expressed as a fixed numerical quota *'is of
secondary importance*'* The primary consideration, he said,
is that the level of inspection must bear a relationship
to the scientific facts* Specifically, the United States
representative proposed the adoption of a threshold of
magnitude 4*75* Thus, he continued,
depending on whether we are able to reach agreement
on criteria, either all seismic events of magnitude
greater than 4*75 located by the system would be
eligible for inspection or, alternatively, only
those events above such magnitude left unidentified
after the application of the United States criteria
would be eligible for inspection* In the former
case, we would propose that 20 percent of all events
located by the system would be subject to inspection
|
in the latter case we would propose that 30 percent
of unidentified events be insp€ftcted* On the basis
of the best estimates provided by United States
scientists, and assuming the existence of control
posts initially only on the territories of the
three original parties, it would appear that either
formula applied to events of magnitude 4*75 or greater
would result in about twenty inspections in the
Soviet Union in the average year* 103
T8
. yiis /u. noi.nL
88
Later in the discussions In answer to a Soviet
question in regards to tests below the threshold, he
stated '^that tests in the underground cmvironisent lower
than the seismic magnitude of 4.75 would be excluded from
the first phase of the proposal and that there would be no
104
moratorium on these tests in the treaty*"
Soviet Reaction to the proposal * The initial Soviet
reaction was that the proposal did not require the control
system that was recommended by the Conference of Experts
in 1958 because the preBent national systems can detect
explosions above 4*75 magnitude in all environments. He
stated later that "if the United States proposal is adopted
it will preserve and even legalise the possibility of con-
tinuing the nuclear arms race, of improving various types
105
of nuclear weapons by underground testing."
Soviet Union Proposes Temporary Criteria
As a means out of the impasse over technical cri-
teria, the Soviet representative at the 172nd meeting on
February 16tt introduced a proposal on "temporary criteria."
The "temporary criteria" he proposed wast
1. An event may be regarded as suspicious and
subject to inspection only if it is located according
to the data of several sxirrounding control posts
within an area up to approximately 200 square kilo-
metres, in accordance with the recommendations of the
1958 experts* report.
2. A located seismic event shall be ineligible
for inspection if, and only if, it fulfills one or
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(a) its depth of focus is established as
below 60 kilonetres;
(b) its epicentral location is established
to be in the deep ocean and the event is unaccom-
panied by a hydroacoustic signal consistent with
the seismic epicentre and origin timei
(c) it is established within 48 hours to be
a foreshock by the occurranee /sic7 of a larger
event within the accuracy of the determination of
the two epicentre;
(d) it is established to be an aftershock
of a seismic event of at least magnitude 6 which
has been clearly identified as an earthquake by
the criteria of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above*
3» The basic data for all criteria will be
obtained from the control posts, supplementary data
not involved in determining the eligibility of a
particular event for inspection may be derived
from national stations*
The Soviet representative continued that the Soviet
IMion would agree to the dispatch of inspection teams
during the initial period of the operation of the control
organization within quotas agreed upon on the basis of the
above criteria* He added further,
the scientists of the Soviet Union and the Western
Powers would continue the joint study of the ques-
tion of criteria so as to eliminate any existing
difference of opinion and work out and agree upon
a complete set of scientifically based criteria
which vould replace the simplified temporary
criteria* 106
At the 173rd meeting, in answer to Western ques-
tions in relation to the proposal, the Soviet representa-
tive said, "the joint research program would be stipulated
in the treaty and would begin as stipulated in the treaty*"
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Western critique of Soviet criteria propogaX ^ At
the ISOti) meeting t the United States representative pre^'
sented his formal critique of the Soviet temporary criteria
proposal* He stated that the United States considers the
criteria generally acceptable technically, with qualifica-
tions* The qualifications he put forth weret
(1) It will be necessary to reach a satisfactory
und€urstanding that if progress in research does not
lead to agreement on improved criteria by the end
of the initial treaty phase the use of the criteria
adopted by this Conference will continue, or some
alternative arrangement will be made to ensure that
the control organization will not be left without
criteria*
(2) 200 square kilometres is too small an area
to use as the area of uncertainty in locating a
seismic event with the control system* The U*S*
position is that the area eligible for inspection
consists of that 500 square kilometres which has
the highest likelihood of containing the epicentre*
V^Then adequately precise regional technical improve-
ments in the system have been developed the area
eligible for inspection will be 200 square kilo-
metres which has the highest likelihood of contain-
ing the epicentre*
(3) The larger event which follows the foreshock
must itself be clearly identified as an earthquake *^0S
The problem of criteria was not solved in this
period, but the differences between the two positions was
not too large and appeared to be negotiable*
goviet Phased Treaty and Moratorium
Cn March 19, 1960, at the 188U> meeting, the Soviet
Uhion submitted its own proposal on a phased treaty* The
proposal stated that the Soviet Governmcmt was willing to
reach agreement on the basis of the following:
OP
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To conclude a treaty on the cessation of all
nuclear weapon teats in the atmosphere, in the
oceans and in outer space i and of all underground
tests which produce seissnic oscillations of mag-
nitude 4 •75 conventional units or above.
In regaurd to unidentified underground events
producing seismic oscillations below magnitude
4«75 conventional units, which according to the
United States contention do not lend themselves to
control, the Soviet Government is prepared to agree
to the United States proposal to institute a pro-
gramme of Joint research and experiments by the
Soviet Union, the Uhited States and the Unitcsd
Kingdom, on the understanding that all parties to
the treaty assume at the same time the obligation
not to carry out during that period any nuclear
weapon tests producing seismic oscillations of
magnitude 4.75 conventional units or below. •'•"°
In answer to several questions put forth by the
Western representatives, the Soviet representative stated
that the joint research program would begii after the
treaty was signed, and that the agreeiaent not to test
below a threshold of 4.75 magnitude should be a part of
the treaty.
On March 21, he further added that the drafting of
the joint research program would be done by the prepara-
tory c^mLsston and would last for four or five years* As
to the moratorium, if no agreement was reached after four
or five years on a criteria, he said, this would not re-
lease the parties to the treaty of their obligations. He
reaffirmed the Soviet position that the question of inspec-
tion quotas must be solved as a political question and the
Soviet contention that nuclear explosions were not neces-







inspections within the limits of the agreed quota could be
made for incidents below or above the threshold*
West Conditionally Accepts Soviet Phased Treaty
and Moratorium Proposal
On March 31, 1960, the Western representatives in-
troduced the Joint declaration of President £isenho)wer and
112
Prime Minister Hacmillan which was released on Karch 29.
The United States representative, in commenting on
the communique, stated that the essence of the "United
States-United Kingdom communique is the decision that those
Governments are agreeing to a common approach with the
Soviet Union on the over-all framework of this treaty."
He further pointed out
that as soon as our treaty has been signed and ar-
rangements have beon made for a coordinated research
prograiaine designed progressively to improve the
means of control for seismic events below a magni-
tude of 4»75, the two Western Governments will be
prepared to put into effect a voluntary moratorium
of agreed duration on nuclear weapon tests below
that threshold. This would be accomplished by a
unilateral declaration which would be made by each
of the three Powers.
He continued that the communique "invited the Soviet Govern-
ment to join at once with their Governments in making ar-
rangeoients for establishing and nutting into operation
such a coordinated research program." The United States
representative set forth the Western views in relation to
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treaty proposal. First, that the Western Powers consid-
ered foiir or five year raoratorium as ''excessive." Second^
the moratorium should not be incluaeu in the treaty.
Third, that the West felt that nuclear detonations would
113be necessary as part of the research program.
On April 6tb at the 194tt meeting, the United States
representative in replying to several questions asked by
the Soviet representative made the following comments in
reference to the United Kingdom-United States joint decla-
ration of March 29.
In answer to several questions about the research
program, he said,
our three governments will have to agree on whatever
coordinated research progranme is adopted by us.
Further, it is expected that scientists frcin the
three powers v«3Uld on a full reciprocity basis be
able to observe a:\d cooperate on any reseeurch pro-
gram that have already been started.
Thus the United States considered national research pro-
grams which would be coordinated between the three powers.
On questions relating to nuclear detonations for
research purposes he said,
the United States is convinced that a limited number
of nuclear explosions is an essential element of a
vigorous seismic research programme. There is no
question in our minds but that the best way to
learn how to discriminate between nuclear explosions
and earthquakes is to use nuclear explosions di-
rectly in the research programme.
In answer to questions relating to the moratorium


















treaty is signed and agreement has been reached on a pro-
gram '^^ coordinated research." He added that the mora-
torium could come into effect before the treaty is signed
if a program of coordinated research is agreed upon. The
reason for the Western proposal that the moratorium not be
includ€Ki in the treaty was explained as a United States
policy to embody in a treaty only tbose obligations in
fields related to disarmament whose fulfillment can be
adequately verified. In relation to the length of the
moratorium, he referred to a previous statement he made
which said, "the exact terms of this moratorium will be
developed as plans are worked out for a coordinated re-
search program and in the light of progress towards an
adequately safeguarded threshold treaty.** As to what would
happen if no agreement is reached when the moratorium ends
he said that it would end, ^otherwise it would be a mis-
nomer to call this a moratorium."
United States proposes research study group . On
April 12ti at the 196ife meeting, the United States represen-
tative announced that he had given the other delegations a
memorandum requesting a meeting of experts to discuss a
coordinated research program.
Prior to the recess on April 14, the Soviet repre-
sentative had tentatively approved the date of May 11 for
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Special Aircraft Sampling Flights
During this period, there arose a series of dis-
cussions over two aspects of special aircraft sampling
flights. The first over observers on these flights; and
the second, over routes for these flights.
The Conference of Experts of 1958 had agreed in its
recommendations that it might be necessary in certain
cases to carry out special flights to locate clouds which
might contain radioactive debris from a nuclear explosion.
They added that the aircraft and crews should be provided
by the host country and that, in most cases, the flights
115
would follow routes previously designated.
Observers on Aircraft sampling flights . The dis-
cussion stemmed from the Western view that there should be
one or more observers on aircraft sampling flights. At
the 155t3i rooeting on January 18, the Soviet representative
repeated their argument that there should be one observer
on these flights. On January 25Ui at the 159tt meeting, the
Soviet Union submitted a proposal that there should be an
observer from the control organization and one from the
host country. On February 4tii at the 166tt meeting, the
Soviet representative proposed that the administrator ap-
point from two to four staff members of the control system
as observers on special flights and that such observers be
specialists of the system and "appointed on a parity basis
from among the nationals of both sides concerned."
cie
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At the IdStb meeting on March 14tt, the representa-
tive from the United Kingdom introduced a proposal that
authorised the administrator to appoint two observers on
special sampling flights but allowed the host country to
designate a representative to accompany the observers on
the flight. ^^^
The Soviet representative replied to this proposal
that the Soviet Union wanted the host co\intry representa-
tive to participate in the control operations on a parity
basis. He added further that he considered the United
Kingdom proposal a departure from the general principle of
118
staffing. The representative from the United Kingdom
replied that aircraft sampling flights were a special case
119
and had to be treated differently*
This is as far as this problem was solved during
this period » and it was carried forward to the next period*
^election of aircraft sampling routes * The ques-
tion of routes for special aircraft sampling flights was
brought into the discussion by a proposal by the represen-
tative of the United Kingdom introduced on January 18tb«
He proposed that
as soon as the requirement for a flight is known
t^ie administrator will propose a flight route to
the party or parties concerned. Once the adminis-
trator's proposal is made there will be twenty-four
hours for the administrator and the parties to agree
on this route or an alternative one. Failing such
agreement there will be another twenty-four hours
se
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for the paucty or parties to satisfy the commission
with an alternative route. 120
The Soviet representative objected to the proposal
and referred to the recommendation of the 1958 Conference
of Experts that **it is sufficient that flights for the
purpose specified should be made along routes laid down in
121
advance."
On February 1st at the 163rd meeting, the Soviet
representative outlined the Soviet views on aircraft
sampling routes* He stated,
the aircraft flights must be carried out in a certain
way and in accordance with the circumstances and
requirements, so that if a nuclear explosion in the
atmosphere has really taken place, and if data ob-
tained from other methods confirm this, if its loca-
tion and yield have been determined, and if by
mathematical or other means the route of the move-
ment of a cloud has been worked out through various
calculations, taking into account the wind, altitude
and so forth, then of course, the route which will
be aelcjcted for the despatch of the aircraft will
have to be such as will traverse that particular
area, so that the aircraft can fly through the area
and collect samples. ^22
On April 13tfc at the 197tt sMieting, the Uhited Kingdom
introduced a new proposal to solve the mutual problem of
routes of aircraft sampling flights and the controversy
over observers. The proposal was a package deal whereby
the Western powers would accept the Soviet proposal on
permanent routes for sampling flights to be established in
accordance with criteria to be established in Annex I on
















proposal for two observers on aircraft sampling flights
123
not nationals of the country concerned.
The Soviet Union did not reply to this package pro-
posal during this period, and the issue remained unsettled*
Summary
This period had been marked by extensive debate on
the technical problems of the system and appeared to be
headed for a definite impasse. However, various proposals,
the United States phased agreement, and the Soviet Union's
phased agreement and moratorium, appeared to show the way
out of the deadlock. With the VJestern conditional accept-
ance of the phased agreement and a moratorium linked to a
research program, chances for agreement improved. Fuurther,
most of the other points separating the sides were aired
and narrowed by proposals.
The meetings were recessed on April 14 and scheduled
to reconvene on April 25, 1960.
VIII. THE SEVENTH PERIOD APRIL 25, 1960 -
AUGUST 22, 1960
Introduction
The seventh period of the negotiations began in
Geneva on April 25, 1960, and forty-eight formal meetings
were held until the Conference recessed on August 22. The
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moratlum proposal; staffing and the "deputies" problem}
the seismic research program; the Soviet quota inspection
proposal; draft Annex I on the detection and identification
system; draft Annex II on privileges and immunities; and
discussion and adoption of an article for the treaty on
definitions of terms and units*
Continued Discussion of the Phased Treaty and Moratorium
Proposal
At the 202nd meeting on May 3rd, the Soviet repre-
sentative introduced the Soviet Union's official reply to
the joint declaration of President Sisenhower and Prime
Minister Macmillan of March 29, 1960. This declaration
proposed a phased treaty with a moratorium below a magni-
tude of 4.75 for an agreed time in conjunction with a
Joint seismic research program. The Soviet representative
first saj-d that the length of the research program is
closely linked to the duration of the moratorium. The
Soviet Union, he said, has recommended a Joint research
program tiiat will last four to five years and feels that
the duration of the moratorium should not be less than the
period of the Joint research program. He continued that
the Soviet Union has no objections during the implementa-
tion of the program of using a strictly limited number of
Joint underground nuclear explosions to verify the methods
and instrumentation of underground tests below the threshold,
Further, he said, the Soviet Union would accept the Western
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proposal that the moratorium not be a part of the treaty
but be carried out by unilateral declaration. He con-
cluded by saying,
the fate of the entire proposal hinged on the dura-
tion of the moratorium and that the expiration of
the moratorium without agreement would not auto-
matically release the parties of their obligations
and the renewal of atomic weapon tests* 124
The Seismic Research Program
On May 27tt at the 206ti> meeting, the Soviet repre-
sentative reaffirmed the Soviet Union's convictions in the
recommendations and conclusions of the 1958 Conference of
Experts. He then stated that the Soviet Union agreed to
the Western proposal for a limited number of nuclear ex-
plosions as part of the research program because of the
Western insistence of their importance. Therefore, he
said that since the Soviet Union does believe in the va-
lidity of the 1958 Conference of Experts, the research and
the experiments of the joint research program should be
carried out by the United States on its own territory.
However, he added, that because it would be a joint re-
search program, Soviet specialists should be given the
opportunity of taking part in the carrying out of nuclear
explosions; and, further, the Soviet Union must have
guarantees that the nuclear explosions shall not be used
125for military purposes.
United States submits proposal on safeguards . On
June 2nd at the 208tb meeting, the United States
'OflC-J O.:. i J >/:>(tss,';\i<X5,jr)4.
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representative submitted a proposal on safeguards in con-
nection with peaceful detonations under the research pro-
gram. He said that the proposal was put forth within the
perimeters of certain limiting criteria that the United
States must adhere to; namely, the desirability of con-
ducting some nuclear detonations this year to not lose the
forward racanentum of our seismic research, the need to take
account of existing domestic legislation which regulates
all considerations involving special nuclear materials,
and the desire to prevent the spread of nuclear weapon
technology to countries not now possessing it. He then
set forth the proposal on safeguards as
:
First, the party shall detonate only nuclear de-
vices of proven design in its experiments.
Second, the devices used in these experiments
shall be taken from a special depository of previ-
ously deposited devices established by the party
within its territory. We consider that such prior
deposit should take place within the shortest pos-
sible time and thus propose, specifically, 15 August
of this year as a time-limit. The devices, suitably
packaged, shall be under the constant surveillance
of representatives of the other parties or, if
preferable, of an international group. The devices
may not be altered, and devices, once withdrawn
from the depository, may not be redeposited. A
device removed from the depository in order to be
detonated shall remain under surveillance until
detonated.
Third, the representatives of the other parties
or of the international group responsible for sur-
veillance shall be permitted to observe all aspects
of the detonation and its instrumentation except
for the interior of the package.
Fourth, no diagnostic instrumentation will be
used in the near vicinity of the device except for
specified yield measurements. Such yield measure-
ments as are made under this provision will, of
xox
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course, be under the surveillance of the other
parties or the international group, as the case may
be, and all the Information thus obtained will be
available to thein.l*^
Soviet Reply and counter»'P.roposal » On June 15tb at
the 214tb meeting, the Soviet Union formally replied to the
United States proposal on safeguards for research nuclear
explosions. The Soviet representative first rejected the
United States proposal and then sultnnitted a Soviet pro-
posal on adequate safeguards for research nuclear explo-
sions* The Soviet proposal wast
1« A full description and blueprints of the
structure of the device to be exploded must be made
available beforehand to the other participants in
the programme and these must be allowed to inspect
the internal and external structure of the device.
2. The representatives of all participants in
this prograioRie must be present at the place of
assembly and explosion of the device.
3. The instruments and measurement apparatus
shall be Installed by all the participants in the
programme.
4. All data obtained as a result of the explo-
sion shall be made available to all the participants
in the programme. ^^'
United States introduces new proposal . On July 12tt
the United States representative introduced a new proposal
as a way out of the deadlock over safeguards for experi-
mental nuclear explosions for seismic research. He
proposed that:
Sach of the three powers at this table supply in
approxdLmately equal quantities a number of nuclear
devices of older and militarily out-dated design to
be used in the research detonation progranunc. The
devices thus assembled from the three countries
would ... be placed in a pool ior use by any of
<:cT
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the three countries in their research prograimaes.
All the devices in the pool could be opened for
non->destructive examination of their separate com-
ponents at the time of their deposit in the pool.
This exeunination would be aimed at allowing all
parties to view the internal design of the devices
and at ensuring that the devices were safe and suit-
able for the purposes intended. Following, examina-
tion, the devices would be kept under joint technical
surveillance until detonated. Observation and in-
spection of the explosion site and emplacement of
the instruments by representatives of the three
original parties would be much the same.^^^
Soviet reply to this new proposal . On August 2nd
at the 237a meeting, the Soviet Union made its formal
reply to this new proposal by the United States. The
Soviet representative stated that the Soviet Union had no
objection to the establishment by the United States and
the United Kingdom of a pool in which these countries
desire to deposit nuclear devices for carrying out under-
ground nuclear explosions for purposes of research.
However, he continued, the Soviet Government cannot agree
that the Soviet Union should be involved as a supplier of
nuclear weapons to the United States for research which
the Soviet Government believes to be unnecessary. Later
in the discussion, the Soviet representative said that the
safeguards proposed by the Soviet Union in its proposal
would apply to any country that carried on experimental
nuclear explosions under any research program. However,




on b»n noinU ja ©vl^t*;:^! i»lvoa
lO 'iwiiv. : oil i -Xi nid wXUs>aii 1-.^ :.^c<; dil^J J&ilJ
^.<w xft«)X3i/n
i« ii^ S; ti'i? I di;a
^ 9JLV J» Aff
104
they consider any experinental nuclear explosions as neces-
129
sary now or in the future*
This period ended without any meeting of the minds
on the problem of safeguards for nuclear explosions for
research purposes* However, there was a general agreement
on the principle that safeguards should be established to
ensure that no military advantage is derived from the ex-
perimental nuclear explosions for seismic research*
On-»Site Inspection and the Quota Proposal
United States introduces draft article titled
"On-site Inspection of Seismic Svents *" On July 13tfc, the
United States representative introduced a draft article on
on-site inspection of seismic events* In summarizing the
draft article proposal, he said
2
Under paragraph 1 the administrator is to notify
all parties to the treaty whenever he determines,
in accordance with criteria to be stated in annex I,
that a seismic event eligible for on-site inspection
has occurred* In this paragraph we make special
provision for the possibility that an area eligible
for inspection may lie in the territory of more than
one party; the effect of our draft would be that
events in such cases would be considered to have
occurred in the territory of each party concerned
so that, if an inspection of the event were to take
place, such inspection would be counted separately
agaiinst the quota number of each party within whose
territory the inspection were carried on* This, of
course, is regardless of the side of the boundary
between the territories of those parties on which
any evidence of an incident might be found*
Under paragraph 2 we provide for the immediate
despatch of inspection groups by the administrator
when events occur in the territory of any of the
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original parties, if a request for an inspection
is raade within a fifteen-Kiay limit by the original
party or parties of the other nuclear side.
Paragraph 3 deals with eligible events occurring
in territories of non-original parties. Here we
would permit any party to address a request for in-
spection to the control commission. If the commis-
sion should decide that an inspection ought to be
carried out and if a quota number were still avail-
able for use for an inspection on that territory in
that year, then the commission would direct the
administrator to instigate such an inspection. We
have included a special provision to the effect
that in this instance the party liable to inspection
should abstain from voting when the decision of the
commission was being made.
In Paragraphs 4 and 5 we cover the matter of
determining the number of on-site inspections which
may be carried out on the territory of each treaty
party. As for the three original parties, this
number would be stated in the treaty eifter we had
reached agreement. As for other parties, the number
would be determined by the commission, after con-
sultation with the party, by a two-thirds vote of
tha conanission. We further provide that, in any
case, this number could not be lower than two, and
there is also a formula for arriving at a provisional
number pending the commissions determination of the
party's regular annual number.
In paragraph 6 we made provision for review of
all these numbers for all parties, and here we re-
quire that this review take full account of the
practical experience of the operations of the system
and measures taken to maintain or improve its effec-
tiveness. The numbers may be revised by the commis-
sion with the proviso that no number shall fall below
two or be less than 30 percent of the average number
of underground events of seismic magnitude 4.75 or
above occurring in a party's territory and remaining
unidentified under the criteria which will be agreed
and of course stated in annex I.
In paragraph 7 we provide for the ccxmnenc^nent
date of the annual inspection periods during which
the inspection number of each is to be used.
In paragraph 8 special provision is made to cover
the possibility that a party may expressly request
inspections on its territory, or that with its agree-
ment a number of inspections 2ibove its quota may be
carried out.
The final paragraph of this article states that
eox
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"the administrator shall make available to all
Parties to the Treaty within twenty-four hours
aifter receipt all reports sutHnitted to hire by
on-site inspection groups, together with relevant
data and analysis. 130
The United States representative, in concluding his
statement, said that the draft article was submitted by
the United States in an attempt to put together in one
article the elements that deal with on-site inspections
that were included in the previous United States draft
articles VI and IX on the functions of the Control Commis-
sion and Administrator and his staff previously submitted
131in a revised form on July 1, 1959.
Soviet critique of United States proposal . On July
26tt at the 234ti meeting, the Soviet representative gave
his formal reply to the United States proposal on on-site
ins^^v^ctions. In his initial remarks, he said that the
Soviet position in relation to on-site inspection was
based on three arguments.
First, that a demand for an inspection is an
official expression of suspicion that the Sta*^^ to
which the inspection group is to be sent has carried
out a secret underground nuclear explosion and has
thus violated the treaty on the cessation of nuclear
weapon tests.
Second, that an on-site inspection affects the
security interests of the State on whose territory
this measure is carried out.
Third, that inspection will be used not in order
to apprehend violators, since we believe that there
will not be any, but only in order to aoinounce, after
carrying out such an inspection, that suspicions that
a nuclear explosion had been carried out were com-
pletely unfounded and that the treaty was being
observed
•
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Because of these arguments, he said that the number
of inspections which the sides should be allowed for the
purposes of mutual security should be small. The suggested
United States figure of 20 inspections on the soil of the
Soviet Union a year, he continued, was "completely unreal-
132istic and unacceptable*"
Soviet Union introduces quota number proposal *
Following his initial remarks about the Soviet views on
inspection and the United States proposal, the Soviet rep-
resentative introduced a proposal for a specified number
of on-site inspections to be included in the treaty* He
proposed that the treaty contain a provision to the effect,
That on the territory of the Soviet Union and
likewise on the territories of the United States
and the United Kingdom, and on territories under
their jurisdiction up to three visits per year may
be made by inspection groups to each of the above
mentioned countries, to any place where, according
to readings of instruments at control posts, uni-
dentified events suspected of being nuclear weapon
explosions have been observed. An inspection group
within the specified limits shall be dispatched by
the control commission for on-site investigation
of an event suspected of being a nuclear explosion,
at the request of any of the original parties to
the treaty • • • €uid the concurrence therewith of
the other parties shall not be required.
He added that the Soviet Union considered it
"essential" to use its quota for on-site inspection of any
event below or above the 4.75 threshold, and that this
quota was subject to review in accordance with the same
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provisions adopted for review of the system, two years
after adoption of the treaty axid annually thereafter*
In reference to the draft articles on on-site in-
spections submitted by the Soviet Union and the United
States, he declared that there was not too much difference;
and if the United States approaches the problem realistic-
133
ally^the problem could be settled quickly.
united States comments on the Soviet quota prorosal .
The initial United States comment was to reaffirm the
United States views on on-site inspection as: first, to
ascertain if there has been a violation; and second, to
deter a potential violator. The United States representa-
tive commenting further said that there is very little
deterrent factor in the Soviet proposal of only three in-
spections out of several thousand incidents. The quota
number must be based or related, he said, to the number of
unidentified events.
At the 236tt meeting, the united States represcuit:!-
tive commented further on the Soviet quota proposal. He
said the United States does not want to inspect every
unidentified seismic event. It is impracticable and un-
necessary. All the United States desires, he continued,
is that the number of inspections must be mathematically
related to the number of unidentified seismic events. The
purpose of having any control system, he added, is to
iiUi.
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provide for reasonably effective assurance that all parties
to the treaty are fulfilling their obligations. He then
went on to say that the present state of technology did
not allow the identification of all events as either man-
made or natural; therefore, on-site inspections are neces-
sary to confirm this fact and are not a suspicion of a
State of having violated the treaty
•
In relation to the axgument of the Soviet Union
that the number of inspections must be kept small to pro-
tect the security interests of the country being inspected,
he stated that this was a familiar argument "but not the
least completely convincing." He added that the inspec-
tion area would be quite small, 200 to 500 kilometers, and
the means to get the team to the area and its equipment to
the area would be subject to the control of the host coun-
try. Further, he continued, there had never been any
objection to the number of observers that the host country
could use at the site to protect its own interests.
He then said that he was rejecting the quota pro-
posed on technical grounds; however, "how the final quota
is arrived at does not necessarily have to be based on
technical grounds." Further, he added, the United States
figure of 21 inspections was based on the estimate of 105
unidentified events that their experts estimated for the
Soviet Union annually and taking 20 per cent of this total
as acceptable.
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The Soviet draft article on on-site inspections was
also inadequate, he continued, because, first, it fails to
state how the parties are to be informed about the occur-
rence of events eligible for inspection; second, it fails
to make any provision at all for on-site inspections on
the territories of non-original parties; and third, it
does not establish the basis upon which quotas are to be
134
reviewed or revised periodically.
This period ended on August 22 without any further
progress on solving this stumbling block.
Inspection Criteria
Another main aspect of the problem of inspection,
criteria, v/as also given wide treatment during this period.
The Soviet Union had submitted a proposal for temporary
criteria on February 16, 1960, and the United States had
135
submitted amendments to this proposal on March 2, 1960.
United Kingdom proposal . On May 12tb at the 205tt
meeting, the United Kingdom representative submitted a
proposed amendment to the temporary criteria in an attempt
to break the deadlock. The remaining issue separating the
sides from reaching agreement was the si25e of the inspec-
tion area. The Soviet proposal stated 200 square kilo-
meters and the United States amendment 500 squaire kilo-
meters as the maximum area far inspection. The proposal
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that 200 square kilometers be the standard area of inspec-
tion in cases where adequate travel-time curves exist and
where data from a sufficient number of control posts sur-
rounding the epicenter have been obtained. In cases where
one or the other of the two conditions is not fulfilled,
then the larger area of 500 square kilometers would be
136
open for inspection.
Soviet comments . The Soviet representative at the
217te meeting on June 22 commented on the United Kingdom
amendment proposal said that the conclusions of the Con-
ference of Experts in 1958 had put forth the area of
localization of 100—200 kilometers and subsequent tech-
nical discussion had not disproved this conclusion.
Therefore, he continued, the Soviet Union believes that
the conclusion of the experts should be used because the
three powers had agreed on the conclusions of that con-
ference. He clarified the Soviet position when he said
that
200 square kilometres is a localization in those
cases where an event taJces place in the centre or
is surrounded on all sides by control posts. But
if the control posts are situated to one side of
the event, in such cases we provide for the pos-
sibility of a more extended area in which inspec-
tion will be carried out. 137
New United States proposal . On July 13tb, the
United States representative introduced a proposal on
temporary simplified criteria for on-site inspections.
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This proposal incorporated the original Soviet proposal,
the suggested United States aroendments , and the United
Kingdom suggested amendment* This 2u:ticle» he said, was
to be incorporated into annex I on the detection and iden-
tification system. On the issue of localization of events
for inspection, the one issue not agreed upon, it stated:
In cases where adequately precise regional travel
time curves are available, and where consistent
arrival times are available from control posts sur-
rounding the epicentre, that is, from control posts
at least one of which lies in every possible 90
degree sector around the epicaltre, the area eli-
gible for inspection will be 200 square kilometres*
In case^ .here adequately precise regional txavel
time curves are not available, or where data from
control posts lying in every possible 90-degree
sector around the epicentre are not available, an
area of 500 square kilometers shall be eligible for
inspection* The area eligible for inspection shall
be chosen so as to have the highest likelihood of
containing the epicenter. ^38
No further action was taken on this issue during
this period.
Draft Annex I - Detection and Identification System
Another important aspect of the treaty that was
given extensive discussion during this period was draft
annex I on the Detection and Identification System* On
July 20ti» at the 231st meeting, the United States represen-
tative introduced a new and revised version of annex I
which incorporated all the modifications in the system
recommended by the United States since it was originally
introduced on December 16, 1958. The draft annex was
iftJtVCc ijfc'
















divided into five main parts j part I was a general de-
scription of the system, part II dealt specifically with
the individual components of the system, part III dealt
with data reporting and evaluation, part IV concerned it-
self with support facilities including coramunication
system, and part V dealt with the phasing of headquarters
and regional offices. It was in regards to part V that
the majority of the discussion was concerned,
Soviet viev/s « On August lltb the Soviet representa-
tive put forth the Soviet views in regards to Part V of the
annex on the phasing of the installation of the detection
and identification system. He first commented that he
believed that the proposal was departing from the principle
of equality because it only installed control posts in the
Southern Hemisphere in the second and third phase. This
he felt would be to the advantage of the .v jst because they
do most of their testing in the Southern Hemisphere.
The second comment he made was in reference to the
number of control posts to be established in the countries
of the original parties. The figure for the United States
of eleven he felt was too low, and the figure of twenty-
one for the Soviet Union was much too high. He then recom-
mended two control posts in European Russia because it is
largely an aseismic area. In relation to the l^astern part
of Russia, he stated that it was necessary to consider the
total number of control posts needed for ail Asia,
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thirty-seven. Eastern Russia, he said, contains about 40
pc^ cent of the area of continental Asia, but only a small
percentage of the total seismic area is contained in the
Soviet Union J whereas, almost the entire rest of Asia is
seismic. Therefore, he recommended that no more than
thirteen control posts should be installed on the Asian
territory of the Soviet Union. This would make the total
acceptable control posts in the Soviet Union fifteen.
He then went on to comment on the installation
schedule for aircraft sampling flights over international
wat irs and tl^e installation of shipboard stations. The
Soviet Union, he said, considered that because they did
not present any great difficulty in inaugurating, they
should be put into effect during the first phase. He also
stated that the formation of inspection teams would be
pointless until the control posts hava vaen installed and
were operational because inspection can only be justified
on technical data from these control posts.
In concluding, he submitted a Soviet draft proposal
on the installation schedule of the system incorporating
the Soviet views on the weakness of the proposed United
States draft. •'^^
This is where the discussion stood when this period
came to an end.
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The Deputies Problem and Staffing
Deputies controversy * The Soviet Union had intro-
duced the problem of the deputies with its proposed amend-
ments to draft articles VI and IX on tl^ie functions of the
control commission and the administrator a.nd staff • The
amendment recommended appointment of two deputies by the
140
control commission, one to represent each side.
New Soviet proposal . On June 21st at the 216tb
meeting, the Soviet representative submitted a new pro-
posal* on "deputies" as a means out of the deadlock on the
issue. He first commented that there were two outstanding
problems on the question of the administrator and his
"deputies." First, "the problem of filling the adminis-
trator's post when vacant" and second, "the problem of the
administrator's deputies." As to the first problem, he
felt that it was not serious because someone could always
be found that was acceptable to both sides* For solving
the secona problem, he introduced a proposal that three
deputies be appointed: one from each side, and one upon
agreement between the two sides. Further, he continued,
this third deputy selected by agreement of both sides
would act in the capacity of the administrator when he was
unable to fulfill his duties or when the post became
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United Kingdom Introduces new Western proposal . On
July 6tt, the representative of the United Kingdom intro-
duced a draft amendment to the article on the functions of
the administrator and staff. The amendment proposed that:
The commission shall appoint the Administrator
and the First Deputy Administrator; these appointments
shall require the concurring votes of the original
Parties on the Commission « In addition, the adminis-
trator shall appoint four other Deputy Administra-
tors! ^w<> ^^ these Deputy Administrators shall be
appointed with the e^proval of the Governments of
the USSR, and two shall be appointed with the ap-
proval of the Grovemments of the United Kingdom and
the United States of America.
The term of office of the Administrator shall be
a perioo of three years. The initial term of office
of the First Deputy Actoinistrator shall be a period
of two years; all subsequent terms of office of the
First Deputy Administrator shall be a period of
three years. The term of office of the other Deputy
Administrators shall be a period of three years.
each shall be eligible for reappointment. The First
Deputy Administrator shall act in place of the Ad-
ministrator in case of absence or vacancy. An Admin-
istrator appointed to fill a vacancy which has oc-
curred before the expiration of the t^^." provided by
this Article shall hold office only for the remainder
of his predecessor's term, but shall be eligible for
reappointment . i"^^
Soviet comments . The Soviet representative gave
his official reply to this new Western proposal on **depu-
ties" at the 230ti) meeting on July 15. He said that they
agreed to the amendment in principle » but they could not
agree to the system of appointment because it was unsound
and unfair. By the Western proposal, he said, "the first
deputy would be independent of the administrator as far as
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Other four deputies would be placed in an inferior posi-
tion»" He stated the Soviet position as that all of the
deputies should be equal in status. Based on these com-
ments, he recommended that they should all be appointed
using the same procediores and that they be recommended or
approved by the Govcjrnments of the side concerned. He
then introduced a draft proposal incorporating the above
143
viewpoints of the Soviet Union.
Western comments on the Soviet counter«»proposal .
The United States representative commenting on the new
Soviet proposal on August 5, stated that the "only out-
standing difference between the sides on this question
remained the method of appointment of the four functionel
deputies." He continued that the United States could not
accept the Soviet viewpoint on the selection of the depu-
ties by the Control Commission. The arguments he gave
were that to do so would be contrary to good administra-
tive practice and it would not take into consideration the
interests of the Administrator in selecting his staff
functional heads within the guidelines established by the
Commission. Further, he stated that it was not too clear
what voting procedures the Commission would use on this
question and there were doubts that there might arise the
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This is as far as this problem was solved during
this period, but there had been decided progress and the
differences appeared to be negotiable
•
Staff problems . The other area of disagreement still
remaining was the staffing problem. The principle of
"thirds" had been generally agreed upon, but it was in the
dispensing of the last third that caused the disagreement*
Mew United States proposal . On May 9t4 at the 203rd
meeting, the lAiited States representative introducec a new
staffing proposal that incorporated the provision of the
"thirds," The proposal provided that staff appointments
be evenly distributed in thirds, one-third for the Soviet
Union, one-third for t' e United States and the United
Kingdom, and one-third to nationals of other countries.
In regards to the third third the proposal stated that
"appointments of scientific and technical staff shall be
made in such proportions that the legitimate interests of
the Parties to this Treaty, including the original Parties,
will not be prejudiced,*' Further, the proposal stated
that the head of the control post shall be a national of a
country other than the host country. Also, on-site in-
spection groups shall be composed of technically qualified
personnel who are not nationals of the country being
inspected but that country may designace one or more ob-























Soviet reply and counter-proposal . The initial
Soviet reaction to this new Western proposal was to repeat
past arguments that without specific language on the allo-
cation of the third third it would work to the advantage
of the West* Further, the Soviet Union objected to the
exclusions of host country personnel on the inspection
146groups*
On June 20tb at the 215tb meeting, the Soviet repre-
sentative introduced its own staffing proposal. It set
forth the Soviet views on the allocation of the third
third equally among the three elesnents. It also stated
that on-site inspection teams should be organized on the
principle of parity. The proposal further stated that the
chief or acting chief of each control post or inspection
group should be a national of the host country and his
assistant should be from the other side of the original
parties. Further, it stipulated that appointments of
specialists from nationals other than the original partit^^s
shall be made in equal proportions from personnel recom-
147ended by the original parties.
Uhited States comments on Soviet counter-proposal .
At the 217tb meeting on June 22, the United States repre-
sentative commented on the new Soviet staffing proposal.
First he objected to the Soviet proposal that appointments
be made from lists f\u:nished by governments. Second, he
CJ.
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objected to the extension of the thirds principle to the
auxiliary personnel of the headquarters* Third, he said,
the Soviet provision that no scientific and technical
personnel who were nationals of non-original parties could
be given positions in the control organization unless they
had first been reccxamendad by one or more of the original
parties was not acceptable. He concluded by saying that
the criticisms put forth were not of principle but of the
148
method involved. Although there was additional dis-
cussion on these proposals, no formula could be found to
settle the outstanding differences on the problem of
staffing.
Adoption of tlie Definition Article
In order to dispel problems of interpretation of
technical criteria, the United States representative pro-
posea on hay 11, at the 204tt maeting, thar an article on
definition of units and terms be added to the treaty. At
the 235tb meeting on July 27, the Conference adopted the
draft article on definitions of units and terms which was




This period did not see any concrete results, out-
side of the draft article on definitions, however, there









was a great deal of discussion on the main issues still
separating the two sides. There were many proposals put
forth by both sides in an effort to solve some of these
differences. However, with the introduction of proposals
and counter-proposals the differences w€u:e being constantly
narrowed down to basic principles on which so far there
had not been much give and take.
IX. EIGHTH PERIOD SEPTEMBER 27, 1960 -
DECEMBER 5, 1960
Introduction
The eighth period of negotiations began on September
27, 1960. During the period, twenty-seven meetings were
held. This period found the representatives discussing
the main issues which were keeping the Conference from
reaching agreement on a final treaty. These included:
the moratorium on the phased treaty} the installation
schedule of the detection and identification system} the
quota and on-site inspections} and the problem of deputies.
Additionally, progress on the final draft treaty was made
with the adoption of Annex II on privileges and immunities.
The Moratorium
Although the moratorium was not to be included in
the treaty but would be established by unilateral
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declaration by the separate governments, it was a chief
obstacle to agreement on the phased treaty.
On September 27ti> at the 247tb meeting, the United
States representative presented the United States proposal
on the moratoriijun. He stated that the moratorium should be
effective upon signature of the treaty for such period as
then still remains of the two-year seismic research pro-
gram, plus three months to review the results of that
program* In support of the proposal, that would end at
the same time as the research program, he added,
this approach is eminently sound because the purpose
of the moratorium is to avoid the undesirable as-
pects of a resumption of nuclear testing below the
4w75 threshold during the very period when research
is being carried on, in the hope of making possible
an extension of effective controls to seismic events
of a magnitude of less than 4* 75.
Further, he concluded that the United States is opposed to
moratoriums because it runs contrary to the principle that
there should be no disarmament obligations without controls.
Therefore, he added, the moratorium must be kept short and
be consistent with the time needed for the research pro-
150gram.
On October 5, 1960, at the 250tt meeting, the Soviet
representative formally commented on the suggested United
States proposal on the moratorium. He first said that the
Soviet Union considered the proposal "ambiguious and
vague." This, he said, led the Soviet Union to be puzzled
by the proposal. The main preoccupation, he continued.
SI I
U ac
• £^.>l» ftAdi *;:.£.£ io t. .•> <» io
ari:r ,{
i»±vo8 ©rii box i; olse ^ri
123
appears to be
not a desire to improve and increase the effective-
ness of control over underground low-yield nuclear
explosions but a desire to be rid altogether of the
moratorium or at least to be freed as quickly as
possible from any obligations in connexion with the
moratorii^n.
Further, he said, "we all agree that the period of the
moratorium should correspond approximately to the duration
of the scientific research program*" The Soviet proposal
of a moratorium of four to five years, he continued, was
based on a United States scientific estimate that the
research program would require about three years and that
to establish an effective system of detection would require
about a few more years.
He concluded by saying that the two-year period put
forth by the United States proposal was too rigid a time
limit, the Soviet proposal of a four to five year program
will provide the possibility of organizing a program that
would be possible of achieving progressive improvements in
the methods of control over events below the threshold.
The duration of the moratorium, he added, cannot be shorter
than the time needed for the completion of the joint re-
search program. Another argument he put forward for the
Soviet proposal was that a research program must be con-
ducted in the light of the actual experience of an
operating system and the control system could take from
three to four years to be operational in the first stage.
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The lAiited States representative defended the
United States proposal at the 260fi> meeting on October 27.
In his initial reroarlcs, he stated that the position of
what policy the United States will follow if the seismic
research program is not successful at the termination of
the research program and moratorium period, **it does not
know and that policy must be established only at that
time*"
In answer to the Soviet statement that the Soviet
proposal was based on United States scientific estimates,
he declared that this estimate was based on starting a
program from scratch including the necessary preparatory
tine* The current United States proposal is based only on
actual experimental time, taking into consideration the
actual preparations that have been made and the prograun
can now start from an advanced position*
He further commented that the United States cannot
f04: reasons of principle accept the Soviet proposal that
at the end of the two-year research program and the threes-
month period for consultation, the moratorium should
continue automatically*
In regard to the starting time of the research
program, he said, the United States position was that the
program should start as soon as possible, and before the
;^Si
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signing of the treaty If agreement could not be lnimedl<»
ately reached*
He concluded his remarks by saying that "there is
agreement that the moratorium should expire at the aaiM
time as the research prograxwne, only disagreement existed
152
on the length of the program."
Installation Schedule of the Detection and
Identification System
Another of the major areas of disagreement which
was given wide discussion and attempts to settle during
this period was the phasing schedule of the detection and
identificcitlon system* On July 20 » 1960, the United
States had submitted a revised draft of axmex I on the
detection and identification system* The Soviet Union ob-
jected to portions of this draft annex particularly the
nuiBber of control posts in the Soviet Union (21) and the
exclusion of the establishment of posts in the Southern
153
Kttaisphere diiring the first phase*
United Kingdom Introduces new proposal on phasing *
On September 29tb at the 248t]> meeting, the United Kingdom
representative introduced a proposal on phasing in an
attempt to break the deadlock* He proposed that phase I
be completed in four years instead of three as proposed in
the United States draft* Further, the proposal stated
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installed in phase I, instead of twelve under the former
proposal. Also, he proposed, the installation of the ten
control posts on ships should take part in phase I. How-
ever, he emphasized two major points: one, that phase I
should only cover the territories of the original parties;
and two, that inspection should start as soon as possible*
He explained that the phasing schedule in phase I would
provide a net of control posts in the metropolitan and
oceanic territories of all three original parties so that
seismic events may be capable of being located in any of
these territories. This, he said, would be a net of abcHit
3,400 kilometers spacing, and would enable the simplified
criteria to be applied. Further, he added that inspection
would begin in these territories as soon as a capability
for location exists. Therefore, he concluded, under this
proposal, inspections would be capable of being initiated
throughout the territories of the original parties at the
very latest two years after the treaty went into force.
He then explained how the new proposal would work.
The proposal broke phase I into two periods, A aoid B.
Phase I A would be completed within two years and the
entire phase in four years. This proposal then put nine
control posts in the Soviet Union, six in the United States,
one in the United Kingd<Mn, plus the twenty oceanic posts
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control posts in the original parties to twenty for the
Soviet Union, eleven for the United States, and one for
the United Kingdom. He further outlined that the oceanic
posts v/ould probably break down to one for the Soviet
Uhion, six for the United States, and thirteen for the
United Kingdom* He added that phase I does not contain
any control posts in Africa, but the United Kingdom was
willing to compromise on this point since she was the only
one involved. Phase II and III would complete the network
of control posts to 180 in the Northern and Southern
Hemisphere, primarily on lands other than the original
parties. Phase II would begin within one year and be com-
pleted within five after signing of the treaty. Phase III
would be^in within two years and be completed within six.
Thus, the entire control post network would be installed
154in six years from the time the treaty went into force.
Soviets comments . On October 19tt at the 256tt
meeting, the Soviet representative commented on the United
Kingdom phasing proposal. He initially stated that there
was apparent agreement on the following questions:
The length of the three phases of the installa-
tion schedule for control posts; the length of each
particular phase, as well as the total length of all
three phases; the installation schedule for posts
on oceanic islands; the schedule for putting ship
posts into operation; the installation schedule for
posts in South America, Europe and on the metro-
politan territory of the United Kingdom.
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Where major disagreement remains is the question of
the number of control posts to be established on the terri-
tory of the Soviet Union. He contended that fifteen control
posts for the Soviet Union was sufficient and within the
recommendations of the 1958 Conference of Experts* He
explained that thirteen posts in Soviet Asia would satisfy
the spacing proposed by the experts, 1,000 kilometers in
seismic areas and 1,700 kilometers in aseismic areas. To
support this view, he pointed out the fact that although
Soviet Asia contains 40 per cent of the land mass of Asia,
it only contains about 10 per cent of the seismic area and,
therefore, the distribution of the posts should be pri-
155
marily on the basis of an aseismic area.
West disagrees with Soviet analysis . Contrary to
the initial remarks of the Soviet representative, the
question of the schedule of installation of the detection
and identification system remained unsettled because the
Western representatives pointed out that their proposal
for a four-year first phase was primarily based on the
splitting of the phase into two periods to facilitate
•arly inspection.
Soviet reply to the split phasing proposal . On
November 21st at the 268a> meeting, the Soviet representa-
tive replied on the split ptiasing proposal. He formally
rejected the splitting of phase I into two parts, phase A
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to be ccMnpleted In two yesuos and the entire phase In four
years. He termed the proposal a move backward instead of
forward to meet the Soviet proposal. He continued, a four-
year period for the installation of the first phase of
control posts "is perfectly reasonable and is based on the
shortest period within which this enormous work can be
carried out."
In reply to a series of Western questions on his
rejection of the proposal, he reaffirmed the Soviet posi-
tion that inspection would not begin until the end of the
first phase when the control system had been fully imple-
mented on the territories of the original parties. He
stated further that the simplified criteria that was pro-
posed by the Soviet Union was based on the prcsmise that a
control network would be in existence in order to furnish
the technical facts to support the criteria for on-site
inspections to begin. He repeated the Soviet view that
the time when this condition will be met is when phase I
of the installation schedule of the control posts has been
completed; namely, about four years after the treaty comes
into force. ^^^
Thus the question of annex I, the Detection and
Identification System, was farther from agreement than
what appeared to be the case when the period started.
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Inspection Quotas
There was a great deal of discussion about the
quota system for on-site inspections, but there was no
change in positions during this period—the Soviet pro-
posal for three per year and the Western proposal for twenty
per year,
Tl^ Problem of the '"'eputies
The problem of the deputies for the administrator
was near solution after the Soviet acceptance of the
Western proposal of five deputies. However, the Soviet
Union wanted all the deputies appointed by the Control Com-
mission after the recommendation or approval of the govern-
ments according to their nationality. To this the West
157
objected. ^'
New Western proposal . At the 257Ui meeting on
October 20, the representative from the United Kingdom
submitted a new proposal on the appointment of the deputies
in an effort to break the deadlock. He proposed that the
appointment of all five deputies should be made by the ad-
ministrator subject to the approval of the Commission, In
the case of the first deputy, the Commission's approval
would also require the concurring votes of the three
156
original parties on the commission,
Soviet coiwnents . The Soviet representative com-
menting on the new proposal on the selection of the
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deputies stated that the Soviet Union still preferred to
have the five deputies appointed by the commission, but
the United Kingdom proposal was a step forward* However,
he added, the Soviet Union does not consider that the ad-
ministrator should have the right to reject personnel recom-
mended by a government nor should the control commission
in the case of posts reserved for one of the original par-
ties. He continued that if this was the case, a situation
might arise where one party might find itself without repre-
159
sentation in the higher administrative echelon*
The problem of the deputies appeared to be headed
toward some form of a solution, but this is as far as it
went during this period*
Summary
There was very little progress made during this
period even though several compromise proposals were put
forth by the West* However, the draft annex II on privi-
leges and immunities was adopted on October 17 at the 255tb
meeting, but there was very little disagreement over this
aspect because the Soviet Union and the West had accepted
these terms in conjunction with other international organi-
zations*
Toward the end of this period the majority of the
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]3etween the two sides and in trying to place the blane for
non-agreement on the reluctance of the other side to make
any move toward the position of the other side*
The Conference recessed on December 5, 1960, and
was scheduled to reconvene on February 7, 1961*
X* NINTH PERIOD MARCH 21, 1961 -
SEPTSMBER 9, 1961
Introduction
The Conference was originally scheduled to recon-
vene on February 7, 1961. However, the United States
requested a delay until March 21 to enable the new United
States administration to make a comprehensive review of
the past negotiations and the United States position in
relation to the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests*
This period commenced on March 21 and covered sixty-
seven meetings and finally ended in an impasse and was
recessed on September 9, 1961, after both sides resumed
nuclear testing* The Soviet Union broke the moratorium on
August 30t&, and the United States resumed testing after a
Western proposal to refrain from testing in the atmosphere
was refused by the Soviet Union on September 6 by continued
testing and was formally rejected on September 9. The
negotiations actually regressed due to the introduction of



























Discussion revolved around the outstanding issues,
the key issues being the "troika," the new Western pro-
posals on the outstanding issues, the inspection problem,
the disarmament link, and the resumption of nuclear test-
ing. The United States also introduced a complete draft
treaty which incorporated all the proposals and views put
forth by the Western delegations up to this time*
The Soviet ''Troika" Proposal
The Soviet representative, as Chairman of the 274111
meeting on March 21st, took the floor and gave a long open-
ing statement covering all the aspects of the Soviet
position and revie.ving the reasons for failure of the Con-
ference to achieve an agreement* He then introduced, in
his concluding remarks, a new Soviet proposal for
the replacement of the administrator of the control
system by an administrative council consisting of
three members, representing respectively (1) USSR
and its allies - 1 member; (2) United States, united
Kingdom and their allies - the second member; (3)
Neutral States - the third member of this adminis-
trative council* The three members of the adminis-
trative council, who would compose the collective
executive organ of the control system, would act
as a single whole and would agree amongst themselves
on all steps which they would underteiJce in the
execution of their duties. 1^0
V/estern reply to Soviet "troika" proposal . On
March 30t!i, the United States representative replied to the
Soviet proposal to replace the administrator with a three
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Soviet concern about domination of the control system by
the West was
unfounded because the control system we have postu-
lated would operate independently of political
considerations. The control system by its very
nature should be able to operate independently, and
scientificaJLly, and therefore free of political in-
fluence. /Further, he added.y if there was any
doubt of tnis the proposal of the Western delega-
tions for parity representation as between the Soviet
Union and its allies and the United States and the
United Kingdom and their allies should have removed
that doubt once and for all.
He commented that the control conunission is the chief
policy-making organ of the control system and the system
would operate under general directives laid down by the
commission.
As to the administrator, the United States represen-
tative said, he is not a free agent, he is restricted in
two ways: "first, he works under policies established by
the commission; second, he works under procedures pre-
scribed in the treaty." Additionally, he added, the prin-
ciple of parity that had been proposed with the appointment
of the deputies fully protects the Soviet Union's interests.
In conclusion he said the Soviet proposal of an
executive committee "would be unworkable even with the
best of good will." He continued,
Where rapid action is required as it so often will
be if the control system is to be effective in
investigating unidentified seismic events - which
it must do while critical seismological and
roeterorological evidence is still fresh or avail-
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complete failure even if three Rien of similar out-
look were involved.
Further, he added, this proposal is an addition to the
Soviet veto list after they had assured the Western repre-
sentatives that they would not add any new items. This
new proposal for an administrative council by the Soviet
Union, he contended, would give its representative a total
and absolute veto on every act of the executive head of
161the control organization*
On April 20^ at the 294& meeting, the United States
representative continued his discussion of the '^troika"
issue* The problem of the administrator is so important
he said because it is the essence of the executive or ad-
Biinistrative fxmction to assure the rapid and efficient
operation of the system* He went on to say:
This is not the policy-making or directing func-
tion, which belongs only to the control coomission*
Rather it is the job of making certain that the
precise provisions of the treaty and the orders of
thie coromissior are fully implemented* That this
will be no small job is evident from the scope and
function of the control organization as a whole*
There will be thousands of staff members in the
180 control posts, at a large Vienna headquarters,
on inspection teams, and at satellite tracking
stations. All of those persons will have specified
duties, and their activities will have to be
properly meshed into a unified whole. It will re-
quire great efforts to make sure that this compli-
cated system functions smoothly* It cannot happen
automatically. Orders will have to be given to
cover hundreds of thousands of problems which will
continually arise*
He commented further that it is a recognized fact
2rr













that In large organlasations and administrative units, in-
cluding governments, that a single chief executive officer
is the approach used by all. And he added,
this Biethod of supervising people and getting things
doiM» seems to have nothinq to do vith ideology} the
sane administrative technique is used in the Soviet
Union as in the United States and Great Britain*
He continued that the Soviet proposal for an "ad-
ministrative council" of three members to represent the
three eloRents in the control organization, these members
would be agents of their respective principals and not
officials of the control organisation and this runs con-
trary to the concept of international civil servants.
Further, he said,
the unanimity requirements in this councils deci-
sions is the complete antithesis of an arrangement
for effective control. The function of stn execu-
tive organ in em organization such as the one we
hope to create is vital if control operations are
to have any meaning. Even if one or another in-
dividual procedure could be implemented without the
administrator's decision, that would be meaningless
when the totality of control system operations
could be brought to a halt by a three-man council.
With one man as the chief executive agent, the
ccMntrol commission can clearly hold him responsible
for what is or is not done. With three men having
both an equal voice emd a right of veto authorized
by the treaty itself • • . the possibilities for
mischief and confusion would be endless*
He concluded his remarks by saying,
in all fairness we asic the Soviet Union to face
realities. It cannot appear as the champion of
strict international armament controls when it
insists on subordinating the implementation of
all control measures to its own national veto.
tiJtn.'* 4 .r^. -. :
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It cannot expect to make progress In the disaxma-
BMOit field without joining with other parties in
mutual accommodations necessary to satisfy the
objective requirements of adequate controls ,1^2
Soviet defense of the "troika*" At the 297ih meeting
on April 25tb, the Soviet representative defended the Soviet
proposal for a three—man "administrative council" to re-
place the single administrator. He argued that the Western
assertion that this would give the Soviet Union control
over the control organization was unfounded and not sup-
ported by facts* He pointed out t^iat practically all the
operational procedures would be embodied within the treaty
and the "administrative council" would not be able to
change them* Also, in regards to the criteria, he said,
they would not be able to effect this because it would be
specifically set forth in the treaty and would not be
changeable by the council* He repeated his arguments that
the only way that there could be a practical, impartial,
and objective implementation of the treaty provisions
would b an "administrative council" as proposed by the
Soviet Union* He further commented that the entire organi-
sation has been organised along the principle of thirds
and thus the principle is recognised and accepted by the
West. In conclusion he said that the Western insistence
cm a single administrator is a disguised attempt to con-
vert the organization to its own advantage* And he added,
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not fall into the three categories recognized and, there-
fore, he would be unable to be impartial and objective in
carrying out his duties,"
"Troika" debate continues . On April 27tb at the
299te meeting, the United States representative again took
up the issue of the "administrative council" or as it was
generally called the "troika." He termed this problem as
the issue that was most central and would spell success or
failure for the negotiations.
In reply to the previous Soviet arguments that the
council could not modify or take action contrary to the
treaty, he said,
Our concern is not that on occasions the admin-
istrative council might engage in incorrect actions
in running the control system; our concern derives
from our certainty that, under the council scheme,
there might well be no meaningful action at all, no
implementation of the treaty, and no control. This
is the very crux-of the matter-that, after v/e have
sacrificed our unilateral freedom of action to test
nuclear weapons for our own defense, we are not to
be assiured of any effective control over whether
other parties which have pledged themselves to do
the same are also living up to their obligations.
Our ability to check up on them is to be subject to
any permission that they themselves may give to
allow themselves to be checked up on, even though
they may be cheating.
He concluded his remarks on the subject by saying,
"the fundamental issue is whether the Soviet Union will
accommodate itself to the technical and organizational
requirements of meaningful control, ' he added, "I am
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a constructive Soviet Union approach to whatever disturbs
it* On unrealistic demands, such as that for an adminis-
164trative council, there can, I submit, be no compromise."
United States General Statement and New Proposals
In the opening statement of the United States rep-
resentative on March 21, 1961, he outlined the Western
position and proposed suggested solutions for the out-
standing issues separating the two sides* He said the
major issues and the suggested proposal for solving them
were:
First, on the length of the research program, the
Western powers agree with the Soviet Union that a longer
period is needed than the two year proposal put forth by
the United States for the initial research program* He
proposed a three year period for the initial research
program*
Second, on the question of safeguards for research
nuclear explosions, the Western governments are prepared
to accept the Soviet proposal put forward on June 15, 1960.
He added that this acceptance was put forward on the condi-
tion that the Western governments receive the same inspec-
tion privileges if the Soviet Union detonated any nuclear
devices*
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devices for peaceful purposes, the Western Powers are pre-
pared to accept the same safeguards*
Fourth, In relation to testing in outer space, he
recommended that the conference adopt the recommendations
of the Technical Working Group I which was submitted to
the conference on July 10, 1959*
Fifth, on the question of control posts, he stated,
the Western Powcmts would approve moving two control posts
out of Soviet Asia, thus reducing the total number of con-
trol posts on Soviet territory to nineteen* In conjunc-
tion with this move, the United States would move one of
its control posts either north or south of its borders.
He re-emphasized that the Western Powers still hold to the
splitting up of the phasing schedule in Phase I of the
installation schedule into two periods to be completed
within four years*
Sixth, in relation to the question of inspection
quota, he reaffirmed the Western position that the number
of inspections be linked to the number of unidentified
events* Because of this fundamental principle, he re-
affirmed the Western proposal for twenty on-site inspec-
tions per year in the Soviet Union* He added, that the
Western Powers were also willing to accept the concept of
equality in assigning inspection quotas, equal for each of
the three original parties*
CM
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Seventh, he reaffirmed the Western position on the
simplified criteria and the size of the area of localiza-
Eighth, he reaffirmed the Western position on
staffing of inspection teams, special aircraft flights and
166
the nationality of the head of a control post.
Ninth, in regards to the budget, he said, the Western
powers accept the Soviet proposal that each original party
should have a veto in the commission in approving the total
annual budget of the organization but not individual items.
In addition, he added, the contributions should be equal
for the United States and the Soviet Union with the United
Kingdom paying a somewhat smaller share.
Tenth, on the question of the composition of the
control commission, he remarked, if a workable agreement
on the control organization is found, the Western powers
would be prepared to accept East-West parity on the control
commission. He then proposed that the control commission
should be enlarged to include four Western States, four
Soviet bloc States and three neutrals.
In concluding his statement, the United States
representative said that "we have now set forth in general
terms an overall proposal for a nuclear test ban treaty
which ought to be acceptable to the Soviet Union. "^^^
On March 22nd at the 275!* meeting, the United
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States representative continued to outline the Western
position. In regards to the seismic research program, he
said the United States would welcome Soviet participation
in its seismic research program and Soviet scientific
criticism, but do not recognize any unilateral Soviet
right to insist on altering the contents of our own pro-
gram. He continued that the Soviet Union should only he
concerned about nuclear detonations to be sure that they
were not used for the purpose of v eapons development. He
added that the United States still considered it essential
to investigate decoupling techniques in the research pro-
gram. In relation to the safeguards that the Western
Powers would accept for nuclear detonations in the re-
search program, he stated them as: first, British and
Soviet representatives would be given blueprints of the
nucleao: devices to be used, and they would be permitted to
examine the device inside and out; second, after inspec-
tion, the devices would be reassembled and kept under
Anglo-Soviet surveillance until actually exploded; third,
instruments and apparatus could be installed at the site
of explosion by British and Soviet scientists; four, all
the data obtained from the explosion would be made ava.: 1-
able to the other two countries.
In regards to the moratorium, he proposed that it
would last for three years and would have the same limits
Si^I










> ."! r < !'i i 'T f\ . i"^.r','-i-^.--'. •h--". ^iffF. i.'*- ?»«* v-







as the research program. Further, he continued, "upon
termination of the moratorium each of the parties, on the
basis of information then available to it, will have to
decide what it will do.'* He added that there should be
consultation among the original parties before the mora-
torium runs out for selecting some alternate rather than
just letting the moratorium run out. He concluded by
saying that the United States '*wants and always wanted a
comprehensive test ban treaty as soon as it can be ade-
168quately controlled."
At the 278tt meeting on March 27tb, the United States
representative continued his outline of the Western posi-
tion. He proceeded to go into greater detail about the
problem of the criteria for inspection; the quota system
for on-site inspection; and the Western position in rela-
tion to them.
His initial remarks were directed to point out that
any inspection quota, no matter how high, would remain
entirely hypothetical and illusory if the criteria were so
worded that no seismic event were ever certified as
eligible for inspection. He added however, that the cri-
teria would only become relevemt when the control post
system had he&n installed in proper locations with ade-
quate spacing. Further, he said, the inspection process
EM
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would be effective only if the inspection teeuns were
properly organized and equipped.
The United States representative then went on to
point out seven ways in which the inspection process could
be blocked: first, inadequate or improper spacing or
location of control posts; second, the criteria might be
so drafted as to make sc»ne unidentified events ineligible
for inspection or unduly restrict the area of inspection;
third, the right of veto by the party to be inspected;
foiirth, failure to use the best technical methods; fifth,
lack of confidence if the inspection teams were wholly or
partly composed of nationals of the host country; sixth,
if the number of inspections were so small in relation to
the number of unidentified events that violators would
face little risk of being detected; and seven, unreasonable
delay in beginning on-site inspections.
In conclusion, he said that the Western proposals
were submitted to prevent the above seven methods of ob-
structing inspections from happening with its resulting
disagreement. 169
On March 28tb, the United States representative went
into greater detail on the Western position on staffing.
He initially stated that there was agreement on several
points: first, that all employees of the control organi-
zation should have the status of international civil
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servants; second, that nationals of all parties should
participate; third, that all employees should be acceptable
to their own governments; fourth, that the technical staff
should be recruited in equal thirds, one-third from the
United States and the United Kingdom, one-third from the
Soviet Union, and one-third from other countries.
Disagreement remained with the Soviet Union over
their proposal that the administrator should not have the
right to refuse personnel reconynended by governments. He
said the Western position was that "the organization will
be obliged to take some qualified national of that party
for the job, but he must not have to take the first, or
perhaps the second, person so recommended."
There also is disagreement over the distribution of
the third third, but he said that there appears to be a
means of reaching an agreement. He explained,
by this I mean that we have in mind that some treaty
provision will make it mandatory for th6 adminis-
trator to keep a numerical balance within the third-
third between the USSR and its associated powers,
on the one hand, and the United States and the Uhlted
Kingdom and their respective powers, on the other.
Apart from this balance the rest of the third third,
if any, could be made up of non-associated powers,
namely generally, of neutrals.
In regairds to staffing of inspection teams and air-
craft sampling flights, he reaffirmed the Western view
that this cannot be done by nationals of the inspection
country because this would introduce an element of
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"self-Inspection" and undermine confidence in the work of
the control organization.
As to the nationality of the chief of the control
posts and the head of inspection teams, he stated, he could
not be a national of the host country because he would be
required to make judgments which might give rise to con-
flicts of loyalty. ^^°
On March 29tt, the United States representative re-
viewed the Western position on high-altitude inspection.
He recc»nmended that the satellite system recommended by
the Technical Working Group I be installed within six
171years after the signing of the treaty.
Soviet Reply to the New Western Proposals
On April 4tli at the 282nd meeting, the Soviet repre-
sentative delivered a formal reply on some aspects of the
aew Western proposals.
First, he remarked that there now appears to be
agreement that the recommendations of the Technical Working
Group I Should be included in the draft treaty for the
control of high-altitude explosions.
Second, he consnented, that the Western proposal to
accept the safeguards on research nuclear explosions was
noted with satisfaction. He added,
the sole reason why the USSR is insisting on its















/sicT for the other side to have the assxirance, by
The'^safeguard, that when research nuclear explosions
are being carried out by the United States no loop-
hole will be left, directly or indirectly, for the
improvement of existing, or the testing of new types
of nuclear weapons.
As to the question put forth by the United States repre-
sentative that the safeguards proposed by the Soviet
proposal would apply to any signatory party which tested
nuclear explosions for research purposes the Soviet
representative stated that they would, as he had previously
stated at the 254tb meeting*
Third, as to the United States proposal concerning
approval of the budget with the concurring votes of the
original parties, he agreed with the Western position on
this point but reaffirmed the Soviet position that it
should also apply to individual items and parts of the
budget. He defended this position by saying,
it is necessary that the structure and all the
parts of the budget should be agreed upon among
the original parties to the treaty. Only such
an approach will ensure approval of the budget
as a whole in the control commission.
Fourth, in regards to the share of contributions,
he disagreed with the Western proposal and recommended
that the contributions be shared equally among the three
original paurties.
In concluding his statement, the Soviet representa-
tive said that there appears to be agreement among the
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on control over the discontinuance of nuclear weapon
tests at high altitudes and in outer space; on the
conditions governing the nuclear explosions to be
carried out under an agreed seismic research pro-
gramme and the conditions of control over nuclear
explosions to be carried out for peaceful purposes;
and on the question of the approval of the total
sum of the budget in the control commision by agree-
ment among the original parties to the treaty.^ '2
On April 10^, the Soviet representative commented
on other parts of the Western proposals.
First, in regards to the proposals for the safe-
guards for research nuclear explosions and for peaceful
piirposes. He interpreted this proposal to mean that after
the devices h£ui been inspected internal and external, the
device would remain under observation by representatives
of the Soviet Union until actually detonated, and this
includes the possibility of control over all the processes
connected with preparing the device for detonation to
ensure that the device being detonated is actually the one
that had been previously inspected. As to instrumentation,
he said, the Soviet Union interprets this to mean that
Soviet specialists may set up their instruments
both in the immediate neighbourhood of the device
which is to be detonated, and in the tunnels lead-
ing to the detonation chamber and on x:he surface
of the earth at any distance from the site of the
explosion. Further, Soviet experts will have every
opportunity of inspecting the system by which the
device is detonated, and also of inspecting the
environment surrounding the detonation chamber,
both before the explosion and after.
Second, in regards to the composition of the control
commission he said, the Soviet government accepts the
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Western proposal that the control commission be composed
of four representatives of the Western Powers, four repre-
sentatives of the socialist countries, and three represen-
tatives of neutral States.
Third, in regards to the moratorium he said that
the Soviet government cannot accept the Western proposal
of a three year moratorium which would just pass away
after its expiration.
Fourth, as to the number of control posfes on Soviet
territory, he rejected the Western recommendation of nine-
teen control posts. He reaffirmed the Soviet position
that fifteen control posts was sufficient in accordance
with the conclusions of the 1958 Conference of Experts.
Fifth, he said, the Soviet Union could not accept
the phasing schedule proposed for installing posts that
would put the Soviet Union under control from the very
start of the control organizations operations, while large
areas which were being used or might be used by the
Western Powers for carrying out tests would remain outside
such control.
In conclusion, he said that the Western powers were
still retaining their old unacceptable positions on the
questions of the inspection quota, criteria, staffing of
inspection teams and observers for special aircraft
flights. •'•''^
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Western conunents on the Soviet critique * On April
lltb, the United States representative on commenting on the
Soviet critique of the new Western proposals said that the
Soviet Union had accepted only those parts of the Western
proposals that agreed with Soviet positions.
In regards to financial contributions, he said, the
Soviet Union was demanding absolute equality; whereas, it
was demanding parity in all other aspects of the treaty.
As to the budget question he remarked that tae right
to veto the budget should only apply to the whole budget
because
the Western powers want to see the budget gradually
put together without any veto and then voted on by
the Commission in one final decision. If at that
point, one original party fails to concur, and if
the control organization is left without operating
funds, the problem will then be posed in clear
form. 174
On April 26tb at the 298tb meeting, the United States
representative rebutted the Soviet arguments about the
scientific basis for their proposal that fifteen control
posts be established on Soviet territory. He said that
whether you use seismicity as well as area or take the
simple geographical area approach by itself, "it still comes
out to more than fifteen control posts that should be lo-
cated on the territory of the Soviet Union." Also, he
continued, it can be scientifically shown that the larger
the number of control posts surrounding an event the
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greater the systems ability to identify seismic events.
Therefore, he asked, ". . • what possible difference can
175four more control posts make to the Soviet Union,"
The Western Draft Treaty
On April 18, 1961, at the 292nd meeting, the United
States representative introduced a complete draft treaty
on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests on the be-
half of the United States and the United Kingdom, This
draft treaty incorporated all the proposals put forward by
the Western Powers aind was introduceo uo clarify the final
positions of the Western delegations in treaty form.
The United States representative said in introduc-
ing the draft treaty:
The draft treaty which we now table is complete.
It covers, we believe, every necessary element of
an over-all agreement for the discontinuance of
nuclear weapon tests. We strongly believe that its
provisions call for an adequate control system and
a system which does not impose undue burdens upon
any party to the treaty.
The draft treaty which we present today is a
treaty which the Governments of the United States
and the United Kingdom are prepared to sign immedi-
ately to end tests underground above seismic scale
of magnitude 4,75, in the sensible atmosphere, in
the oceans and in outer space.
Its signature would, of course, be accompanied,
as we have previously agreed, by unilateral declara-
tions on the part of the three original parties
undertaking a moratorium of an agreed duration on
underground tests below the treaty threshold level
of 4,75 and by agreement that seismic research pro-
grammes undertaken by any of the original parties
subsequent to signature of the treaty would involve
x2I
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application of agreed safeguards to such nuclear
explosions as may be included in those research pro-
grammes. It is to be hoped that at the end of the
seismic research programmes our then knowledge will
permit us to lower the treaty threshold.
This draft treaty represents our best and nost
advanced ideas for an agreement which - ill achieve
discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests under ade-
quate international control.
The delegations of the United Kingdom and the
United States will, of course, stand ready to ex-
plain their views fully and to give careful con-
sidej. tion to any ideas which the delegation of the
USSR may have with respect to achievement of the
objective of a sound treaty for the protection of
the people of the world.
We are prepared to discuss this draft patiently
and in detail. It represents our best thought but
we are by no means inflexible about it. V/e are
entirely open to reason. We shall listen carefully*
This draft treaty is presentea i)y the .-/estern
delegations in a sincere effort to assist our nego-
tiations to reach a successful conclusion, ^"^^
The Inspection Problem
On April 19tb at the 293rd meeting, the Soviet rep-
resentative defended the Soviet on-site inspection quota
of three per year proposal. He repeated the Soviet argu-
ment that the Western quota of twenty per year was un-
realistic and unacceptable to the Soviet Union,
He refuted the argument of the United States that
the number of inspections must be sufficiently high to be
an effective deterrent. To support his argument, he said,
the violators of the treaty would be one of the three
original members, three great powers, and he did not be-
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and the resulting condemnation by the rest of the world
for doubtful advantages.
As to linking the number of inspections to a certain
percentage of the unidentified events, he stated, "no
percentage or numerical relationship can be scientifically
justified in this regard, since any number, any percentage
can be insisted on with the same degree of justification or
non-justification#
"
In reference to the composition of inspection teams,
he stated, that the Western insistence on staffing these
teams with non-nationals proves that the West is trying to
gain an advantageous position in the recruitment of staff
for these important control units. He put forth the
Soviet position on this particular issue as:
the Soviet Union merely proposes that specialists
from the Soviet Union and specialists from the
United States and the United Kingdom should take
part in inspections on an equal basis. We want
equal participation of both sides in control
operations in all the coiif^onents at all stages,
in all countries. Only such an approach will
ensure genuine objectivity and impartiality in
control operations.
On the problem of the dispatching of inspection
groups, he stated that the previous Soviet proposal pre-
vents the vetoing or interference of the proposed admin-
istrative council. By this proposal, he said, inspections
may be made at any place where, according to readings of
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occurred, at the request of the sides within the limits of
the annual quota, and that inspection groups within the
specified quota shall be dispatched by the commission
without delay, and shall not require agreement between the
parties of the treaty. Further, he added, the Soviet
Union had previously agreed that inspection groups could
be chosen from inspectors maintained at headquarters on a
permanent basis.
Western conanents . On April 24tb at the 2964^ meeting,
the United States representative commented on the Soviet
position put forth on the problem of inspections. He
first commented, "there have been at least as far as the
world at large knows, no breaches of the voluntary mora-
torium on testing since late 1958." He added, that rather
than proving that no signatory would violate its solonn
pledge under the treaty, it demonstrates that without
controls no one can know the true situation about viola-
tions. He continued, that the number of on-site inspec-
tions that the Soviet Union is proposing has nothing to do
with deterring potential violators, "it is a sort of token
or good-humor gesture that has nothing to do with the
objective requirements of strict scientific international
control."
On the question of the Soviet fear of espionage, he
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espionage conducted on its territories as is the USSR,
Therefore, the scientific measures the United States pro-
poses oiust have no significance from an espionage point of
view." The twenty inspections that the West proposes, he
continued, is based strictly on em interest in effective
control, as is the Western proposal that nationals be
excluded from inspection teams. He added, "he did not
conceive how intelligence could be gathered when the host
country could have an unlimited number of observers along
with the inspection group."
He further remarked that he was still confused
about the procedures for launching an on-site inspection
under the Soviet proposal. He declared that
what is unclear is, first, whether the commission
could overrule the party and decide that the seismic
criteria had not, in fact, been met in the given
case and that therefore there would be n? right of
inspection; and second, whether a majority on the
commission would, by a veto-free vote have to approve
the request for an inspection before it could begin.
The United States position on this issue, he said, is that
it would be opposed to any intervention by the commission
on whether one original party might exercise its right,
within the annual quota, to have an on-site inspection
conducted on the territory of another original party. He
continued, this would be an automatic affair once it had
been determined that the seismic criteria had been met.
As to the subject of criteria, he said, the purpose of
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criteria is to codify scientific standards agreed to by
all three original parties so that whenever seismic data
recorded by the control system show that these standards
have been met, a seismic event automatically becomes
178
eligible for inspection.
United States introduces new proposal on inspections .
At the 310fl> meeting on May 26tb, the United States repre-
sentative proposed in an effort to reach cm acceptable
figure on the number of on-site inspections that an alter-
nate method which the United States previously proposed
could be used to solve the Soviet argument that the
Western figures were inflated and not based on scientific
fact. This proposal, he said, was made at the 278feb meeting
that there would be an unlimited number of inspections up
to 30 per cent of the unidentified events, or 20 per cent
of the located seismic events. This propose. , he said,
still stands and is an acceptable alternate to the current
179Western proposal of twenty inspections per year.
On May 29tlJ at the 3ilUj meeting, the United States
representative continued the discussion about the on-
site inspection quota. He submitted another United States
proposal in an effort to work out some solution to the
problem. He proposed that the "... quota be worked out
on the basis of actual seismic developments, namely, of
recorded seismic events on the territory of each original
a it*'
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party." With this as a basis he proposed a sliding scale
of inspections with a maximum of twenty per year regard-
less of the number of unidentified events and a base of
twelve inspections per year. The number of inspections
between these two figures, he said, would be determined by
the actual number of unidentified events between sixty and
one hundred, for each five above sixty another inspection
could be held up to a niaxiraum of twenty if one hundred
were reached.
In concluding his remarks about this new proposal,
he said,
there is a great advantage to the Soviet Union in
this proposal because if their scientists are right
about the number of unidentified events occurring
in the Soviet Union then the quota of inspections
for the Soviet Union would be lower. Further, if
the Soviet estimate of the number of events is lower
in the Soviet Union and higher in the United States
then she would have more inspections in the United
States than she would receive in the Soviet Union, ^^0
Soviet comments . On May 31st at the 313tfc meeting,
the Soviet representative rejected this new alternate pro-
posal of the "sliding scale" of the West, He said it was
"unrealistic and unpractical for both political and tech-
nical reasons," He repeated the former Soviet argument
that the solution of the number of on-site inspections
must be solved strictly on the basis of a political com-
promise.
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On June 12, 1961, at the 317to meeting, the Soviet
representative introduced into the conference records a
memorandum from the Soviet Government to President Kennedy
of the United states which was handed to him by Premier
Khrushchev in Vienna at their Summit Conference.
The memorandum outlined a change in Soviet position
in relation to the Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear
Weapon i-ests. It supported their proposal for an "admin-
istrative council" and reaffirmed their reasons for this
proposal. Additionally, it discussed the outstanding
issues that were keeping the conference from reaching
agreement, the quota, staffing, on-site inspections. It
then suggested that it might not be better to ". • • start
with the main, the cardinal question, that i.s to say, the
question of general and complete disarmanent?" This the
note continued would solve all the problems that are
plaguing the conference at Geneva, because the Soviet
Union had pledged that it would accept unconditionally any
proposal by the Western Powers on control, once the
Western Powers accept the proposal of general and complete
disarmament.
It went on to say that
... at present, when the armaments race is going
on in the world and when opposing military blocs
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in the interests of the security of oar country and
that of our allies. So long as States maintain
armed forces, no form of control can be disasso-
ciated from intelligence work.
The statement concluded by saying,
the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests does not
mean that the manufacture and stockpiling of such
weapons will cease; and the danger of war is not
diminished. In these circumstances every State is
entitled to suspect that the intention is to use
control as a screen for setting up intelligence
agencies ,1^2
New Western Proposals
Even with the seemingly insxirmountable obstacles
which the Soviet Union had placed in the way of reaching
agreement, the Western Powers introduced further proposals
in an attempt to get the Conference back on the right
path.
On August 28ti) at the 337tb meeting, the United States
representative introduced two new proposals.
The first in reference to procedures to be followed
at the expiration of the moratorium proposed that
about six months before the expiration of the three
year moratorium, with respect to tests below the
treaty threshold of 4.75, a panel of eminent sci-
entists representing each of the eleven nations which
will then be members of the control commission of
the treaty organization should be convened.
This scientific panel would be charged with the
task of preparing a report to the eleven-nation
control commission, by at least a majority vote of
the scientists unit, on the following matters:
(1) recommended improvements in the treaty con-
trol system in the light of the findings of the
esi
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proposed research programme in which we have asked
the Soviet Union to participate;
(2) scientific estimate of the capabilities of
the control system in the light of such improvements;
and
(3) recommendations as to whether or not the
treaty threshold of seismic scale of magnitude 4.75
should be lowered, and if so, to what point, and
indeed whether the threshold can be eliminated en-
tirely by scientific improvements in the treaty
control system.
When that has been done, the control commission
itself, composed of four V/estern Powers, four Soviet
Powers, and three neutral or uncommitted Powers, will
consider the report and agree, by majority vote,
on such draft amendments to the treaty to eliminate
or to reduce the threshold as may be required by
such of the recommendations of the scientists as the
commission may approve. All such treaty amendments
would be submitted to the next annual conference of
the parties or to a special conference if the annual
conference v/ere not scheduled until after the ex-
piration of the moratorium.
In concluding his statement on this proposal, the
United States representative remarked, that the Soviet
objection to the Western proposals on the moratorium was
that it would be "automatically" left to expire. There-
fore, he contended, the above proposal would ensure that
the moratorium would not be allowed to expire automatically
and guarantees the most "careful deliberation and review."
This proposal, he concluded, "is a means to make sure that
when the treaty obligation is extended to cover under-
ground tests of lower yields adequate control measures
shall not be left to chance."
The second proposal that the United States repre-
sentative introduced was put forth in answer to a Soviet
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statement calling for a complete comprehensive treaty over
all nuclear tests. He declared that if that was th*
present position of the Soviet Union » then the lAiited
States was ready to meet that position. The United States,
he continued, was willing to contemplate an initial treaty
threshold that would be lower than the proposed one of the
seismic magnitude of 4.75; and further, "we are even willing
to consider arrangements, if this, with your cooperation,
should prove scientifically possible, which would amount
to virtually no treaty threshold at all." He explained
this as the United States willingness
to negotiate here and now for the immediate lowering
or even removing of the treaty threshold of 4.75,
provided that the Soviet Union is ready to explore
with us, and open-mindedly consider those improve-
ments or adjustments in the control system which
could so increase its scientific capabilities from
the outset as to warrant the lowering or removing
of the threshold.
He then outlined what some of these improveinents and/or
adjustments might be.
The relocation of some of the control posts in
both of our countries and other countries from
relatively aseismic to highly seismic areas, if
that can be done without injury to the whole con-
trol system; the introduction into United States,
United Kingdom and USSR territories of a number of
unmanned seismic recording stations, perhaps in
conjunction with some of the foregoing changes
regarding the relocation or regrouping of control
posts; modification of the total number of control
posts in the United States, the Soviet Union and,
possibly elsewhere; an adjustment of the fixed
annual number of inspections in the quota; and the
immediate adoption from the outset of certain sci-
entific improvements in the treaty control system.
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In reference to the two proposals, he concluded
on the one hand we have the Western proposal for
reducing or eliminating the threshold in the treaty
at the end of the three year moratorium and on the
other hand, we have put forward an alternative pro-
posal for reducing or eliminating the threshold in
the treaty immediately, further he addedjJZ we
shall continue to work for sound arrangements which
will not give the illusion of control without any
substance* Aside from that, however, there are no
limits to our willingness to negotiate on the
scientific control system. ^^^
Soviet Comments . The initial Soviet reaction to
the proposals was to ignore them and to repeat the argu-
ment that all the Western proposals were designed to set
up a system of control without disarmament, which in
effect would be nothing more than an intelligence network.
In conclusion he said,
the Soviet Union will be prepared, a.ixd we have al-
ready told you so repeatedly, to sign a treaty on
general and complete disarmanent and to agree to
any control over disarmament and consequently, over
the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, but not
to any control while the arms race and intensified
military preparations continue; that is, the Soviet
Union will not agree to control separated from dis-
armament. 184
Additional Western proposals . On August 30to at the
338tt meeting, the United States representative continued
his discussion of the issues separating the two sides in
an attempt to find some path to renew true negotiations;
he said the main issue separating the two sides continued
to be th<!> Soviet stand on the "troika" and he reaffirmed








he continued, in order to settle the fears of the Soviet
Union that a single administrator might prove partial to
one side, the Western Powers were ready to introduce a
draft amendment to the article on the functions of the
control commission which would authorize the Control Com-
mission to remove an Administrator or Deputy Administrator
for failure to comply with provisions of the treaty or for
any other reason the Commission decides that it no longer
has confidence in him. Such a decision will require the
concurring votes of seven of the members of the Commission,
Also in an attempt to settle another outstanding
issue, he proposed that on-site inspection teams be com-
posed on one half of either side of the original parties
to the treaty, depending on the country inspected, and the
other half of nationals of countries not associated with
185
any of the original parties,
Soviet comments . The only Soviet comment that the
Soviet representative made on these new proposals was to
refer to the same argument that these discussions would
not be necest>tury if the West would accept the Soviet pro-
186posals on general and complete disarmament,
Soviet Resumption of Nuclear Weapon Testing
The 339tl» meeting on September 4, 1961, opened fol-
lowing the announcement on August 30tb that the Soviet
Union had resumed nuclear weapons tests thus breaking the
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moratorium which had existed since 1958. The annoiincement
on August 30tb and the subsequent confirmation by the
Western Powers that the Soviet Union had exploded a nu-
clear device in the atmosphere did not create the proper
atmosphere for wortnv/hile negotiations.
The United States representative introduced two
Western documents. One a White House statement made on
August 30, deploring the decision of the Soviet Union to
resume testing. The other document was a joint proposal
by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan to
Premier Khrushchev dated September 3, requesting that the
three Governments agree, effective immediately, not to
conduct tests which take place in the atmosphere and pro-
187duce radioactive fall-out.
The Soviet representative read into the record the
statement of the Soviet Union on its decision to resume
nuclear weapon testing. This statement put forth the
Soviet view that it had to renew testing for military
security reasons due to the current international situa-
tion. Further, they contended that France—one of the
United States and the United Kingdom NATO allies—had been
conducting nuclear tests during the moratorium and hinted
that the Western Powers were using this means to test
their new weapons while the Soviet Union was refraining
from nuclear testing, thus putting the Soviet Union in an
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unequal position. The statement continued that plans have
been completed for conducting a series of nuclear bomb
tests of increased power, of twenty* thirty, fifty, and a
hundred megatons of TNT and the powerful missiles to
deliver these nuclear bombs to any point in the world
where an attack on the Soviet Union could be launched from.
The statement concluded by reaffirming the Soviet Union's
desire and readiness to sign an agreement on general and
complete disarmament which would also put an end to thermo-
i. ^ 188nuclear tests.
Recess of the Conference
The final meeting of this conference during this
period was held on September 9, 1961*
The Soviet representative read into the record the
statement of Premier Khrushchev rejecting the joint pro-
posal of the United States and the United Kingdom made on
September 3# He rejected their appeal, the statement said,
because of several reasons. First, it did not take into
account the current state of international affairs.
Second, their statement separates the question of suspen-
sion of nuclear tests from the general question of dis-
armament. Third, the proposal would authorize underground
tests for which the United States is prepared to increase
its military knowledge plus it does not mention what their
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arguments that the only way to solve the current problems
would be to sign a treaty on general and complete disarma-
189
ment as proposed by the Soviet IMion*
The United States representative in commenting on
the Soviet statement said that it was nothing more than a
crude attempt at "atomic blackmail" in total disregard of
the needs and welfare of mankind* In regards to the
reason that the Soviet Union has consistently been trying
to scuttle the nuclear weapon test ban talks, he said
that unanswered question of why the Soviet Union
becaR.e ^ore and more unyielding in its refusal to
discuss the Western proposals, to submit proposals
of its own, or even to negotiate at all, was
finally answered last week.^^O
Summary
When the Conference reconvened on March 21, 1961,
there was high hopes that an agreement might be quickly
reached. The initial Soviet proposal of an "administra-
tive council" quickly ended this high optimism. The
Western compromise proposals, also submitted at the March
21st meeting, were indeed an attempt to solve some of the
outstanding issues. However, as the meetings progressed
it became apparent that an impasse was imminent and the
conference settled down into a series of arguments and
counter-arg uir.ents to positions of principle from which
neither would move* The Western Powers had made their







any toward the Western position and a deadlock ensued.
Although, there was little hope for a brec kthrough in the
deadlock as some of the statements of both sides indicated,
the West continued to try to find acceptable positions on
some of the issues. For example, the Western proposal for
the "sliding-scale" of inspections was one. The primary
stumbling block remained the "troika" issue about which
neither side would change their position. An additional
roadblock to agreement was introduced with the Soviet
statement that it could not agree to control without dis-
armament and because the conclusion of a test ban treaty
would not be a reduction in armaments it recommended that
the talks be merged into general and complete disarmament
discussions which could settle many of the outstanding
issues before the conference in Geneva. This proposal was
rejected by the Western powers, and they reminded the
Soviet Union that it was they who early in the negotiations
kept insisting that the nuclear weapons test ban talks be
kept separate from general disarmament agreements and to
which the Western Powers made a concession in January 1959.
The coupe de grace for this period was given when
the Soviet Union resumed nuclear testing and refused to
accept a Western proposal for an immediate ban on atmos-
pheric testing.
Thus, when this period ended, to carry the question
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to the General Assembly of the United Nations, the pros-
pects for reaching agreement appeared to be very dim
indeed
•
XI. THE TENTH PERIOD NOVEMBER 28, 1961 -
JANUARY 29, 1962
Introduction
The tenth and final period of the Conference began
on November 28, 1961, following an exchange of notes be-
tween the three nuclear powers. Thirteen meetings were
held until the Conference ended in another deadlock when
agreement could not even be reached on the conuaunique to
be issued at the close of the 353rd meeting on January 29,
1962.
The main topic discussed was the new Soviet draft
treaty and the Western rejection of it.
New Soviet Proposal
At the 341st meeting on November 28, 1961, which
marked the beginning of this period, the Soviet represen-
tative introduced a new Soviet proposal. In introducing
this new proposal, he argued that a new approach was
needed to the question of the discontinuance of nuclear
weapon tests, "one which would eliminate the difficulties
and obstacles which have hindered agreement in the past."








conclude immediately an appropriate agreement on
the discontinuance of nuclear tests in the atmos-
phere, under water and in outer space, that is, in
these environments where the implementation of con-
trol is not fraught with any serious technical
difficulties."
To verify these obligations, he declared, existing national
technical system were sufficiently reliable. As to under-
ground nuclear tests, he contended that
the Soviet Government is of the opinion that States
should undertake not to conduct such tests until
agreement is reached on a system of control over
underground explosions as a constituent part of an
international system of control over the implementa-
tion of a programme of general and complete disarma-
ment*
He also went on to say that the time had arrived to include
France in the negotiations.
The Soviet representative then introduced a draft
agreement which incorporated the Soviet position. This
draft agreement read:
The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republic, the United States of America, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the French Republic,
Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest
possible achievement of an agreement on general emd
complete disarmament which would abolish for all
time the threat of an outbreak of war, put an end
to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive
to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons,
including nuclear and thermonuclear weapons,
Believing that the renunciation by States of the
testing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would
facilitate the achievement of agreement on general
and complete disarmament,
Have for these purposes agreed as follows:
Article 1
The States Parties to this Agreement solemnly
eai









undertake not to conduct tests of any kind of nu-
clear or thermonuclear weapons in the atmosphere,
in outer space or under water.
Article 2
For the purpose of exercising mutual supervision
of compliance with the undertaking contained in
Article 1 of this Agreement, the States Parties to
this Agreement shall use their national systems of
detecting nuclear and thermonuclear explosions.
Article 3
The States Parties to this Agreement undertake
not to conduct any underground tests of nuclear
weapons until they have agreed together on a system
of control over such tests as a constituent part
of an international system of control over compliance
with an agreement on general and complete disarma-
ment.
Article 4
This Agreement shall enter into force immediately
upon its signature by the Governments of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of
America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the French Republic, and shall
be open for adherence to it by all States, ^^1
Western Reply to the New Soviet Proposal
The United States representative initial comments
on the new Soviet agreement and position were that it was
a propaganda proposal and appears to be merely a proposal
for a completely uncontrolled ban on nuclear tests. In
essence, he said, it calls upon
the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the
Soviet Union to obligate themselves to conduct no
nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space,
underwater or underground, but there is to be no
international control machinery whatsoever to monitor
this prohibition in the first three mentioned envi-
ronments, where total reliemce will be placed upon
national control capabilities, with apparently no
international supervision and without even the means
of finding out about what the national stations dis-
cover or disseminating the findings of the national
system.






As to underground tests, he continued,
verification of the ban on underground tests, even
the Soviet Union still appears to acknowledge that
international controls are essential here, but * • •
the Soviet proposal declares that no such control
machinery can be set up except in the context of
machinery established to monitor a treaty on general
and complete disarmament.
He declared that
• • • the United States will undertake no paper
commitments or meaningless gestures which can reward
only the one Power, the Soviet Union, which has done
its cynical utmost heretofore to thwart a sound
internationally controlled nuclear test ban treaty.
In regards to the inclusion of France in the nego-
tiations, he declared that even though France became a
nuclear power on its own since the negotiations began and
was not a party to the original conference, the United
States was prepared to accept any nuclear power to join in
the deliberations, although the United States feels that
additional powers would prolong the discussions.
He stated in conclusion,
it seems to us that such an approach as is outlined
in the Soviet proposals which we have heard here
today can only result in much delay in signing a
sound and effective internationally controlled
treaty, and in consequent failure to end nuclear
talks. 192
Soviet Comments on the Western Comments on their New
Proposal
The Soviet representative stated in reply to the
Western comments on the new proposal that
we cannot but express regret that the United Kingdom
Hi
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and the United States delegations have been in such
a hurry to utterance already to negative comments,
I would even say attacks, without having familiarized
themselves with the Soviet Government's statement or
with the draft agreement, without having studied
both these documents carefully and without having
examined attentively the argumentation which we have
expounded, and that they have declared offhand that
this new proposal by the Soviet Union, this new
initiative of ours, is virtually unacceptable .^^^
At the 344ti> meeting on December 5tfe, the Soviet rep-
resentative introduced into the records of the Conference
a Soviet Government statement which had been released on
December 4)ft* It repeated the argument that the Soviet
proposal was put forth as the only solution to the dead-
lock over the suspension of nuclear weapons tests* Further,
it expressed regret that the Western Powers have not taken
up this proposal but, instead, statements have been put
forth that the Western Powers intend to continue testing
in the future* The statement concluded by saying.
The Soviet Government declares with all firmness
that if the Western Powers continue nuclear weapon
tests, including tests under ground, the Soviet
Union will be compelled, in order to safeguard its
security, to conduct such nuclear weapon tests as
it deems necessary for the strengthening of its
defensive capacity* ^^^
Western Formal Rejection of the New Soviet Agreement
On January 16, 1962, at the 350^ meeting when the
Conference reconvened after a holiday recess frc»n December
21, 1961, the United States and the United Kingdom de-






new Soviet proposal on a nuclear weapons test ban. In his
remarks, the United States representative stated that the
new Soviet proposal rejects the principle of international
controls*
It asks each participating State to monitor its own
performance in fulfilling the treaty, even though
this would be both technically and politically in-
adequate. It seeks to annul and liquidate all the
progress achieved in several years of negotiations
to work out mutually acceptable treaty provisions
for a control system. It requires the Western Powers
to rely solely on a Soviet pledge not to test again
at the very moment when a grievous Soviet violation
of its last pledge to adhere to a moratorium on
nuclear weapon tests is still fresh in our memories
.... it is quite apparent v,hy the United States
Government must refuse to have anything at all to do
with this retrogressive Soviet plan.
He concluded his statement by saying,
if the Soviet representative still refuses to nego-
tiate on any basis other than the Soviet proposals
and principles which the Government of the United
States, after thorough and deliberate consideration,
has found to be unacceptable, ... then we see no
alternative to proceed along the lines of a second
course of action."
The second course of action he proposed was that the Con-
ference adjourn while the question of an appropriately
controlled test ban is considered, in relation to general
disarmament and the corresponding international controls,
195by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.
The United Kingdom representative associated himself
with the remarks made by the United States representative.
He added further that the United Kingdom cannot agree that










provide a satisfactory basis for negotiation of a
treaty providing for the end of all nuclear testing
in all environments with effective international
control, because the Soviet proposal does not make
any provision for an international supervision what-
soever of the observance of such a treaty.
He ended his statement by saying that if the Soviet
Government maintains the same rigid position since they
offered their proposal on November 28tt on a "take it or
leave it" basis then the United Kingdom would support the
second proposal put forth by the Uhited States, that the
Conference adjourn while the question is discussed at the
forthcoming Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee discus-
sions.
Soviet Reply to Western Rejection of the New Proposal
The Soviet representative attacked the Western re-
jection of the Soviet proposal of November 28ih and repeated
his former arguments in support of the Soviet position.
At the 352nd meeting on January 26*, he introduced
a Soviet Government statement in reference to the proposal
of the United States that the Conference adjourn while the
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee discusses the ques-
tion. The statement declared that the Western proposal to
end the negotiations came at just the time when there was
a proposal before the Conference that could put an end to








Government thought worthwhile negotiations could be held
197
and wished to continue the Conference,
The Conference Adjourns
The discussions continued until the 353rd meeting
on January 29, 1962, without any apparent change in posi-
tions* Therefore, the United States representative pro-
posed at the 353rd meeting that the Conference recess
immediately until a common basis for negotiations can be
re-established either at the forthcoming meetings of the
Sighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee Conference, through
diplomatic channels, or through informal contacts among
delegations at Geneva*
The representative from the United Kingdom supported
the proposal.
The Soviet representative refused to accept the
proposal and refused to agree to a recess of the Conference.
He was willing to accept a declaration that the Conference
had ended on the request of the United States and the
United Kingdom. To this proposal the Western representa-
tives refused to agree.
The meeting was finally declared adjourned by the
Chairman and left to the next chairman to fix the datw- of
198the next meeting in agreement with the other delegations.
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On January 29, 1962, after three hundred and fifty-
three meetings that had their beginning on October 31,
1958, the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear
Weapon Tests came to a close without reaching agreement.
Although not officially closed, no further meetings of the
Conference have been called*
The Conference had corae about a complete circle; it
began vrith a brief general Soviet proposal to stop all
nuclear weapon tests with only a brief token statement
about control, and it ended with a Soviet proposal for
agreement on a test ban with only national systems for con-
trol.
During the course of the negotiations up to about
the middle of 1960, a great amount of progress had been
made in an attempt to reach agreement on a test ban with
effective controls. This can be seen by the number of
adopted articles for an agreement in Appendix A. The
articles of the treaty that were needed to complete the
agreement were small, but the problems involved in these
few articles were big. These articles brought forth basic
principles on control from which neither side was willing
to venture very far.
In the end, it appears that the Soviet Union








not move toward their position far enough to bring about
agreement and that the Soviet position was the maximum
acceptable amount of penetration of the Soviet Union she
would accept.
After the summer of 1960, the negotiations took a
downhill turn and even with the many proposals put forth
by the Western Powers in the early part of 1961, the
Soviet Union's position remained firm*
The introduction of the "ti-oika" proposal and the
link to general and complete disarmeunent proposal by the
Soviet Union presented further obstacles to reaching
agreement and virtually doomed the negotiations. The re-
sumption of nuclear testing by the Soviet Union put the
finishing touches on the negotiations.
The November 28, 1961, proposal of the Soviet Union
set forth the new Soviet position whereby she still de-
sired a nuclear test ban but would not accept any controls
in association with it.
This new Soviet position ran directly contrary to
the Western position that any agreement on disarmament
must contain effective international control provisions.
Thus, the negotiations had reached another impasse;
and the Western Powers decided that until a more favorable
negotiating climate could be developed, the negotiations








Therefore, on January 29, 1962, after 353 meetings,
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CONFERENCE OP TH2 EIGHTESN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT MARCH 14, 1962 -
JUNE 21, 1963
I. BACKGROUND
After the Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear
Weapon Tests adjourned on January 29, 1962, after failure
to reach a negotiable position, a series of private notes
and talks transpired between the nuclear powers; and it
was finally agreed that the nuclear weapons test ban issue
be included in the discussions of the proposed Conference
of the Eighteen-Nation Conunittee on Disarmanient • This
Committee was established after a series of notes and dis-
cussions between the United States and the Soviet Union as
a forum for the aiscussion of general and complete dis-
armament and was scheduled to convene on March 14, 1962,
in Geneva, Switzerland*
The eighteen members were selected from five North
Atlantic Treaty Organizatic»i members, five Warsaw Pact
Mtabers, and eight noii-nuclear, n<»i-aligned states* Thus,
the members of the Committee for the forthcoming Conference
were: the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Canada














the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Poland, and
Bulgaria—the Warsaw Pact members; Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia,
India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab
Republic-—the non-nuclear and non-aligned members, France
declined to attend the Conference because she believed
that only nuclear powers could take positive steps towards
worthwhile disarmament measures.
II. THE FIRST PERIOD MARCH 14, 1962 -
JUNE 15, 1962
Introduction
The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on
Disarmament convened on schedule on March 14, 1962* They
held fifty-six meetings in private session until the Con-
ference recessed on June 15tb. Also, during this period,
the Subcommittee on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon
Tests was established with the United States, the Soviet
Union, and the United Kingdom as members. The Subcommittee
held eighteen meetings during this period.
Although the Conference was called a conference on
disarmament, the majority of the time was spent on the
nuclear weapons test ban issue. The positions of both
sides was well aired and the non-aligned members contri-
buted to the discussion with the Eight-Nation memorandum
on April 16, 1962.
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Opening Debate
After procedural matters had heen attended to, the
Conference began to hear opening statements; and it be-
came immediately clear that the major issue would be the
question of the nuclear weapons test ban.
At the second meeting, the Soviet representative
criticized the United States for deciding to resume atmos-
pheric testing in the latter part of April and further
stated that the Soviet Uhion would reply in kind.
The United States representative in his opening
remarks said that the United States was prepared to make
every reasonable effort to reach agreement on a nuclear
weapons test ban agreement. He added,
I had €wcpected that a number of representatives
might express here their regrets that the Soviet
Union and the United States had resumed nuclear
testing. But I had supposed that there was one
delegation - that of the Soviet Union - which could
not have found it possible to criticize the United
States for doing so.-*-
The other representatives in their opening remarks
also called for renewed efforts to reach agreement on a
nuclear weapons test ban. The Indian representative sug-
gested an alternate approach to the problem. He suggested
that
If the idea is that one cannot take for granted
the results of the detection efforts by any one of
the three countries involved in this matter - that
is to say, if the United States is not prepared to
accept the judgment on this score of the United










it may be wortn considering whether scientic de-
tection stations could Jae established by national
efforts in other countries or could be interna-
tionally established. If it is possible to spread
bases all round the world to manufacture these
weapons, it should also be possible to establish
these peace stations in various parts of the world,
in countries, tiiat are only partly committed or are
uncommitted to the two blocs. Then, in the event of
an explosion, the results would come in from every-
where*
He contended that the problem is one of detecting
nuclear explosions and that detection would establish
proof of violation of a test-ban agreement. Ke added,
"there had to be agreement, but agreements cannot be left
2to trust."
The athiopian representative suggested an inter-
national scientific system of verification to resolve
3differences in results of national detection systems.
Establishment of a Subcommittee on a Treaty for the
Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests
On March 21, 1962, at the 6tt meeting of the Con-
ference, they approved the establishment of a Subcommittee
on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons
Tests composed of the United States, the Soviet Union, and
the United Kingdom. The subcommittee would pursue private
talks towards reaching agreement on a Treaty for the Dis-
continuance of Nucleaur Weapon Tests.
Subcommittee meetings . At the first meeting of the





proposal to amend the Weatern draft treaty of April 18,
A
1961, as amended on May 29, 1961 and August 30, 1961,
The proposed amendments were;
1, Provisions for safeguarding other States
against the consequences of preparations for test-
ing* This would consist, in large part, of declara-
tions on the part of heads of States that there will
be no preparations for testing, and agreed rights to
inspect, a certain number of times per year, equal
numbers of declared sites on each side.
2, Provisions to shorten the time spent before
the beginning of the inspection process. This would
primarily be a question of the way the preparatory
fionanission functioned and agreement to cooperate in
speeding up, by all possible means, the establishment
of detection facilities including temporary control
posts,
3, Provisions to make the treaty comprehensive
from the outset. This would mean, in essence, re-
duction to zero of the present threshold of 4,75
degrees seismic magnitude,
4, Provisions to allocate an agreed limited
number of inspections within the inspection quota c
to zones which had normally little seismic activity.
The Soviet representative rejected the new Western
proposal and accused the West of submitting proposals that
they knew were not acceptable. He reaffirmed the Soviet
proposal of November 28, 1961, as the only basis for agree-
ment and repeated the argument that national systems were
g
now capable of detecting any explosion in any environment.
On March 22nd at the 2nd Subcommittee meeting, the
United Kingdom declared that the v^estern Powers were pre-
pared to negotiate on the Western draft treaty as modified
or
we are ready to do more than that; we are ready to
scrap our draft treaty completely and to start all











over again. We only ask that a nuclear test ban
agreement should provide for some adequate measure,
a minimum measure of international verification. ''^
The Soviet repres(i:ncai:u.ve refusea co oe swayed by
any arguments that the Western representatives put forviard
and repeated his arguments on the appropriateness of the
Soviet proposal of November 28ti» for a complete ban on
nuclear weapons tests and reliance on national detection
systems which he declared were now completely adequate.
Subcommittev- deadlocked. On March 22nd, the Sub-
cammittee submitted their report to the Conference and
declared that they had heen unable to report any progress
in reaching agreement.
Deadlock continues but positions aired . The Sub-
committee reconvened on March 28ti», but there was no change
in positions and the deadlock continued. However, certain
points were aired that set forth the basic positions
clearer.
The Soviet argument boiled down to that she could
not accept controls and inspection without genuine disarma-
ment because it would be nothing but a disguise for
espionage which would be a threat to her national security.
Ttee Soviet representative argued that because there had
not been any complaints or accusations from the Western

















The united States representative in reply to the
Soviet argument that there had not been any Western com-
plaints during the moratorium and thus proves the effec-
tiveness of national systems said,
• • • the fact is that although we in the United
States knew that the United States itself was not
conducting any nuclsar tests we did not know at all
what was taking place cai the territory of the Soviet
Union . • • • Yes, indeed, our scientists did record
hundreds of seismic or acoustic signals during those
three years of negotiation, and some of them may
have looked as if they could have been caused by a
secret underground nuclear detonation, or perhaps
by very heavy chemical explosions, or perhaps by
earthquakes* But how could we say anything at all?
We had no data enabling us to identify one detected
signal from another as a nuclear explosion; we had
no right whatsoever to seek an on-site inspection;
we did not wish to voice suspicions in a way that
might interfere with the test ban negotiations. So
we had to keep our silence, with our many unconfirmed
suspicions some of which did emerge in the press or
in public statements by private individuals • • • «
I submit that nothing could prove more clearly the
need for an international control system, for whether
the Soviet Union was or 'as not testing, many people
in the United States believed that during this
period the Soviet Union was secretly testing, and all
we, the Government, could say was that we had no
evidence*
5
Dl,zzussi.on of the Nuclear Weapons Test Ban Shifts to the
(Conference
With continued deadlock in the Subcommittee, discussion
on the test ban issue shifted to the Conference,
At the 13ti» and 14tt Meetings of the Conference, the
non-aligned members of the committee kept the attention of
the Conference on the nuclear wo&oons test ban issue and




The Burmese representative proposed that a more
simple system could be used, eliminating international
control posts from the territories that object to them but
retaining the right of conducting an agreed nuxaber of
properly safeguarded on-site inspections by an interna-
tional control organization.
The Swedish representative recommended further use
of existing scientific establishments which could be co-
ordinav;<3d into an international system. Further, he
recoiaraended the establishment of a commission composed of
prominent scientists to analyze the data received from
these stations to determine if a violation naa incurred.
He also asked that invitational inspection might be the
solution if coupled with the right of withdrawal of the
other parties if it is refused
.
The Mexican representative made a similar recommen-
dation in relation to inspection, but he went fi-irther to
say that the country concerned would be required to furnish
additional reports and data and the control commission
should have the right to confirm the data by direct ob-
servation.
Summary of the United States position . On April 4ti?
at the 15tb meeting of the Conference, the United States
representative summarized the present United States posi-
tion. He stated it as: first, the United States wanted a










test-ban treaty which gave reasonable assurance that all
countries were stopping tests and would be unable to
resume them without being exposed; second, the United
States believed that only an international control system
with a network of control posts, aircraft sampling flights,
and on-site inspections, together with an internationally
organized headquarters offered an adequate technical basis
for control; third, only an international system was
politically sound, for without it there could be no way to
obtain impartial data and settle disputes; fourth, the
United States was not wedded to a single formula and was
willing to examine all suggestions; fifths the United
States was unable to find any justification for the Soviet
13
rejection of international controls.
Summary of the Soviet Position , The Soviet repre-
sentative at the 15Uj meeting also summarized the Soviet
position. He stated that tl^ Soviet Union still maintained
that national systems of detection and identification were
fully sufficient. In relation to the question of on-site
inspections, he declared that the Soviet Union would not
agree to international inspection of unidentified events
on its territory, short of agreement on general and com-
plete disarmament. He then introduced a Soviet Government
statement which attributed lack of progress to the resump-






"conducive to businesslike negotiations on general and
complete disarmament," The statement blamed the v/estern
Powers for the failure of the conference because tney
refused to acknowledge that national systems were adequate
for control and the reluctance of the Western Powers to
14
stop testing.
The Question of Continued Tests and a Moratorium
The conference discussion shifted to consideration
of the question of testing by Nuclear Powers while the
conference was meeting.
On April 9t^, President Kennedy and Prime Minister
Kacmillan sent a joint letter to Premier Khrushchev which
basically stated that if the Soviet Union could not recon-
sider its position and express a readiness to accept the
principle of international verification, then the planned
15
nuclear tests for April would go forward as planned.
On April 12JA, Premier Khrushchev replied to the
joint letter and accused th« Viestern Powers of trying to
force inspection on the Soviet Union for other than control
reasons. He reaffirmed the validity of the Soviet pro-
posal of a comprehensive test bain treaty with the use of
national systems for verification and control.
Conference discusses the testing issue . On April










Conference called on the Nuclear Powers not to resume
testing while the negotiations were continuing.
The Soviet representative announced at the April
12tb meeting that the Soviet Union would agree to renounce
nuclear testing while negotiations were taking place in the
Conference, In concluding his statement, he said "the
Soviet Union was ready to consider seriously all the points
of view put forward in the present meeting and in the
earlier debates on this question." Further he said, the
Soviet Union will "ponder all possibilities that may offer
themselves in order to insure the signing of a treaty
putting an end to all forms of testing of nuclear
17
weapons."
United States re jects new Soviet offer for a mora-
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torium . Also on April 12ti, the United States Department
of State released a statement rejecting the Soviet offer
for a nev/ moratorium and termed it "another unfortunate
effort to substitute paper pledges for guaranteed agree-
ments." In rejecting the moratorium, the statement con-
tended that
the United States does not intend to place Its secu-
rity and the security of its allies at the mercy of
Soviet on-again-off-again tactics. iVe ore ready to
conclude an effective test ban agreement now. But
we cannot be led into another paper pledge which,
far from guaranteeing a halt to nuclear testing,
would only give rise to a false sense of security
and provide yet another opportunity for the Soviet
Union to prepare in secret for its own nuclear testing. ''•^
?^«/
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The Slght'^Natlon Memorandum
On April 16tJ» at the 21»t meeting of the Conference,
the representatives of 3raasil, Biirma, Ethiopia » India,
Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic
introduced a joint memoranduia putting forth certain sug-
gestions and ideas for the Nuclear Powers to consider as a
possible means of breaking the deadlock that was preventing
them fron reaching agreement on a nuclear weapons test ban*
The memorandum stated that there were certain areas
of agreement as well as existing differences, and these
areas of agreement should be explored further and extended*
They commended for the consideration of the Nuclear powers
the following suggestions and ideas as a means of extending
the areas of agreement and to assist them in reaching a
final agreement on banning nuclear tests.
• • • possibilities exist of establishing by agree-
ment a system for continuous observation and effec-
tive control on a purely scientific and non-political
basis* Such a system might be based and built upon
already existing national networks of observation
posts and institutions, or if more appropx~iate, on
certain of the existing posts designated by agreement
for the purpose together, if necessary, with new
posts established by agreement* The existing net-
works already include in their scientific endeavours
the detection and identification of manmade explo-
sions* Improvement could no doubt be achieved by
furnishing posts with advance instrumentation * • * •
Furthermore, the feasibility of constituting by
agreement an International Commission, consisting of
a limited number of highly qualified scientists,
possibly frc»n non-aligned countries together with
the appropriate staff might be considered* This
Commission should be entrusted with the tasks of











of observation posts and of reporting on any nuclear
explosion or suspicious event on the basis of thorough
and objective examination of all the available data*
All parties to the treaty should accept the obliga-
tion to furnish the Commission with the facts neces-
sary to establish the nature of any suspicious and
significant event* Pursuant to this obligation the
parties to the treaty could invite the Commission
to visit their territories and/or the site of the
event the nature of which was in doubt • • • •
Should the Commission find that it was unable to
reach a conclusion on the nature of a significant
event it would so inform the party on whose territory
that event had occurred, and simultaneously Inform
it of the points on which urgent clarification seemed
necessary. The Party and the Commission should con-
sult as to what further measures of clarification,
including verification in loco , would facilitate
the assessment. The paFEy concerned would, in ac-
cordance with its obligation referred to . .
above, give speedy and full cooperation to facilitate
the assessment.
After full examination of the facts, taking into
account any additional data furnished to it as sug-
gested above, the International Commission would
inform the parties to the treaty of all the circum-
stances of the case and of its assessment of the
concerned event.
The parties to the Treaty would be free to deter-
mine their action with regard to the treaty on the
basis of reports furnished by the International
Coimnission • . • .^^
Western and Soviet Interpretation of the Memorandum
Soviet interpretation . On April 19tt, the Soviet
representative introduced a statement from the Soviet
Government welcoming the Eight-Nation proposal. The state-
ment set forth that the Soviet Government interprets the
memorandum as involving national networks of detection
posts only, plus an international commission which would
process and analyze data. As to the question of inviting
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of suspicious events, the statement said this should be
decided by the States themselves* The Soviet Union it
said would be willing to study the proposal as a basis for
further negotiations and would agree to a moratorium
during the negotiations if the West did likewise.
Western interpretation ^ The representative of the
United Kingdom said he interpreted the memorandum to mean
that it endorsed the principles of international control
and on-site inspection and further that the Uhited Kingdom
would accept it as a basis for negotiation if the Soviet
Union accepted this interpretation of it.
The United States representative stated that the
United States position remained that the international
commission must have unquestioned right of inspection* He
argued that a State could physically prevent on->site inspec-
tion but the legal right of inspection must be recognized.
To support this argument he said,
if there was ambiguity in the treaty on this point,
or on the relationship between the international
control commission and the several Stat :^^ parties
to the treaty, and if the responsibility for the
prevcmting this on-site inspection could not be
laid firmly on any party to the treaty this would
affect the decision of other parties to consider
th^aselves free of their treaty obligations, and
the world would not know precisely what had hap-
pened*
In relation to the Soviet statement in reference to
the £ight-Nation proposal, the United States representative
••y;^
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remarked, that it appeared that the Soviet Union was will-
ing to negotiate only on those aspects of the proposal
that were compatible with their position but to ignore the
provisions involving international control and on-site
inspection* He added , however, that the United States was
willing to use the proposal for further discussions if the
Soviet Union did not reject international controls and
adequate ^ci-site inspection*
He denied the Soviet claim of the detection and
identification capabilities of national systens to monitor
all nuclear explosions and requested the Soviet Union to
introduce scientific evidence to support their claim*
As to the question of an uncontrolled moratorium,
he said,
the united States was prepared to negotiate on the
basis of the principles of the United States/United
Kingdom draft treaty and the experts reports of
1958 and 1959, but It would renounce tests only when
a sound and reasonable test ban treaty providing for
measures of effective international control and
adequate and objective scientific on-site inspection,
had been signed .^^
Soviet comments on Western interpretation * The
Soviet representative in exercising his right of reply
stated that the United States and the United Kingdom were
only willing to continue the negotiations if the Soviet
Uhion accepted their conditions* He also charged them
with rejecting the Eight-Nation memorandum as a basis for
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that no chance of agreement could come about with nuclear
explosions in the background and reaffirmed the Soviet
willingness to agree to a moratorium during the negotia-
tions,^^
Subcommittee Discusses the Sight-Nation Proposal
Despite the apparent difference of interpretation
of the Sight-Nation memorandxim the Nuclear Powers agreed
to discuss the memorandum in the Subcommittee*
At the 9U) meeting of the Subcommittee on April 20^,
the United States representative charged the Soviet Union
of unilaterally misinterpreting the Sight-Nation proposal*
He addcKl that if progress is to be made, the Western
Powers must know whether the Soviet Union was really
changing its position and was now willing to accept a
properly staffed and financed international control organi-
sation and to permit on-site inspection on its territory
24
when requested by the international commission*
The Soviet representative refused to add to the
previous Soviet interpretation of the proposal until the
Western Powers had accepted the proposal as a basis for
negotiation* He accused the Western Powers of maintaining
their previous position while considering the new pro-
, 25posal*
At the April 24ik meeting of the Subcommittee, the
Soviet representative clarified the Soviet view of where
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the Sight-Nation proposal fit in between the Soviet pro«-
posal and the Western proposal* He stated that the eight-
Nation memorandum was a coii^roBU.se between the Western
draft treaty which provided for 12—20 inspections a year
and the Soviet proposal of Noveniber 28 which proposed none
because it proposed inspection by invitation* He continued
that the international scientific commission proposed by
the m4Hsorandum was a compromise between the Western demand
for a world network of control posts and the Soviet pro-
posal which relied on national detection systems* He also
declared in concluding his statement that the Soviet Union
did not object to the creation by agreement of new observa-
tion posts to transmit data to the international commission
as proposed by the memorandum*
The l^ited States representative aXso at the April
24tk meeting of the Subcommittee clarified the Western
interpretation of the Eight-Nation memorandum and said it
implied the following verification arrangements}
1* effective detection through an international
network of control posts which may be based on exist-
ing national systems « supplemented by international
stations or a combination of both*
2* An international organ or body whose duty
will be receiving and processing data from the con-
trol posts, and thereafter taking action on the
basis of the data it receives and analyzes from
this new system of control posts*
3* Some effective means of establishing the
identity of any detected event where data from the
detection apparatus are in themselves inadequate
to determine whether a nuclear explosion or a
natural event took placet and
. I, •/ ,* :
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4* An obligation - I repeat » obligation - on
the part of the country on whose territory the
unidentified event has taken place to allow this
international organ or body the right to identify
the event in the only way possible • • • by sending
to the territory of the country where the uniden->
tified event has taken place an objective, scientific
inspection team which will report back to the inter-
national organ or body.
He continued that, although the United States be-
lieves that a truly international system of control posts
is best» it is prepared to examine the possibility of con-
structing, on the basis of existing systems,
an international, supplemented or integrated control
post network which will give the necessary degree of
assurance and which, through mechanical, technical
and other safeguards will also provide reliable
scientific and trustworthy data*
In relation to the international scientific or head-
quarters body, he stated, there was general agreement on
this point in the past and there appears to be agreement on
this point now. However, he added, this body must be:
(1) armed with an agreed and objective series of
criteria against which to check recorded data froa
properly placed control posts with appropriate in-
strumentation in order to determine, whe .:ver pos-
sible, that a nuclear test has or has not taken
place
;
(2) provided with agreed criteria with which to
isolatfe those data which are only indicative of the
fact that a test could have taken place, where it
is not possible by the use of data from detection
systems instrumentation to ensure that a test has
not taken place
j
(3) equipped with procediures and methods to
ensure that the data showing testing could have
taken place are adequately investigated so that the





••yf ;"TO ,^ i'Ti T '?'7. f."
*Jt
2X0
(4) staffed with impartial, scientific personnel
so that all participating States can have confidence
and trust in the objectivity of whatever conclusions
the body may draw*
He concluded his statement by summarizing the views
of the United States in reference to the issues contained
in the Eight-Nation memorandum. He stated these views as:
first, there appears to be agreement between the two sides
that the memorandum can be an effective and useful docu-
ment and that it can be one of the basis for further nego-
tiations, but not an exclusive basis; and second, there is
also apparent recognition of the necessity of an inter-
national network of control posts, the requirement for an
international scientific headqueurters body, and the need
for an effective means to identify certain events which
27
might be nuclear explosions.
The discussions in the Subcommittee continued, but
there was no appreciable change in positions in reference
to the Interpretation of the Sight-Nation memorandum. At
the May 3rd Subcommittee meeting, the Soviet representa-
tive said that the meetings had reached an impasse be-
cause of the Western continued adherence to their old
positions on International control and mandatory on-site
inspections.
Non-aligned Nations Express their Views on the Impasse








non-aligned members discussed the problttn of the impasse
in the Subcommittee* They did not offer any interpreta-
tion of their memorandum because they felt that this wa«
up to the Nuclear Powers to interpret the memorandum, but
they did make some suggestions*
The Mexican representative suggested that the
Nuclear Powers study the network of observation posts, the
composition of the commission and the principle of inter-
national control* He stressed that it was not possible to
guarantee treaty observance through coercive means « "the
only sanction was moral condemnation by public opinion and
the fact that the offended party would automatically con-
sider itself freed from the obligations undertaken under
the treaty*" He added,
in view of the situation, it seems to us that it
is becoming increasingly urgent and essential every
day to draw up an agreement fixing now - I repeat,
now - the date for the discontinuance of nuclear
tests, even if this cannot be before the conclusion
of the series of explosions already begun and before
the beginning of the answ<u:ing series announced by
the Soviet Union* The plans of both parties for
carrying out explosions must have an end, ajid this
end should be fixed now in a treaty • * * so that
this year or the beginning of next year may &o.e a
definite &nd to the senseless nuclear competition.^^
The Swedish and Indian representatives urged the












D<adlock Continues in the Subcoiamittee
On May IIU at the 13tt aoating of the Subccffiunittee,
the Soviet representative stated that the Cight-^Nation
proposal could sttrv as a freiaework of agreement and c.j)ced
the v/estern representatives to record agreement on the
following principles: first, use of existing national
detection systems, suppl&iaented where necessary by other
observation posts established by agreement} second, on an
international commission of scientists with appropriate
31
staff; and third, on inspection by invitation*
The Western representatives refused to agree because
they considered this proposal as being too general and un-
clestr, and suggested a meeting of technical experts to
discuss the possibilities of national systems and addi-
32tional observation posts*
The Soviet representative in reply stated that this
course would only add to the deadlock* He added that the
Soviet Union would agree to set up the international
commission if the Western Powers accepted national systc^ms,
and they would agree to inspection if the West agreed that
it should take place by invitation*
In relation to the qu«^stion of whether the Soviet
Union would, in fact, invite inspection, he replied, "in

















coiwaisslon should be invited to establish iii loco th«
33
nature of events about which doubt has arisen*"
At the final Subcoremittee meeting during this
period on May 29tb^ the United States representative sua-
Buorized the current situation in the negotiations*
He denied the claim of the Soviet Union that
existing national systems could detect and identify all
nuclear explosions* He analyzed the current Soviet posi-
tion as using the existing national systems and not supple-
menting them as had been proposed where necessary* He
said it also appears that national systems would only
report data to the international commission relating to
events considered suspicious by each national system under
the Soviet proposal*
In relation to the international commission, he con-
tended that such an international commission under the
Soviet proposal would not bother the Soviet Union at all*
He pointed out that under the Soviet proposals the com-
mission would simply have to analyze such data as national
networks chose to provide and then try to settle anv
questions by dis^crussion with the party concerned* At most,
he continued, a party might **on occasions of its own
choosing, decide for its own reasons to invite a few
members of the commission to pay what would amount to a
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In conclusion, he said that ther« was still no
cloar evidence that the Soviet Uhlon had moved fron their
34
November 28, 1961, position*
SmwBi!*ry
On June 15, 1962, the Conference took a recess
until July 16, 1962* Before the recess there were several
meetings at which tlie representatives summarised th-^^r
views on t;.& t^'- ogress of the Conference. All recognized
the value of the E;ight~Nation proposal, but there was
still a wide difference of opinion in the interpretation
of that proposal by the West and the Soviet Union. Al-
though there did not appear to have been any appreciable
progress, there had been a wide airing of views which
prompted the Eight-Nation Memorandum; azKi even though
the issues remained deadlocked, the positions were more
clearly recognized*
Thus, the first period of the Conference of the
Cighteen-Hation committee on Disarmai^tnt came to a close
after fifty-six plenary sessions and eighteen meetings of
the Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of
Nuclear Weapon Tests during which the majority of the
discussion revolvcKl around the continued quest for a












III, THE SECOND PERIOD JULY 16, 1962 -
SEPTEMBER 7, 1962
Introduction
The second period of the Conference of the Eighteen-
Nation Coiwnittee on Disarmament conimenced when the Con-
ference reconvened on July 16, 1962. Before the Conference
recessed on September 7, 1962, twenty-six plenary sessions
were held and the Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discon-
tinuance of Nuclear Weapcm Tests held seven formal meetings*
Debate continued in the plenary meetings and the
Subcommittee over the interpretation of the Cight-Hation
Memorandum. The introduction of two draft treaties, one
comprehensive and the other for a partial ban, by the
United States and the United KingdcxR on August 27, 1962,
put the V/estern position into concise treaty language.
The non-aligned members of the Conference continued to
put forth various suggestions in an effort to bring the
Nuclear Powers together to work towards an acceptable
solution of the nuclear weapons test ban issue. As in the
first period, the nuclear weapons test ban issue remained
the major topic discussed during this period.
United States Introduces Report on Project Vela
On July 16, 1962, at the first plenary meeting of







the preliminary findings of Project Vela, the seismic re-
search program carried out by the Uhited States* The
united States representative comnenting on this prelimi-
nary report of the results of the program said,
the problems involved in this report of research
are the central ones in the negotiation of a com-
prehensive test ban* The questic ns both of the
respective capabilities of distant and close-in
instmrrentation to detect and identify seismic
disturbances, and of the way in which all types of
instrumentation can be best combined in a control
system, are crucial in determining the level of
control system effectiveness* These questions
also give the sieasure, as well as the extent, to
which on-site inspections must be cmiployed*
He suggested that because of the importance of this
scientific data that the conference spend several meetings
either formal or informal discussiry this data and also
look at some implications this data has on the issues
35before the conference*
Soviet Union rejects the new data * On July 20t* at
the 21st meeting of the Subcommittee, the Soviet represen-
tative denied the necessity to conduct scientific research
for reaching an accord on a nuclear test ban* He contended
that the new scientific data was not "germane" to the
present negotiations and that "if there really is anything
new in these data, this new material tenus to support our
position and not yours*"
Western reply to Soviet rejection * At the 22nd Sub-






the Soviet charge that the new data would support the
Soviet case and not the Western* He argued that
these findings do not demonstrate the possibility
of doing away with either international control
posts located on various parties territory or the
necessity for a certain appropriate number of on-
site inspections to determine the precise nature
of unidentified events.^'
Debate About Testing During the Negotiations
Soviet Union resumes testing » When the Sovi^c
Union annouiicei on July 21st that they intended to conduct
•nothor series of atmospheric tests, this started extensive
debate on the subject in the Conference.
United States comments At the 60tt meeting of the
Conference on July 24ti, the United States representative
remarked
,
After the Soviet Union last year abandoned the
laoratorium and conducted a series of more than forty
tests I I suppose that it felt that it had a right to
test last* Be that as it may, members here will
remcunber that, even after that series of more than
forty tests, the United Kingdom and the United States
made proposals for the stoppage of testing at that
point and forever—the principal price for which,
in terms of assurance, was that international inspec-
tion be permitted to look at less than one part in
two one-thousands of Soviet territory in any given
year. That was after that series of tests and before
the recent united States series of tests, but even
that farthing was not paid to bring this testing to
and end
.
He concluded by saying,
there is suspicion that even a tiny bit of inter-
national inspection involves espionage affecting
the sGcux-ity of the Soviet Union. But, surely,
we can find some way not to have to deal with this
problem of good faith { arrangements which make it
txs






irrelevant} arrfiingements which provide assiirance;
arrangements upon which confidence can be built in
the light of experience, as we move forward. 38
Soviet defense of position . At the 22nd Subcom-
mittee meeting on July 26ilJ, the Soviet representative
denied that the Soviet Union had broken the moratorium.
He referred to President Eisenhower's statement of December
29, 1959, when he said that the United States was no longer
bound by the moratorium and to France's "systematically"
39
carrying out bomb tests in the Sahara.
United States reply . The United States representa-
tive, in exercising his right of reply, simply said that
President Sisenhower did not say that the United States
would test and "indeed it did not do so," further he added
that Premier Khrushchev on January 14, 1960, had said that
the Soviet Union would not renew tests if the West did not
resume testing. In reference to the last to test argtiment,
he said, that the Soviet Union was the last to test before
40the moratorium went into effect in November 1958.
Interpretation of the Eight-Nation Memorandum
Western interpretation continued . At the 21st
Subcommittee meeting on July 20tt>, the United States rep-
resentative reviewed the major principles of the Eight-
Nation Meraorandum. He pointed out that the memorandum
stipulated that the system might be based and built upon









necessary by new posts by agrecui^nt* He continued, there-
fore,
if agreement on a control system had to be reached
by the parties to a treaty v^ich by definition, would
be an international agreement, the system as a whole
would be international in character* /Tn conclusion
he contandedj7 the obligation to accept on-site in-
spections by the representatives of the cooamission is
in reality part and parcel of ti a obligation to fur-
nish the commission with the facts necessary to
establish the nature of any suspicious and significant
event* -^
Soviet c<»Bments on v/estern interpretation * Thm
Soviet representative stated that it was the United States
representative's interpretation alone which accorded the
system of control posts an international character and that
this was not inherent in the memorandum* He argued that
the memorandum called for a national network and not an
42international network*
Controversy continues * At the 22nd meeting of the
Siabcoromittee on July 26tb, the debate over interpretation
of the Sight-Nation Memorandum continued* The United
States representative continued to maintain his position
that the monorandum ^explicitly*^ called for a system of
international control posts and obligatory on-site inspec-
tions* He pointed out that the United States accepted the
memorandum as "one basis" for fiurther negotiations and that
proposals such as the Mexican and Brazilian proposals,
should be welcomed*














was reading into the mentorandum an interpretation of its
own* He continued to argue that the m«&orandum was ex-
plicit in its description of control posts as being
nationally manned and that inspection was not obligatory*
He did admit, however, that there were some missing parts
in the nMffiiorandusi that were subject to interpretation, but
the basic parts were being given a different interpretation
44by the West*
The Mexican and Brazilian Proposals Brought to the
F<
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orefront
The Mexican proposal suggesting a cut-off date for
nuclear testing and the Brazilian proposal for a limited
test ban for tests in the atmosphere and outer space were
given wide discussion and were generally favored by the
non-aligned nations as a solution to the present deadlock
if agreen»nt could not be reached on the basis of the
Eight-Nation Memorandum*
Controversy over Mexican proposal * The matter of
interpretation of the Mexican proposal for a cut off also
became the center of controversy between the Soviet Union
and the West* At the 60tt meeting of the Conference, the
representative from the United Kingdom, commenting on the
Mexican proposal said,
a trea y should be signed and a date to be written
into t J +-r«aty on which the ban would be fixed by
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any country to make such last tests as it felt it
required to make for national security .^^
At the 21st meeting of the Subcommittee, he also
said that consideration be given to the Mexican proposal
whereby the Nuclear Powers could fix a date, merely as an
illustration, terminating nuclear tests and that such a
46date might be written into the test ban treaty.
The Soviet representative replied that the Western
Powers were interpreting the proposal on their own condi-
tions. According to him, the Mexican proposal suggested
the setting of a date to terminate nuclear testing "whether
an agreement has been reached by that time or not#" The
Soviet Union he said was willing to discuss the proposal
47but without conditions or provisos submitted by the West.
The United Kingdom representative argued that the
West was not attaching conditions and provisos to the
Mexican proposal. He continued to maintain that the in-
clusion of a terminal date for testing in a test-ban treaty
48
was explicit in the proposal.
At the 61st meeting of the Conference, the Braziliein
representative spoke in favor of the Mexican proposal but
added that "it might have the undesirable effect of stimu-
49lating experiments during the rest of the current year."
At the 63rd meeting of the Conference, the Mexican
representative again urged the Nuclear Powers to take up
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limiting the ban to atmospheric testing until an accord
was reached on detection, identification, and controls
SO
concerning testing in other environments.
At the 64tb meeting, the Swedish representative
suggested that the following measures might be dealt with
immediately t first, the adoption of the Brazilian pro-
posal outlawing at least atmospheric and outer space test-
ing} second, coupling of the Brazilian and Mexican pro-
posals} third, the initiation of practical steps leading
to a ban on underground tests as well, consisting of an
inventory of existing geo-physical observation posts,
specific plans for equipping some stations with modern
instruments, invitation to institutes to accept as a more
definitive obligation the duty to register internationally
all data observed, a study of a rapid communications
system, blueprints for additional stations and plans for
51
creation of an international commission*
New Proposals Submitted by the West
At the 23rd Subcommittee meeting on August 9tfc, the
United States representative delivered a statement on the
new proposals that the united States and the United Kingdom
were introducing based on the results of the United States
Project Vela,
He initially remarked that a number of technical

















to respond to the eight-nation initiative and to achieve a
workable comprehensive test ban treaty have been brought
about by an extensive evaluation of the suggestions of-
fered by the eight nations and by the review of the find-
ings of research programs on the detection and identifica-
tion of underground seismic events* Two conclusions in
particular offer real promise, he said: first, is a re-
assessment on the basis of increased experience, of seismic
detection capability, which indicates a substantially
better capability for long-range seismic detection than
has been the case in the past; the second, is that the
estimate of the number of earthquakes comparable to an
underground nuclear test of a given magnitude has been
substantially reduced from the previous estimate.
He indicated that these developments w^re signifi-
cant for the following reasons
i
First, the increase in long—range detection
capability makes it possible to develop a world-
wide network of control posts with substantially
fewer detection stations in the Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and other coun-
tries than those proposed in the April 18, 1961
United States-United Kingdom treaty draft.
Secondly, the decrease in the number of unidenti-
fied events with which a detection system will have
to cope will make it possible to decrease the number
of on-site inspections required for verification.
Thirdly, these developments do not provide a
definite way of determining from seismic data in all
cases that a particular seismic event has not been
an underground explosion and, therefore, these
developments do not eliminate the certain require-
ment of effective, reliable and objective on-site
CSS
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inspections as an essential element of any system
of verification*
He continued that on the basis of these develop-
ments, the Ut^ited States is prepared to discuss a compre-
hensive test ban treaty based on "a viorld wide network of
supervised national monitoring posts*" This, he added,
would also involve a reduction in the number of on-site
inspections previously required by the United States*
The keystone to an agreement, he maintained, is the
obligation to facilitate the on-site inspection called for
under the treaty* This, he continued, is so
because many seismic signals can be identified as
coming from earthquakes, but no seismic signal can
as yet be positively identified as coming from
nuclear explosions* Therefore, the only way to
clear up the doubt as to the origin of an uniden-
tified event is by on-site geographical inspection
of the site frcm which the signal originated*
Technical developments, he continued, have not changed
that conclusion* He added,
indeed, to the extent that greater reliance is placed
on seismic data from distant stations the need for
on-site inspection intensifies rather than diminishes*
Therefore, on-site inspection goes to the very heart
of the issue of verification of a comprehensive
nuclear test ban*
To put the issue straight on the Uhited states
position in relation to the principle of on-site inspec-
tion, he spelled it out as follows
s
1* There should be prompt certification by an
appropriate official responsible to an international
coRRBiission that a seismic event reported by a net-
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has been geographically located according to the
agreed scientific criteria and has not ho^n
eliminated from consideration piursuant to agreed
criteria*
(a) The United States position is that these
criteria should be on a scientific basis, as stated
previously* These criteria will, of course, be
concerned with the location of a seismic event, in-
cluding the approximate time and position of the
event, and with events which can be eliminated as
ineligible for inspection*
(b) The United States position on the area
to be covered once an inspection has been certified
may n&ed to be broadened somewhat from that previ-
ously stated because of changed capability <xi
geographical location of a network of fewer inter-
nationally supervised national stations*
2* Upon certification by the appropriate inter-
national official of events within the territory
under the Jurisdiction or control of the United
States or the Uhited Kingdom the agreed number of
on-site inspections are to be carried out at the
request of the Soviet Union* If such events are on
the territory under the jurisdiction of the Soviet
Union the agreed number of on-site inspections are
to be carried out at the request of the United States
or the United Kingdom* If such events are on terri-
tory under the Jurisdiction or control of other
parties the selection of events to be inspected is
to be by agreed procedures*
3* Any party having Jurisdiction or control of
territory in which an on-site inspection is re-
quested is obligated to facilitate the prompt on-
situ inspection of the area* The on-site inspec-
tions shall be carried out by teams organized by
the international commission* These teams shall be
organized on an objective basis which ensures ade-
quate representation of scientific and technical
skills, and on a basis vdiich adheres to the principle
that self inspection by nationals of the State in-
spected or of its allies must not be permitted*
In regards to Soviet resistance to inspection, he
said, it appears to be motivated by two concerns* First,
is that the Soviet Union will not tolerate inspection
because inspectors may learn something of military value*
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To alleviate this concern, he said the united States is
"openminded" and quite reasonable about such matters as
the means by which an inspection team would be transported
from the border of the State to the site of the unidenti-
fied event. He called on the Soviet Union to put forward
any proposal in this regard that she may have, and it will
find the West "very reasonable indeed," The second concern
the Soviet Union appears to have, he said, is that talking
in terms of a "right" of on-site inspection by an inter-
national commission, this implies "somehow of a derogation
of the sovereignty of the State on whose territory the
inspection is demanded," He said that, if this is the
problem, then the United States is prepared to consider
the question in a different manner. That is,
it would be acceptable to the United States if,
instead of stating a provision for on-site inspection
as a right of the party requesting an inspection, the
on-site inspection requirements were to be stated as
an obligation to be fulfilled by the party on whose
territory an unidentified seismic event occurred.
On the question of the number of on-site inspections,
the United States representative outlined the present
United States position. Up to this point, he said, the
United States position on the number of on-site inspec-
tions has been for a sliding scale between twelve and
twenty. However, he added that if the obligation to
facilitate on-site inspections is accepted, the United
States is prepared to consider a reduction from this
n^iiivqo'
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figure based on the new scictntific information* This
number, he continued,
roust take into account the detection, location, and
identification capabilities of a network of inter-
nationally supervised national stations and the need
to establish reasonable confidence on any side that
no violation of the treaty will in fact occur*
The United States, he contended,
does not seek on-site inspections because it wants
international Inspectors of the commission moving
on Soviet soil but rather, and only, because
scientifically on-site inspections are an essential
part of a truly verifiable nuclear test ban treaty*
He then proceeded to outline the network of inter-
nationally supervised national stations as envisaged by
the United States* This new position of the West would
differ in two ways from the previous Western position, he
pointed out* First, it would Involve a substantially
MMnller number of stations; and second, it would Involve a
network of international supervised nationally manned
stations instead of a network of internationally operated
stations* For this system to be effective, he said, it
would require that the international commission be able to
process systematically and regularly the scientific data
received from all stations, including those from within a
particular country* Therefore, he continued, the inter-
national c<»!Qmisslon must have: rapid and reliable communi-
cations; be assured that all posts are operated strictly
and continuously in accordance with strict scientific





operated at peak efficiency and data is being reported
continuously and accurately without jamming or inter-
ference; personnel of the control stations must meet
agreed standards; instrumentation of the control stations
must be constructed, equipped and calibrated in accordance
with agreed standards; the commission must be made promptly
aware of any suspicious event; and each control station
must be located at a quiet site in a region scientificailly
satisfactory to the commission*
In conclusion, he argued that "nationally manned
control posts must be under effective and adequate supers-
vision at all times* The objective is to have inter-
national supervision of a nature which provides effective
international control, giving all parties to the treaty
confidence that the nationally manned stations are con-
tinuously operating in the efficient and scientific manner
required."
Summing up the present new United States position,
he said it consists of: first, acceptance of the obliga-
tory nature of on-site inspections; second, a willingness,
once the proposal referred to first is accepted, to con-
sider a reduction in the number of on-site inspections
based upon a scientific evaluation and the need to provide
all parties to a treaty with reasonable confidence that no











once the proposal referred to first is accepted, to con«»
sider a network of detection staticois which: would in«>
volve a substantially smaller niJtmber of stations world-wide
than the number previously proposed, including a substan-
tially smaller number of stations in the Soviet Uhioni
would involve internationally supervised , nationally
manned stations instead of a network of internationally
52
operated stations*
Soviet comments on the new proposals in the Sub-
committee * The Soviet representative comented in the
Subcommittee following the submission of the new Western
proposals, that this new position on control posts and on-
site inspection has not changed the position on the
principle of the basic conditions on which agreement could
be achieved* He continued that "it must also be empha-
sized in this connexion that the United States, while
giving wide publicity to its new position, is in fact de-
fending its old position, slightly dolled up for purposes
of disguise*" In addition, he added, the United States is
only paying "lip service" to the Sight-Nation M^Borandura
and has not accepted the compromise proposals put forward
by this memorandvtm* He ccmtinued that there is a cardinal
difference between the invitational inspection concept put
forward in the mcdnorandum and the condition of acceptance
of obligatory on-site inspcKztion as the key to further
oci
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negotiations under the United States proposals. He ex-
poiinded his previous arguments that the new United States
position is not scientifically and technically based; and,
in the light of the new scientific data put forward by the
United States, it has no grounds for adhering to its
53former position.
Test Ban Issues is Aired by the Conference
With the Subcommittee still deadlocked, the discus-
sion of the test ban issue shifted to the plenary sessions.
United States reviews the issue . At the 69tii meeting
of the Conference, the United States representative re-
viewed the course of the test ban negotiations. He blamed
the present deadlock: on the obstructionism of the Soviet
Union in refusing to budge from its interpretation of the
Eight-Nation Memorandum and its refusal to discuss scien-
tific matters which would facilitate steps leading to
agreement
•
As to the new United States proposals, he said,
they were based on scientific and political realities and
were consistent with the Eight-Nation Memorandum. As to
on-site inspections, he continued, they will be necessary
because even
a superior, well-operated system of detection
stations ... will not be able to identify all
events detected by it.






Hm contended that the Soviet interpretation of the Sight-
Nation Memorandum on the suibject of on-site inspection
means that it is an "option to be honoured only if, at the
54
tine, the Soviet Uhion so desires*"
Soviet representative ccffliments on the issue * The
Soviet representative commented that the Uhited States new
proposals contained "nothing hopeful or rational" and the
united States position had remained unchanged* Further,
he added, the proposals were an "ultimatum-like d«iiand,"
whereby unless the Soviet Union accepted the obligatory on-
site inspection principle, the United States was not
55prepared to examine other aspects of its own proposal*
United Arab Republic submits a new suggestion * The
representative of the United Arab Republic commenting on
the deadlock in the Subcomsiittee requested the Nuclear
Powers to iron out their basic differences which he be-
lieved stemmed from "political considerations rather than
from the observance of practicality*" He continued that
the £ight-Nation Memorand\im remained the "best, the most
practical, and the fairest basis" for an agreement and he
questioned the need for "discussions of the modalities" of
a test ban* In conclusion, he suggested that the Nuclear
Powers explore the possibility of seeking agreement on















Uhited States replies to Soviet statement * At the 70t*
meeting of the Conference, the Uhlted States representa*
tive denied the Soviet charge that the new United States
proposals contained an ultimatum but Instead they stressed
the relationship between the acceptance of the principle
of obligatory on-site Inspection and the nustber of inspec-
tions and control posts. He continued that new scientific
information had made it possible to reduce the number of
on—site inspections and control posts but there would
always be a certain number of unidentified events that
could cmly be identified by on-site inspections* In con-
clusion, he said, "it would be rather a fruitless exercise
to discuss the reduction in the nionber of inspections and
control posts without acceptance of the principle of
57
obligatory on-site inspection*"
United States comments on UAR suggestion * At the 71st
meeting of the Conference, the United States representa-
tive commented on the represent.ative of the United Arab
Republic* 8 suggestion that the Muclear Powers establish
criteria governing situations requiring on-site inspection*
He said that the Joint Uhited States-United Kingdom scien-
tific research program was just such an approach* The
results of this program have been introduced for discussion
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program, but, he added, the Soviet Union has refused to
CO
discuss this data.
Soviet Union critiques United States proposals and
outlines the Soviet position on a test ban . At the 71st
meeting also, the Soviet representative gave a forraal reply
to the United States statements on its position. He first
said that a careful analysis of these stateanents revealed
that they did not add anything constructive to the present
debate. The Soviet analysis of the United States represen-
tative's statements was that he:
touched upon various aspects of the problem of a
nuclear test ban treaty; he spoke at scMne length on
the history of our negotiations, on the scientific
aspect of the matter , on the analogy between on-
site inspection and control over general and com-
plete disarmament, and so on, and he asserted that
the main requisite for the conclusion of an agree-
ment on a test ban must be the recognition of the
principle of international on-site inspection.
The Soviet representative pointed out that the lack
of positive results in the negotiations can be attributed
to
the Western Powers desire to make the solution of the
problem of a nuclear test ban dependent upon an agree-
ment by the Soviet Utaion to open its territory for a
legalized intelligence system under the guise of
international control and inspection.
He continued that the Soviet Union is just as much in
favor of effective control over the compliance of a nuclear
weapon test ban as anyone else. However, he added, "it
does not believe it is necessary to have a form of inter-
national control which could be used as cover for
ir
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intelligence activities*" Therefore, he argued, the
Soviet Union after a thorough and many-sided study of the
question has concluded that
compliance with the obligations of an agre«nent on
the cessation of nuclear weapon tests can, with
sufficient guarantees, be successfully verified by
the use of existing national means of detection of
nuclear explosions* It was on the basis of this
careful conclusion that the Soviet Union submitted
its 28 November 1961 proposal for the cessation of
all nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer
space, under water or underground, using for purposes
of control, systems of national detection of nuclear
explosions*
This proposal, he continued, was based on a new approach
to the question of cessation of nuclear weapon tests which
would eliminate difficulties and obstacles which had pre-
vented agreement before* This approach, he said, made it
possible to solve the problem without "jeopardizing the
security of States*" He added, this approach was rejected
by the Western Powers "because it would have disturbed the
intelligence plans of the United States and its NATO
allies."
This was the situation, he contended, when the
eight-Nation M«aK>randum was submitted by the non-aligned
States in an attempt to break the impasse* He continued
that the Soviet Union accepted this memorandum as a basis
for agreement, in an attempt to bring about the reaching
of agreement cm the cessation of nuclear weapon tests*
This proposal of the non-aligned v/as a compromise because,
he said, it recognised that a system of continuous
ut
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observation and effective control over the cessation of
niiclear test can be based and built upon already existing
national networks of observation posts and institutions*
Further I he added, this memorandum proposed the establish-
ment of an international commission cos^osed of a limited
number of highly qualified scientists to process the data
received from national stations, thus adding an element of
an "international nature" in the system*
As to the question of on-site inspection, he said
the memorandum also puts forth a compromise proposal in
that once a suspicious event is located by the coau&ission,
the count! y concerned will
give speedy and full cooperation to facilitate the
assessment, thus the State concerned would have the
responsibility of clearing itself by all means at
its disposal, refusal to invite on-site inspection
if that is the only way to finally verify the event
would be reported to the other parties concerned and
to world opinion*
This, he contended, would be a vezry serious matter and "a
decision that could not be taken lightly*" Therefore, he
argued, the formula of an on-site inspection upon invita-
tion without bringing to it the concept of an obligatory
on-site inspection does not precliK^e the ^.^ssibility of
59
on-site inspection in concrete cases*"
Indiar^ representative expresses viewa on the issue *
At the 72nd meeting on August IQVkf the Indian representa-




an agreement on a test ban was not remote, the main diffi-
culties, he said, centered around the respective claims
regarding the capability of national stations in detecting
all types of events and the nature of on-site inspection*
He pointed out, in this regard, that the United States
position was that not all events were detectable, while the
Soviet representative had said that national stations had
detected practically all nuclear tests* To the Indian
representative , these 8tatem€&nts showed that there was not
too wide a divergence of views on the question*
As to the problem of on-site inspections, he said,
that the Sight-^Nation Memorandum contained "built-in
obligations" which would provide adequate assurance that
the ban would not be violated* He pictured the inter-
national commission as a scientific body which v/ciald
generate the spirit of mutual obligation and international
duty, to which States would respond autoBUitically if it
called for a decision of requiring on-site inspection.
As to the deterrent effect idea as put forth by the
united States, he felt that the memorandum contained such
a scneme in that the international commission itself could
call for inspection if a suspicious event occ\irred* He
added that the Soviet statements indicated that they would
comply with such a request*










substantive difference on the issues separating the
Nuclear Powers from reaching agreement*
United States and United Kingdom Introduce
Alternative Draft Treaties
Comprehensive test ban treaty * At the 75ti meeting
of the Conference on August 27tb, the United States repre-
sentative tabled a comprehensive test ban treaty based on
the new Western proposals put forth by the United States
and the United Kingdom* On introducing the new comprehen-
sive draft treaty, he said that it was based on the scien-
tific research program carried out by tli& United States and
also takes into account the constructive suggestions of the
Eight-Nation Memorandum. He summarized the treaty as
follows
:
This treaty provides for the cessation of all
nuclear tests in all environments* The parties to
the treaty would undertaJcc to prevent and prohibit
the carrying out of such tests at any place under
their Jurisdiction* Further, the parties to the
treaty would refrain from causing, encouraging or
in any way participating in the carrying out of any
tests anywhere at any time*
These obligations would be supervised by an inter-
national scientific commission assisted by an inter-
national staff and a verification system. Each party
would also undertake to cooperate with that commis-
sion in carrying out all measures of de ection,
location, identification and inspection, and in
establishing elements of the system* The commission
would have general responsibility for the collection
of data on, and the reporting of, all events which
could be suspected of being nuclear weapon test
explosions and for making positive identification
of the nature and origin of such events as necessary*
The draft treaty provides that the commission






West, four from the Soviet bloc and seven chosen
from among parties jointly nominated by the United
States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union*
The United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet
union would hold permanent membership on the com-
mission*
The international staff would assist the commis*
sion by carrying out functions at the headquarters
and by manning any international stations which
might be set up by the commission in agreement with
the parties concerned where that was considered
desirable and was mutually acceptable* The staff
would also participate in the international super-
vision, inspection and monitoring of the nationally
manned detection stations*
The executive officer of the commission would
be responsible for the staff under the direction of
the commission* He would select the scientific and
technical personnel for the international staff
under criteria set forth in the treaty* The veri-
fication system would include nationally manned,
internationally supervised and monitored detection
stations to be constructed at sites which would be
agreed upon by the parties to the treaty* The com-
mis^ision would establish the specifications and pay
for maintaining, constructing, equipping and training
of personnel for these nati<»kally manned stations*
In addition, in so far as appropriate, use would
be made of a number of national stations already in
existence* The parties would assume an obligation
to ensure that the system would begin operation at
least six months after the entry into force of the
treaty* Obligatory on-site inspection of unidentified
events would be provided on tlie basi& of carefully
defined procedures laid down in the treaty* The
executive officer, on behalf of the coimnission,
would indicate which events had been located and
remained unidentified after the application of
criteria specified in the treaty*
The sise of the area in any party's territory
which might be inspected in connexior^ vith any uniden-
tified event would also be designated in the treaty*
Inspection would take place under an annual quota
arrangement for each country—an agri?ed maximum per
year—but only if the events mat the treaty require-
ments for eligibility for on-site inspection • * • •
The objective of on-site inspections would be
carried out by teams organized by the commission
so as to prevent nationals from any State inspecting
events on its own territory* States would assume
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an obligation to facilitate and to cooperate in any
on-site inspection undertaken under the treaty*
A party would have the right to withdraw from
the treaty if it determined that the treaty had been
violated, or the obligation to facilitate an on-site
inspection had not been fulfilled, or a nuclear
explosion was conducted by a State not a party to
the treaty and such an explosion jeopardized the
withdrawing States security, or an explosion occurr€>d
and it was not possible to identify the State con-
ducting the explosion but such explosion might
jeopardize the withdrawing party's national security,
the withdrawing paurty would request that a Conference
be called to include all other parties, '^f/ithdrawal
would not take effect until the passing of a speci-
fied time*
The treaty would come into force on a specified
date which would be subject to negotiation, thus
incorporating the recoimnendation made by the
Mexican representative on 9 May 1962*
The United States representative indicated that the
keynote of the comprehensive treaty was the provision for
obligatory on-site inspection which provides that ail
States have an "unconditionally, unequivocal and an Honest
Injun obligation to facilitate such an on-site inspection*"
Partial test ban draft treaty proposal * The United
States representative continued his statement that "the
United States in this search for agreement is not content
to leave any area unexplored or any worthwhile idea un-
proposed*** He then went on to say,
the United States while continuing to negotiate
urgently and in any ap-r- , late: forur^ for a com-
prehensive treaty, in the interests of all humanity,
would nevertheless be prepared in an effort to
reach the widest possible area of agreement, in the
soonest possible time, to agree to a treaty banning




In proposing this partial treaty, he said that
there are three reasons why such a treaty would be in the
interests or a positive gain for society* First, it would
result in a downweurd turn in tne arms racej second, it
would have an effect on all countries about to enter the
nuclear arms race emd make more difficult the prolii\;ration
ox nuclear weapons; third, it would stop uie radioactive
pollution of the atmosphere, space and the oceans*
He then stated that briefly this treaty would
i
ban nuclear weapon tests in or above the atmos-
phere and in territorial waters or high seas;
bind the signatories to refrain from encouraging
or participating in such nuclear explosions by any
other State;
permit explosions prescribed in the treaty for
peaceful purposes under conditions specified in the
tre.!ityj
not require any international verification
machinery
;
provide a cut-off date for testing; and,
contain provision for withdrawal, after notice
had been given, if a party deemed the treaty had
been violated or that a State not a peurty to the
treaty had tested and if the party also deemed this
jeopardized its national security*
He continued that in the past a partial test ban
treaty has been tied to a moratorium on underground test-
ing* This proposal, he argued, runs contreury to the reason
the United States will consider a partial test ban treaty,
that is to get agreement now on those portions which are
agreeable while negotiations continue on a cc^nprehensive
test ban treaty* He added that to make a partial test ban
treaty contingent upon a moratorium would only revive the




issues that should be left for solution as part of a
comprehensive test ban treaty.
In concluding his statements on the two draft
treaties, he pointed out that neither treaty prohibited
the conducting of laboratory tests nor preparatory work
for testing, and he added that the United States plans to
remain in readiness.
Soviet Union Rejects the Western Draft Treaties
The initial Soviet reply to the submission of the
two alternative draft treaties was expressed by the Soviet
representative that "on the basis of our first impressions,
these documents repeat already well known United States
proposals on the question of the cessation of nuclear
weapon tests." He continued that the comprehensive draft
treaty, "leads one to think that it rejects completely the
proposals of the neutral States." He added, "the Soviet
position in relation to obligatory on-site inspections is
very clear and the embodiment of this condition in the new
draft treaty makes it unacceptable as a basis for agree-
ment."
As to the partial test ban treaty, he said that it
is designed to preserve the possibility of underground
testing, "in other words on legalizing the nuclear weapon."
He added that making underground tests permissible would
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act as a stimulant to the nuclear arms race* Therefore,
he said, we must talk about the cessation of all nuclear
weapon tests*
He concltKled his remarks by saying,
I repeat that the Soviet Union is in favour of an
early cessation of all nuclear weapon tests* If
that is also the desire of the United States and
the United Kingdom, why should we not accept the
proposal of the eight neutral States as a basis
and try to work out quickly—and that can be done—
an agreement on the banning of all nuclear tests
in the atmosphere, in outer space, unc^er water and
underground • ^
2
At the 76th meeting, the Soviet representative con-
tinued his analysis of the two alternative draft treaties
proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom* He
repeated that the new draft treaties do not reveal any
change in substance from the position held by the Western
Powers over the years of negotiations, that is "it still
requires on-site inspection not for control or verification
but for intelligence purposes*'* He added that the new
draft treaty was not a new position but a "new dress on
the old girl*" He argued that a comparison of the draft
treaty submitted by the Western Powers on 18 April 1961 and
the latest draft treaty reveals that the Western Powers
have not accepted the Jight-Natlon Memorandum compromise
proposaxw ^^ecause an integral part of both treaties is
obligatory on-site inspections* Consequently > he added,










act as a stimulant to the nuclear arras race* Therefore,
he said, we must talk about the cessation of all nuclear
weapon tests*
He concluded his remarks by saying,
I repeat that the Soviet Union is in favour of an
early cessation of all nuclear weapon tests* If
that is also the desire of the United States and
the United Kingdom, why should we not accept the
proposal of the eight neutral States as a basis
and try to work out quickly—and that can be done—
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an agreement on the banning of all nuclear tests
in the atmosphere, in outer space, unJler water and
underground • ^^
At the 76th meeting, the Soviet representative con-
tinued his analysis of the two alternative draft treaties
proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom* He
repeated that the new draft treaties do not reveal any
change in substance from the position held by the Western
Powers over the years of negotiations, that is "it still
requires on-site inspection not for control or verification
but for intelligence purposes*" He added that the new
draft treaty was not a new position but a ^*new dress on
the old girl*** He argued that a comparison of the draft
treaty submitted by the Western Powers on 18 April 1961 and
the latest draft treaty reveals that the Western Powers
have not accepted the Sight-Nation Memorandum compromise
proposal;^ because an integral part of both treaties is
obligatory on-site inspections* Consequently > he added,
they have not moved toward the Eight-Nation Hemorandum
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%^ich puts forth the principle of Inspection by invlta-
ti<m» He continued and pointed out that the last draft
treaty sulxnitted by the Western Powers was built on the
premise of international control posts on the territories
of States parties to the agreement and the new draft
treaty in substance describes an international system of
centralized observation stations with international super-
visors appointed by the international commission* The
Eight-Hation Memorandum he said calls for national sta-
tions for the detection of nuclear explosions* Both
treaties, he continued, place the emphasis on the appoint-
ment of one person to have full authority over the inter-
national control system while the memorandum on the other
hand suggests an international commission of a limited
number of highly qualified scientists which would be the
main link in the chain of the system* Therefore, he con-
cluded that the WestejR draft treaty incorporates very
little of the memorandum*
In regard to the partial test ban treaty, he said
the United States representative in his statement in
regard to the partial test ban treaty downgraded the
importance of underground testing while on previous state-
ments he had spelled out the military significance of such
tests* He further argued that contrary to the argument of
the United States a partial ban on tests would not stop
erf.:^ no fl ..?vf ?.
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the proliferation of nuclear weapons* He agreed with the
Ultiited States representative that the partial treaty would
stop the radioactive pollution of the atmosphere, space
and oceans* However, he added, there was a rauch greater
danger, "that was theniu>-nuclear destruction if the arms
race is allowed to continue* ** He also rejected the par-
tial treaty on the grounds that this would give the United
States a military advantage because they had used this
means of testing to perfect its improvements and raoderni-*
zation of the nuclear weapon* Therefore, he pointed out
that if the underground tests were legalized, this would
give the United States the means to continue her military
development while the Soviet Uhion would have its hands
tied*
In conclusion he saidt
We propose to the Western Powers to come to an
agreement to put an end to the testing of all nuclear
weapons whatever may be the environment for such
tests* The Soviet Union is ready to approach this
question as a constructive matter, taking into account
all the useful thoughts and consideration which may
have been advanced in the course of the debate by
various delegations*
Basing ourselves on this, we are ready to note
certain differences in the nature of the proposals
with regard to the banning in the various environ-
ments, talcing into account the distinction that has
to be drawn between tests under water, tests in outer
space and in the atmosphere, and tests underground.
At the same time-—and X would stress the importance
of this point—simultaneously we would end all
testing, but with respect to nuclear tests in outer
space, in the atmosphere or under wat<Kr such a deci-
sion would be final in its nature; whereas With
respect to underground tests such an agreement would
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be only on the basis of an understanding that it
would remain in force until such time as it could
be replaced by a permanent solution.
To find such a permanent solution to the problem
of a cessation of underground nuclear tests we can
use the very sound foundation of the memorandum of
the eight neutral Powers.^^
Non»Aliqned Members Express Views
At the 76te meeting on August 29ti», the Nigerian
representative commenting on the United States and United
Kingdom alternative draft treaties said that these treaties
marked a significant advance by the West toward a test ban
but that the chances for their acceptance were fair,
particularly the partial test ban without inclusion of a
moratorium on underground tests* He concluded that any
agreement had to take into consideration the problem of
underground tests} therefore, a partial test ban treaty
must include a moratorium on underground tests pending an
agreement on a comprehensive test ban."
The Brazilian representative at the 7 Tib meeting
suggested that rather than taking "painstaking efforts" to
ascertain the true intentions of the Sight-Nation Memoran-
dum, the conferees should negotiate on the partial test
ban treaty proposal because it had not been discarded
65
entirely by any delegation*
The Swedish representative said that the Eight-
Nation Memorandum is the "only possible bridge for
compromise" and asked the Nuclear Powers to give it more
ilL fX
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consideration* He continued that the West and the Soviet
Union appeared to be in agr<»eiient on the use of national
c^servation posts and the need for an international com-
aission and their differcunces regarding procedures for on-
site inspection appear to be negotiable* In concluding,
he proposed that the establishment, at least on an interim
basis, the international scientific commission as proposed
in the memorandum* The first task, he said, for the com-
mission should be to examine the problems pertaining to
66the organization of a control system*
The Burmese representative proposed at the 78tt
session that because little reliance could be placed on an
unconditional moratorium that the heads of the Nuclear
Powers should:
(1) assume personal responsibility for ensuring
that no underground tests are conducted • * * until
a comprehensive treaty comes into force,
(2) pledge themselves anew to work for * • • a
comprehensive treaty,
(3) agree, following the Swedish proposal, that
the international scientific commission envisaged
in the Sight-Nation Memorandum be established « • • •
(4) and that their delegations will cooperate
fully with this commission in working out an agree-
ment on the complete cessation of nuclear tests*^'
At the 7dtk meeting, the Nigerian representative
clarified his previous views on a moratorium by saying
that he had merely requested that the Nuclear Powers con-
sider the question of a moratorium on underground tests























The Ethiopian representative suggested that in the
event agreement was not reached on a nuclear weap^i test
ban consideration should be given to a "pledge" by the
69Nuclear Powers not to test after the end of the year*
The Mexican representative aired his views at the
80U^ flMeting» and he said the Conference had three ways
leading to a cessation of tests i first » conclusion of a
treaty with the necessary guarantees prohibiting nuclear
tests in all environments; second, agreement on the cessa-
tion of atmospheric, outer space and underwater testing
without prejudice to continuing negotiations in regard to
control over underground tests; and third , the recommenda-
tion of the time limit to end competitive nuclear tests*
He ac)cr. owledged that a treaty required reasonable
guarantees, but there were no automatic guarantees which
were 100 per cent dependable and that in the last analysis
the best guarantee of fulfilling obligations was "national
honour and good faith*"
In conclusion he said that
a study of our debate makes it difficult to avoid
the following conclusions
t
(a) arguments produced by either party to explain
or justify their respective attitudes might be valid
from their respective points of view, but from the
point of view of the higher interests of humanity
those arguments are unacceptable and they should be
set aside, because nobody can justify an indefinite
continuation of nuclear weapon tests;
(b) the armaments race does not increase but re-











(c) nuclear weapon tests have neither moral nor
juridical justification; and I call attcuition par-
ticularly to this last point-
ed) the parties have already accepted one of the
obligations mentioned in the memorandum of the eight
non-aligned States. Which? The obligation to col-
laborate with the international scientific commission
submitting to it those elements, data and facilities
required by it for the identification of doubtful
phenomena. '0
At the dlst meeting, the representative of the
United Arab Republic suggested the need to agree on the
modalities of a control system and urged consideration of
the recent Swedish proposal on the interim establishment
of the international commission* In regards to the par-
tial test ban treaty, he said that there is almost agre€^-
ment and that each party concerned should "give a little
71here and a little there, in order to reach agreement."
United States Replies to Soviet Charges About the
Draft Treaties
At the final Subcommittee meeting during this
period, the United States replied to the Soviet charges in
reference to the two alternative draft treaties. He
refuted the Soviet argxjment that the comprehensive draft
treaty was not any different than the 18 April 1961 Western
draft treaty proposal. He said that there were areas where
significant change had taken place and outlined them as:
first, the new treaty proposal relies on nationally manned
stations as proposed by the Sight-Nation Memorandum;






been significantly altered, it has been expanded to in~
elude more non-aligned States, the staff has been greatly
reduced, the executive officer would be more directly
related to the commission and could be replaced by the
commission; third, the question of obligatory on-site in-
spection has been substantially altered, not in respect to
the principle of on-site inspection but in the reduction
in the number of quota for on-site inspection and the
formulation of the inspection teams has been delegated to
the executive officer with the restriction that no na-
tional inspect his own country.
The United States representative continued that the
Soviet representative had made many comments on the new
draft treaty proposal to show that there was no change in
the Western position; however, he ignored the far reaching
changes and concentrated on "some rather small differences,
or on areas where the 18 April 1961 treaty and the 27
August 1962 comprehensive treaty are actually the same."
Many of the issues the Soviet representative re-
ferred to, he said, the United States has been repeatedly
been requesting the Soviet Union to sit down and talk about
these areas of differences; however, the Soviet Union has
refused.
In regards to a moratorium, he repeated previous













work towards a comprehensive agreement if a partial test
ban treaty was accepted , but the United States would not
accept the obligation to refrain from underground tests
without adequate and effective controls.
In a further effort to solve the Soviet fears of
"espionage" by the international commission, he proposed
the possibility of having the conunission empanel a highly
qualified body of very eminent scientists who would be
chosen solely on the basis of their high scientific
knowledge, who would conduct the investigations for the
commission* Further, he proposed the establishment of
objective criteria and procedures for the commission in
such a way that each party would be obligated to allow the
commission to conduct inspections, and this procedure would
obviate the necessity to leave the decision to invite the
commission to the individual discretion of each party to
72the treaty at the time*
United States Proposes Subcommittee Meetings During Recess
At the August 31st meeting, the United States rep-
resentative introduced a statement by President Kennedy
whereby he accepted the beginning of 1963 as "a reasonable
date" for the termination of all nuclear testing* To
accomplish this purpose, the statement added that negotia-
tions be accelerated and that maximiun effort be made to
conclude an effective agreement by that date* Ho%raver, in
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relation to a moratorium, the stateinent said that
gentlemen's agreements and moratoria do not provide
the type of guarantees that are necessary* They do
not give the assurance against an abrupt renewal of
testing by unilateral action* This is the lesson
of the Soviet Government's tragic decision to renew
testing jus^. a year ago. Nor can such informal
arrangements give any assurance against secret under-
ground testing* That is why we must have a definite
agreement with reasonable and adequate assurance*
The United States cannot be a party to any renewal
of false hopes which the Soviet Government shattered
last September • • • .'^
In accordance with the President's statement, the
United States representative proposed that the SubccMiariittee
meet during the forthcoming recess proposed for the Con-
ference in order to reach an agreement on a test ban by
74the beginning of the next year*
At the 81st meeting, the Soviet representative
agreed to the proposal but declared that negotiations had
to be conducted on the basis of the Soviet November 28it
proposal or the Eight-Nation Memorandum*
However, after an exchange of views, it was decided
that each delegation could resume negotiations in the Sub-
committee on whatever it decided and the Subcommittee was
scheduled to continue negotiations during the recess*
Summary
Following the d2nd meeting on September 7, 1962,
the Conference was recessed until Movember 12, 1962* The





the forthcoming Eighteenth General Assembly meeting of the
United Nations.
This period of twenty-six plenary meetings and
seven Siibcomroittee meetings did not see any appreciable
change in the positions of the Nuclear Powers. The Soviet
Union remained firm in its position and refused to nego-
tiate on anything other than national detection systems
for control of a comprehensive test ban with the acceptance
of an international scientific commission as proposed by
the Eight-Nation Memorandum but without defining their
concept on how this body would operate. The Western posi-
tion was clarified by the discussions of the new scientific
data and the introduction of two draft alternative treaties.
One for a comprehensive test ban with internationally
supervised national detection systems, an international
commission to monitor the system and the use of obligatory
on-site inspection for unidentified events located by the
system under a quota system—these were the provisions
introduced in the two draft alternative treaties. The
other proposal was for a partial treaty prohibiting test-
ing in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater with
reliance on r ational systems for control. The United
States would not accept a moratorium on underground tests
in conjunction with the partial treaty.
















1962 remained the center of continued debate over inter-
pretation. The proposal by the Mexican representative for
a cut-off date to end all nuclear testing was accepted by
both nuclear sides but with different interpretations.
The Subcommittee did agree to meet during the
recess after the acceptance of the 1 January 1963 cut-off
date on testing » but the debate over what should be dis-
cussed or not indicated that agreement would be difficult
in the Subcommittee during the recess.
This period did see the acceptance of national
detection systems for control by the West, but with inter-
national supervision; however, the Soviet Union refused to
accept the principle of obligatory on-site inspection, the
keystone of the Western proposals, although she did accept
it by invitation. Thus, this period opened with the
Conference deadlocked on the niK:lear weapon test ban issue
and it closed in the same status.
IV. THE THIRD PERIOD NOVEMBER 26, 1962 -
DECEMBER 20, 1962
Introduction
This period commenced when the Conference recon-
vened on Novcunber 26, 1962, following a recess since
September 7, 1962. Thirteen meetings of the Conference







The Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance
of Nuclear Weapon Tests actually remained in session during
the Conference recess and held a total of twenty-seven
meetings, nineteen during the recess.
Basically the period was spent in a search for some
means to break the continued deadlock that had existed in
the test ban negotiations since the Soviet Union intro-
duced its treaty proposal on November 28, 1961, based on
national detection systems for control over the detection
of all nuclear explosions in all environments*
The Eight-Nation Memorandum of April 16, 1962, re-
mained in the center of the controversy over interpreta-
tion* The introduction of a United Nations resolution
which adopted the Mexican proposal for a cut-off date of
January 1, 1963 for nuclear testing added anocher element
to the dispute over interpretation or proposals*
The Soviet Union and the United States Review the
Subcommittee Meetings held bijurinq the Recess '**'
Western critique * At the 83rd plenary meeting on
November 26th, the Iftiited States representative in his
initial remarks about the Subcommittee meetings during the
recess said, "tinfortunately" no progress was made*
The Soviet Union, he said, during the Subcommittee
meetings continued to reject the very minimum amount of












Inspection of seismic events that would give "reasonable
and adequate assurance of compliance with a comprehensive
nuclear test ban agreement*** He continued that the Soviet
delegate also refused to consider a partial test ban on
testing in those elements which do not require interna-
tional verification*
After this initial statement he added that there is
cause for hope and gave three reasons why: first » there is
a strong incentive to halt the arms race; second, just the
fact that the Eighteen—Nation Committee exists and con-
tinues to provide a forumi third, recent events have had a
sobering effect and they have also shown that the Nuclear
Powers can reach agreement*
The United States representative concluded his
statement by reviewing the status of the nuclear weapon
test ban negotiations* First, he said, the recent General
Assembly session of the United Nations gave a great deal
of time and debate to the test ban issue and two resolu-
tions were the outcome for guidcuice of this Conference*
Second, he continued, the main obstacle to agreement re—
maxns the fundamental issue of underground tests, but he
added, agreement is almost certain if the question of
76
control and inspection is settled*
soviet critique * The Soviet representative in his
opening statement to the Confexence on Novcunber 26t^ remarked
^*r
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in regards to a partial test ban agreement
»
half-measuires In the question of the cessation of
tests, that is such measures as would preserve the
possibility of carrying out further nuclear weapon
tests in any one environment, would provide no
solution to the problem, /U& continuedj|7 all nuclear
weapon tests, in the atmosphere, under water, under-
ground or in outer space should be put an end to
once and for all* Furthermore this problem must be
solved now*
In relation to the meetings of the Subcommittee
during the recess, he said that no progress was made be-
cause the Western Powers continued to hold to their old
positions and, as a result, the talks remain in a dead-
lock* Further, he added that at the nineteen meetings of
the Subcommittee during the recess,
the Western powers stubbornly continued to put for-
ward their demand for the establishment of an inter-
national control system and compulsory inspection
knowing beforehand that it is impossible to reach
agreement on such a basis*
In conclusion, he said that the Westem position is
that agreement should be limited to tests only in the
atmosphere, outer space and underwater, and they "insist
on retaining their freedom of action in regard to con^
tinuing nuclear tests underground*" The Soviet Union, he
continued, "being anxious that the cessation of nuclear
weapon tests should be real and not Illusory, cannot leave
the question of underground tests open*" To conclude such
an agreement would result in continuing and extending the
77
nuclear arms race and in involving other States in it*
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Sweden Reintroduces the Proposal for an Interim
Commission
At the 84k^ meeting on November 28i^, the Swedish
representative repeated a previous statement of his when
he saldf
would It not be worthwhile to consider now the
establishment, at least on an Interim basis » of the
commission proposed In the Sight-Nation Memorandum,
about which the Powers are in agreement, with, as a
first task, the scientific examination of the question
of how a control system should be organized?
He added that such a course would extend the area of agree-
ment and thereby facilitate the reaching of a permanent
test ban treaty*
He then proposed that the Huclear Powers call in
inmediately a panel of scientists from different countries
and to leave it to this panel to act for the time being as
an interim commission* This panel would set up on a time-
limited basis to study and help establish the necessary
machinery for a test ban agreement, he pointed out* It
would also, he continued, furnish the conference with
scientific and technical information* And he proposed
that a moratorium be in effect during the existence of
this scientific panel*
The advantages to this approach, he remarked, were
that valuable experience could be gained while negotiation
continue and it will also make it eaisier and quicker to
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In concluding his statement, he said, '^If we do not
act very soon it might be too late because we do not know
how long the favorable circumstances will last which now
78facilitate an agreement."
Comments on the Swedish proposal * The United States
representative, in commenting on the Swedish proposal, re-
affirmed the United States position that the detection
stations on various countries* territories and compulsory
on-site inspection by the commission provide the most
effective and objective method for both detecting and iden-
tifying seismic events. He further stated that the
Swedish proposal appeared to suggest a moratorium to which
the United States was opposed unless there was some means
to give the commission the power to conduct on-site inspec-
79tion to verify the moratorium.
The United Kingdom representative also commented on
the Swedish proposal when he said, "regardless of whatever
body is set up we must have the fullest assurance that
adequate detection exists and that the information derived
80therefrom is properly correlated."
The Burmese representative endorsed the Swedish
proposal and said, "the setting up of an impartial inter-
national scientific ]x>dy was indispensable to a successful
81test ban treaty."
At the 86tt meeting of the Conference, the Soviet
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representative rejected the Swedish proposal because it
would sidetrack the conference from its main task of
82
reaching agreement on a comprehensive test ban.
Western and Soviet Summary of the Progress of the Sub-
committee
At the B6^ meeting, the United States and the
Soviet Union each made a more concise report on the prog-*
ress of the Subcommittee*
Western review * The United States representative
said that the Western Powers approached the Subcommittee
meetings during the recess with the hope of finding a
common ground with the Soviet Union in order to make some
progress* The West, he explained, proposed a working
arrangement to look at the operation and composition of
the international commission, but the Soviet Union stated
that this would have to wait until outstanding issvws in
principle had been agreed upon* He continued that when it
was proposed to work out questions relating to the world-
wide control post system, the Soviet Union said it was not
necessary, because all the required posts already existed
and there was no need for coordination and cooperation
among the existing stations*
On the question of on-site inspection, the Soviet
Union, he said, refused to provide information on what
scientific basis they believed that existing systems of
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detection were adequate to detect and identify all seismic
events
•
As for the Soviet position on how agreement could
be reached, he remarked that they all boiled down to
acceptance of the Soviet November 28, 1961 proposal.
First, acceptance of the November 28^) proposal for a comf-
prehensive ban on all tests with the use of national
systems for detection and identification; second, accept-
ance of their interpretation of the Eight-Nation Memorandum
as being essentially the same as their November 28&i> pro-
posal plus an international commission of unspecified
powers; and third, acceptance of a ban on tests in the
atmosphere, outer space and underwater and a moratorium on
tests undergroiand •
He continued that the basic issue has and still re-
mains the problem of underground testing and its control*
The West, he said, has proposed to set aside for now this
issue and accept an agreement in the other environments or
to settle it "on a strictly objective scientific basis***
The Soviet Union he contended "purports to have the scien-
tific basis but refuses to present any scientific evidence
to support its claim" that national detection systems can
control a treaty for banning nuclear tests in all environ-
sents*
He concluded by saying that the Western position is
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still "crystal clear" about the subject of an uncontrolled
moratorium, "we will not enter into such an uncontrolled,
83
uninspected moratorium arrangement again."
Soviet review # The Soviet representative in his
initial remarks said that the position of each side had
been narrowed considerably and are now not far apart* Con-
sequently, he added, no great effort is needed to overcome
the small distance separating the Nuclear Powers from
reaching agreement*
In reference to the United Nations debate and resolu-
tions, he said that three conclusions can be drawn: first,
that all nuclear tests must be prohibited without excep-
tion; second, that it is difficult and almost impossible
to reach agreement while testing is being continued; and
third, there is solid and overwhelming support for the
Eight-Nation Memorandum for a compromise solution to the
problem of banning nuclear weapon tests*
As a compronise solution to the problems dead-
locking the Subcommittee on the test ban issue proposed
that the suggestion put forth by Soviet and Western scien-
tists meeting in London that the use of automatic seismic
stations which do not require the presence of foreign
inspectors might be considered • He continued that the
Soviet Union was prepared to accept this idea for the
purpose of control*
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He reaffirmed the Soviet contention that they could
not accept compulsory inspection because of national secu-
rity reasons and that existing and technical improvements
84
make the demand for inspection superfluous.
Western reply * The United Kingdom in replying to the
Soviet statement remarked that the difference between the
two sides had indeed been narrowed, but the narrowing, he
said, had been done entirely by the West and "not one iota
of it from the Soviet Union."
In relation to the use of aut<^atic seismic stations
he said that the conclusion of the experts was that they
would be helpful in reducing the number of on-site inspec-
tions but not of eliminating them.
At the 87th meeting of the Conference on December
5ti, the United Kingdom and the United States representa-
tives both made statements that basically attributed an
inflexible Soviet position as the reason for continued
deadlock. The United States delegate went further and
stated that
it appears that the Soviet Union in their actions
and statements in the Conference and the Subcommittee
is attempting to turn the United Nations resolution
into an uncontrolled moratorium on underground
tests, ^e added thajt7 the United States delegation
believes that we may once again be greeted with a
unilateral pledge on the part of the Soviet Union.®^
Debate over Automatic Seismic Stations











Conference on December 7a, the United States representa-
tive gave a foxrmal reply to the Soviet proposal of using
automatic seismic stations for control* He stated that a
close review of the Soviet proposal revealed that the pro-
posal as it now stands is that it is not to be considered
as a part of an overall control system* The Soviet pro-
posal, he continued, is that we agree in principle not
only to accept some
unclear, undefined system of automatic seismic
stations to monitor underground tests, without
regard to where they might be located and without
regard to the equipment in those stations or how
they would function but, also, that the Western
Powers must accept the Soviet view that no on-site
inspection would be necessary in my circumstances*
This the United States representative declared the West
could not accept and on the present basis, the proposal is
unacceptable
•
He added, however, that the West was willing to
study in a scientific, objective, and impartial manner any
proposal which the Soviet Uhion would make on automatic
seismic stations* Further, he stated, there is no evidence
which indicates that a system of automatic stations could
replace completely or substantially a manned network of
control stations or could do away with obligatory on-site
87inspections*
Soviet views * At the 90tt meeting on December 12tt,
the Soviet Union proposed acceptance of the Soviet proposal
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to consider automatic seismic stations. The Soviet Union,
the Soviet representative said, would agree thee these
stations should be established in highly seismic areas in
the Soviet union and it was willing to allow foreign
personnel to deliver and retrieve the equipment for the
international center. Thus, he argued, the proposal would
consist of "automatic seismic stations with certain ele-
88
ments of international control."
Additional Western comments . The United States
representative welcomed the Soviet statement as meaning
that the Soviet Union was ready to negotiate further on
the use of automatic seismic static ns. He added that the
West had not rejected the idea of "black boxes" but re-
jected the idea that they replace the need for manned con-
89
trol stations and on-site inspection.
Sxammary of the Subcommittee Meetings During this Period
At the 94th meeting of the Conference on December
19tb just prior to the recess of the Conference, the Nuclear
Powers reviewed the progress of the Subcommittee amd the
outstanding issues on the nuclear weapon test ban problem.
Western review . The United States representative
began his review of the test ban issue interpreting the
Soviet proposal for the use of automatic seismic stations
in the control system. The proposal, he argued, boiled








stations but that there would be no coordination or super-
vision of nationally manned detection stations nor any
obligatory on-site inspections*
The Western position was that a properly located
and adequately built system of automatic stations might
possibly be useful but there was no scientific facts or
information that such a system could replace a manned sta-
tion system nor would it eliminate the need for on-site
inspections*
He commented further that a system of automatic
seismic stations properly equipped and located might be
helpful in checking on data provided by nationally manned,
internationally coordinated stations* He added, however,
that because of the difference in opinion on the capability
of a proposed automatic seismic system, the West had pro-
posed a meeting of qualified experts to make a scientific
and technical study of the use of automatic seismic sta-
tions in a detection system* To support this Western
proposal, he gave several reasons for such studies? first,
it is necessary to know the technical capabilities of such
a system to determine its proper scope in an overall de-
tection and identification system; second, need to examine
the equipment itself and properly analyze it under actual
conditions to enable proper placement to receive maximum
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third, It provides another means to narrow the area of dis-
agreement even further in the area of identification of
underground tests*
To this Western proposal for a scientific study, the
Soviet Union, he pointed out, has not responded but "con-
tinues to insist that we agree in principle first and then
discuss the technical details*"
In relation to the Soviet proposal to accept foreign
personnel to deliver, place, anc retrieve automatic seismic
equipment under proper safeguards, he said,
this is a step forward towards solving the problem
of international coordination and supervision of a
detection and identification* /fTe continued thatjT
although, their proposal was made in reference to
the placement of automatic seismic stations it could
just as easily be applied to on-site inspection
groups and could eliminate the Soviet fear of espio-
nage by foreign personnel*
As to the United Nations resolution calling for the
end of all tests as of 1 January 1963, he said, the Soviet
interpretation that this means whether agreement is
reached or not and the acceptance of an uninspected, un-
controlled moratorium is unfounded and unacceptable. The
United States, he said, interprets this resolution to mean
the Conference should strive to reach by 1 January 1963
agreement on an adequate and effective treaty with an
effective detection and identification system* To reacn
this goal, he pointed out that there were two roads
available; first, by reaching agreement on a comprehensive
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ban on all tests with adequate and effective control; or
second, if the difficulties to reaching a compr hensive
ban are too great then a partial bari against tests in the
areas where they can be adequately controlled and where
there is already agreement should be followed.
In sunonary, he said,
the United States has done its level best to reach
agreement with the Soviet Union on an effective
treaty banning tests, but the United States is just
not prepared to accept anuther sad experience with
a unilateral uninspected arrangement on tests, nor
is it prepared to accept an unworkable system of
"black boxes" in its Christmas stocking.^0
Soviet review . The Soviet representative in his
remarks on the course of the meetiigs of the Subcommittee
stated that the main issue preventing agreement remains
the problem of inspection. He continued that the Soviet
union considers inspections as not necessary in order to
reach agreement on banning all nuclear weapon tests*
In relation to the automatic seismic station pro-
posal, he stated,
what is to be put into the automatic stations we
wish to solve in collaboration with the Western
Powers, but these details can and should be agreed
after we have reached agre«aent in principle with
the United States on the use of the automatic
stations as an adjunct to national detection sys-
tems without the demand for inspection.
As to technical studies, he said that the negotia-
tions are now deadlocked and if a technical discussion was








the basic principles it would "Inevitably" introduce
91
another deadlock towards reaching agreement.
Summary
The Conference recessed on December 20, 1962, with
continued deadlock on banning nuclear weapon tests* This
period started on November 26, 1962, after extensive
United Nations debate and a mandate in the form of a
General Assembly resolution that the Conference and the
Nuclear Powers use everything in their power to conclude
an agreement by January 1, 1963*
The majority of the time was spent in trying to
find a path to break the deadlock on the test ban issue.
The non-nuclear members made repeated suggestions, but
none of them were accepi;ed by the Nuclear Powers, The
Soviet proposal for automatic seismic stations was the
only new proposal that was intr^oduced, but this was tied
to the question of inspections* The period ended with the
same deadlock as existed when it began*
Thus the Conference recessed without reaching
agreement on the cut-off date proposed by the united
Nations resolution*
V* THE FOURTH PERIOD FEBRUARY 12, 1963 -
JUNE 21, 1963
Introduction
This period commenced on February 12, 1963, after a
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recass from December 20, 1962 • Pifty-t%iro plenary sessions
were held^ but the Subcc»nralttee on a Treaty for the Dis-
continuance of Nuclear Weap<Hi Tests was not reconvened.
The period opened on a note of optimism following a
series of private talks between the Nuclear Powers during
the recess* However, even with the Soviet acceptance of
the principle of on-site inspection and the use of auto-
matic seismic stations to supplement national detection
systems, agreement was not possible because of differences
between the technical and political aspects of inspection*
The basic positions that the sides held at the beginning
of the period they still held at the end of the period*
A great deal of the discussion in the early part of
the period was spent in trying to work out procedures to
continue the debate on the test ban issue and also tc dis-
cuss other issues of disarmament* With both siaes deaa-
locked in their positions on the test ban, the Conference
finally decided to discuss the nuclear test ban problem on
Monday of each week and turn to problems of general and
complete disarmaments at the other meetings*
The united States put forth comprehensive details
of the technical aspects of its position on inspections,
but the Soviet Union refused to discuss these details u^til
there was agreement <m principle*
The announcement of new private talks of the Nuclear
dds





Powers in Moscow on July 15, 1963, added another optimis-
tic note at the close of the period when the Conference
recessed on June 21, 1963
•
Opening Statements
United States review of the meetings held during
the recess * At the 96tt meeting on February I2tt, the United
States representative in his opening remarks stated
that there is some reason to hope that a test ban
agreement may be on the way, for it does seem to us
that the basic ingredient of success—a desire for
agreement by both nuclear sides may now exist*
He continued that an exchange of letters between
President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev had produced a
new negotiating position where the one remaining obstacle
to agreement remained the details of a verification
system. The system seems to be in agreement, he said, and
outlined it as:
First, the system now under discussion is prem-
ised on the use of nationally owned and operated
detection networks* Those national stations would
submit data regularly and in a uniform manner to
an international data collection centre* At the
recent meetings in New York and Washington, the
United States arid the Soviet Union exchanged prelimi-
nary lists of seismograph stations from which the
data-gathering arm of the verification system might
be selected* Such selected stations in each others
territory would form the basic network and the United
States has given tha Soviet Union a general descrip-
tion of the type of instruments used at each of the
United States stations*
The second element of the new verification system
involves the use of automatically recording seismo-
graph stations* Such stations could supplement the
U\i.
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data collected by national stations and could help
to a degree in detecting, locating and identifying
seismic events, thus improving the capabilities of
the verification system* At private meetings which
took place during the recess, the United States sug-
gested ten sites in United States territory where
automatic recorder might be located. The United
States delegation furnished information on the
average seismic noise levels at those sites* The
Soviet Union accepted one of the United States sites
declined the other nine, and requested two others in
their place. The United States said that it did not
object to the two alternative sites, and gave the
Soviet Union noise level data for those two sites as
well. The United States specified ten general areas
within the Soviet territory v;here automatic recorders
might well be located. The United States asked the
Soviet Union to designate specific sites for auto-
matic stations within those ten areas, to be recom-
mended by the Soviet government on the b.^sis of its
knowledge of the noise level and othor local factors*
The areas specified by the United States included
the areas of the three sites suggested by the Soviet
Union but the United States did not surcept the Soviet
contention that there need only be three such auto-
matic stations.
Later on, in private talks the United States sug-
gested that its requirement might be met with seven
automatic stations if satisfactory assurances could
be obtained concerning the characteristics of Soviet
national seismography network* There was no recip-
rocal response by the Soviet Union, which continued
to state that the three sites specified in Chairman
Khrushchev's letter of 7 January would be sufficient
and that no additional sites could be contemplated.
Noise level data for the three Soviet suggested
sites were produced by the Soviet Union at the last
session of the private talks.
The third element of the new verification system
involves on-site inspections. The on-site inspection
quota concept, first officially advanced by the
Soviet Government in 1959 and then repudiated by it
in 1961 has again heen accepted by the Soviet Govern-
ment.
The United States representative summaurized the new
status of a nuclear weapons test ban agreement by saying





talking about a verification system based on national
manned detection stations, automatic seismic stations and
a quota of on-site inspections."
He concluded his statement by saying that
we agree with the Soviet Union that the conclusion
of a test ban treaty is a political act and, indeed,
an act of the highest importzmce* We reject the
Soviet contention, nowever, that the provisions for
the control system can also be decided solely on a
political basis, without regard for objective
scientific considerations. We must therefore, con-
tinue to be guided by our best understanding of the
current technical situation, and this will inevi-
tably prescribe for us the outer bounds of any
agreement .^^
Soviet statement * The Soviet representative in his
opening statement spent very little on the nucleau? test
han issue. He said that the Soviet proposal to accept on-
site inspection was truly a concession to the West which
had repeatedly stated that they were ready to conclude an
agreement if the Soviet Union accepted on-site inspection*
He added, the Soviet Union still considers on-site inspec-
tion as unnecessary but "we are willing to give each side
two or three to satisfy the fears and desires of the
West."^"*
United Arab Republic Proposal
At the 99ti^ meeting of the Conference on February
18ti», the United Arab Republic representative proposed
three methods of proceeding as alternative means in an








weapons test ban negotiations. Firsts that the nuclear
parties might submit new draft test ban treaties incor-
porating their ideas and formulations* Second, suggested
that working papers might be produced setting out the back-
ground to or the outline of the Nuclear Powers thinking on
the various problems in the test ban question. Third, if
agreement on a quota number of inspection could not be
reached immediately, for the time being this question
could be put aside and the Nuclear Powers could proceed
with the discussion of other pertinent and relevant
94problems.
On the 20th of February at tl i lOOtt meeting, the
United States representative stated in reference to the
representative of the United Arab Republic's proposal for
alternative procedures that the United States would agree
to any one of the suggested procedures that were acceptable
to the Soviet Union.
The Soviet representative rejected the proposal on
procedures outlined by the United Arab Republic by saying,
flexibility, in our opinion should help towards finding
ways to solving outs ta:\ding issues as quickly as pos-
sible, but if one takes flexibility to mean, and calls
flexibility, an approach which leads the Committee
away from solving the main issues, then we are opposed
to such flexibility, we are opposed to such an ap-
proach. ^^
Deadlock Continues
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At the lOOtb meeting on February 20U>, the United States
representative commenting on the progress of the Conference
said that, although there appears to be a narrowing between
the two positions^ there also appears to be a deepening gulf
which makes it more difficult to bridge.
He then outlined the latest steps that the West has
taken to reach agreement. He described them as:
(a) reduced substantially their requirements on
an annual quota on on-site inspections*
(b) agreed to remove their previous requirement
that nationally manned control posts should be
subject to international supervision and control.
(c) agreed, provided the Soviet Union will supply
data concerning the capability of its own national
stations and will reaffirm its ireeraent of last
summer to build new natio**al stations where these
are needed, to consider reducing to seven the number
of automatic stations, they believed will be needed
on Soviet territory,
(d) agreed to accept reasonable figures on the
extent of the area subject to inspection.
(e) indicated their willingness to reach an
accommodation with the Soviet Union regarding par-
ticularly sensitive military installations which
might be located in an area to be Inspected.
Soviet views on the status of the negotiations .
The Soviet representative attacked the Western Powers for
retreating from a position upon which they declared tnat.
agreement could be reached; that is, Soviet acceptance of
the principle of on-site inspection. He added that pre-
vious statements of the Western representatives asking
only that the Soviet Union accept the position they repu-
diated with the November 28, 1961, proposal implied






Western acceptance of the Soviet quota for on-site inspec-
tions of two to three per year* He accused the Jest of
now naming eight to ten on-site inspections and couching
this in the form of eun ultimatum.
He closed his statement by saying that
if their purpose is to protract the negotiations,
if their purpose is to take advantage of the Soviet
Union's constructive positicm in order to bargain
for the 9 catest possible number of inspections,
then we can straight out that nothing will cane of
this except delay, ^S
Soviet Union clarifies position* At the lOlst
meeting, the Soviet representative outlined the Soviet
position in relation to the international elements of the
proposed treaty. Ke stated thim as:
(1) Two to three on-site inspections a year on
the territory of each nuclear power.
(2) The installation of three automatic seismic
stations on the territory of each nuclear power.
The stations may also be situated on the territories
of non-nuclear States, naturally with the consent
of their governments.
(3) The establishment of an international com-
mission of scientists, as proposed by the eight
non-aligned States members of the Eighteen-Nation
Committee.
He repeated the Soviet view that on-site inspections
are not necessary and that Soviet acceptance of this prin-
ciple was done solely to facilitate agreement.
In regard to automatic seismic stations these, too,
he said, were not necessary but were again put forward by
the Soviet Union in an effort to reach agreement. He
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national detection and identifying systems were scien-
tifically capable of detecting and identifying ail nuclear
explosions*
In reference to the discussion of details and side
issues, he said that the Soviet Union is opposed ^o such
procedures because "if the basic issues are not settled it
is impossible to settle them by discussion of other re-
lated issues •'*
The Soviet representative stated in conclusion that
the Soviet Union remains firm in its conviction that
despite the complication created by the actions of
the United States at the present time there are still
possibilities for reaching without delay an hcmest
and fair agreement that would satisfy all parties.
The keynotes of the Soviet position he repeated were:
first, national means alone ensure effective control over
all types of tests } second, the number of on-site inspec-
tions and automatic seismic stations is not a subject for
bargaining; and third, the guarantee of success of the
99
negotiations lies in solving the basic issues*
United States comments * The United States repre-
sentative said that the Soviet position as it stands boils
down to, that the number of on-site inspections is not
negotiable and that acceptance of this number by the
United States is necessary before anything else is dis-
cussed*
In regard to the number of inspections proposed by
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the West, he said that there was a possibility of a mis-
understanding but that in the letter that President
Kennedy sent to Premier Khrushchev on December 26, 1962,
he clearly stated the United States position as:
With respect to the number of on-site inspections
there appears to have been some misunderstanding*
Your impression seem«5 to be that Ambassador Dean
told Deputy Kuzentsov that the United States might
be prepared to accept an annual ninaber of on-site
inspections between two and four. Ambassador Dean
advises me that the only number which he mentioned
in his discussions with Deputy Minister Kuzentsov
was a number between eight and ten. This represctnted
a substantial decrease in the request of the United
States as we had previously been insisting upon a
n\]mber between 12-20. I had hoped that the Soviet
Union would match this motion on the part of the
United States by an equivalent motion in the figure
of two to three on-site inspections which it had
some-time ago indicated it might allow.
The United States representative also added that
subsequent to this letter private talks were held in New
York and Washington so there would not be any further mis-
understanding about the number of inspections desired by
the United States.
Soviet Counter-reply . The Soviet representative in
replying to the United States representative's statement
simply stated that in a conversation that he had with
Ambassador Dean on 30 or 31 October 1962, Mr. Dean said that
the main point about which we differed was underground
tests. The Soviet representative then quoted Mr. Dean as
saying, "^If the Soviet Union were to agree to a small num-


















--. r* ?. !•< fimA
278
will be no more differences between U8«" The Soviet rep-
resentative added that "of course, It was only an unoffi-
cial figure." However, he continued, further unofficial
statements Including those made to Professor Federov of
the Soviet Union by Professor Wlesner of the United States,
where the figure of two to three Inspections was also men-
tioned and the official statements of the United Kingdom
representative In this Conference also confirmed this
Western position. He concluded that "the Issue has been
clarified and that It should not serve as an obstacle to
our negotiations*"
United States Proposes Smaller Number of Inspections
At the 102nd meeting cf the Conference on February
25tb, the United States representative Indicated that In
private talks he had with the Soviet representative he ex-
plained the United States position on a number of the
features of the inspection system* Also, he said the
United States could accept an annual quota of seven on-
site inspections if the Soviet Uhion was willing to accept
102the verification system envisaged by the United States*
Views on Automatic Seismic Systems Aired
At the 103rd meeting on February 27yi, the Soviet
representative set forth the Soviet position on the use of
automatic seismic stations* He said that the Soviet Union
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sees the ptirpose of the stations is to verify the proper
functioning of national networks for detection and identi-
fication of nuclear explosions* In order to fulfill this
purpose, he explained, there is no need for a large number
of stations* Soviet scientists, he continued, consider
that more than three stations on Soviet territory would do
•'absolutely nothing more to verify the proper functioning
103
of national networks*"
At the lOStt meeting on March 13ti>, the United States
representative outlined the Uhited States views on the
role of the automatic seismic stations*
He stated that the Western Powers envisaged that
the Nuclear Powers would supply sealiKi recorders and cer->
tain sealed instruments for autot&atic stations* The
stations, he continued, would be built according to agreed
specifications by the host country, lund the host country
would assume certain maintenance responsibilities in con-
Junction with the stations* Data, he explained, would be
picked up and the instruments maintained and checked by
personnel from the other side and from the international
commission, a maximum of eight times yearly* He continued
that duplicate recorders outside the stations would record
duplicate data and host country personnel would pick up
and transmit this data to the international commission for
its own use and for transmission to the other side*
9VS
Y^Jfc'S^^^ 1 »\v«i. ,* .'.jv u '^i'i^ IC' .-.^^.x^x^xirq Ad^ &•««
- » /t^^Ki ; f 0( <i r . '« ;
©A ^•^r. * •! "*f;..







-nf^«^ .j.;^ i.j. j-t^
•d bXvow









The United States, he said in summary , has proposed
that seven such stations be built and operated in the
104
Soviet Union* "
Debate on Procedures Continues
United States outlines views on procedures . At the
104ti> meeting, the United States representative outlined
the United States on procedures which the Conference should
follow to reach an agreement on the nuclear weapons test
ban issue. He stated that the Western position was, "that
we wish to discuss concurrently with the question of the
annual quota of on-site inspections, the question of when,
where, how and by whom inspections are to be carried out."
This procedure, he argued, would make it easier to find a
mutually acceptable number of inspections*
In regard to the Soviet claim of the ability of
national systems to detect and identify all nuclear explo-
sions, he stated that this is scientifically unfounded, and
called on the Soviet Union to produce the scientific proof
to support their claim.
In conclusion, he said that Soviet answers to the
questions on criteria to locate events; on how will they
be selected for inspection within the quota; on the size
and shape of the inspection area; on how the inspection
will be carried out; and the composition of the inspection
osr.
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ftre necessary because they have a direct relation to the
105
meaningfulness of any inspection quota.
Soviet views . The Soviet representative rejected
the United States proposal for consideration of related or
technical issues and repeated former arguments that to
discuss administrative or technical questions without
agreement on the main question "we would need not only
days but many weeks and months, perhaps even years, of
technical discussion*"
In conclusion, he stated that the only path to
agre€unent is to agree on the comprehensive conditions
which the Soviet Union has put forth because they are an
106
acceptance of "Western proposals in their entirety."
Western views of Soviet stand on technical issues .
On March 6i&, the United States representative, coBKienting
on the Soviet rejection of the proposal to discuss the re-
lated technical details of the inspection issue, denied
that they would lead to further deadlock and delay. He
continued that the United States could not view the one
iten of on-site inspection quota in complete isolation from
all the other factors relevant to the issues. He explained
that these factors will determine the relevancy of the
numbetr selected of its adequacy in the system of verifying
observance of the treaty.
In conclusion, he said, "^frankly, we are now somewhat
X8<;
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at a loss about how to proceed on this question if our
negotiating partners refuse to discuss most of the unre-
solved questions and post an ultiiaatum on the one issue
107
which they will discuss."
Soviet counters-reply * The Soviet representative
simply stated that the Soviet Union was not opposed to dis-
cussing the technical issues at once
just as soon as we see that the United States is
willing to reach agriiement on the beusis of the
compromise proposals for a quota of two to three
inspections and the number of automatic seismic
stations. 108
Views of the Sight Non-Aligned Members
The Mexican representative summarized the position of
the eight non-aligned members of the Committee at the 109tii
meeting on March 15ti».
He began his statement by saying
the negotiation of a treaty when the sides concerned
fear and distrust each other and when a struggle for
prestige is involved, when each attributes to the
other secret and malicious intentions, is a task:
requiring great patience and immense tenacity,
^e added,/ only the clear realization that a funda-
mental and common interest which transcends all dif-
ferences is at stake can persistence in this task
be possible.
This, he contended, is the political climate in which the
Conference finds itself, and such are the circumstances in
which an attempt to negotiate a nuclear weapons test ban
is being made.
He accused the Nuclear Powers of sincerely desiring an
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agreement but this desire was ''feeble, weak and Incom-
plete," a desire he said "subject to so many conditions,
promises and provisos that it lacks any creative pov.ar."
He continued that the distance that separates the
Nuclear Powers from agreement does not depend and is not
measured by the difference between the number of inspec-
tions • The distance, he said, is a question of will, the
willingness to negotiate all controversial points. He
continued
,
A solution depends on the evaluation which each side
makes of, and the importance it attaches to, the
urgent settlement of these problems, and the political
appraisal, right or wrong, which it makes of the con-
sequences of failure*
He stated further that "whether we admit it or not,
whether we like it or not, the cessation of nuclear tests
is the basis and a prerequisite for any progress in the
various aspects of general disarmament •"
To show that this was the sentiment of the non-
aligned members, he quoted statements of the otner non-
aligned representatives supporting this position.
The Burmese representative said at the lOStti meeting,
"first things must come first. And the cessation of
nuclear tests comes first • • • • "
The Swedish representative also stated at the lOOib
meeting, "My delegation also fully endorses the view
that the conference must concentrate its immediate
efforts on the test ban issue."
The Indian representative said, "We are here to
achieve agreements on general and complete disarmament
• • • • But there is a logic of events; and the logic
of events at this moment is such that it gives pri-











The Sthiopian r«presttntative stated, "that his
delegation • • • associates itself with the determina-
tion, widely expressed, tc make headway in the task
entrusted to this Committee: First, by solving the
remaining problems that divide the Nuclear Powers
on the question of a test ban treaty;".
The Brazilian representative said at the 103rd
meeting that "Even had we desired to give priority in
our discussions to other important problems, it would
have been difficult for the Conference to direct its
interests temporarily from the questions of
tests • • • •"
At the 98tii meeting the representative of Nigeria
had this to say, "My delegation has at all times main-
tained that it is pointless talking about disarmament
unless an effective stop is put to the perfection of
these diabolical weapons of mass annihilation and
naked aggression against humanity*"
And finally, the representative of the United Arab
Reptiblic said at the 99tt meeting that "I feel it my
duty, however, to state frankly that our study of
disarmament problems in the absence of the long
cherished and now feasible test ban agreement, or at
least in the absense of favourable signs for its
solution, will remain, to say the least, largely
academic •
"
The Mexican representative continued and accused
the Nuclear Powers of not giviny adequate consideration to
the views and proposals submitted by the eight non-aligned
members of the Conference.
He then proposcsd, for the time being, a provisional
agreement to suspend underground tests, which will permit
banning of tests in the three environments where no inter-
national control is required since the national means are
sufficient to identify "explosions." Hov/ever, ne added,
this provisional agreement would not be an uncontrolled
moratorium "as the principle of on-site inspection has















the setting into motion the complicated machinery of the
international commission as proposed by the 2ight«-Nation
Memorandum* Further, he said, this agreement could be
established for a definite time limit*
In conclusion, he summarized, the position of the
eight non<>aligned members as desiring that all possible
ways to reach an agreement be explored; but if a compre-
hensive and definite treaty cannot be attained in a short
time, then the possibilities of a provisional agreement
109
should be considered*
Soviet comments . The Soviet representative in his
comments on the position of the non<-aligned said that the
Soviet Union was in complete agreement with the urgency
and desires of the world that an early agreement be reached,
but the inflexible United States position prevents the
reaching of early agreement*
United States comments * The United States repre-
sentative denied the Soviet charge of inflexibility and
charged that it was the Soviet Union because of its failure
to give its views on necessary related issues that is
111preventing progress in the negotiations*
Debate Over On-Site Inspections and Control
On April 1st, the Unitea :tates representative at
the 116Ui meeting summarized the United States position in
relation to on-site inspections as follows*
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First, we believe that each nuclear side should
designate the events it wishes to inspect in the
territory of the other, submitting seismic data to
locate the event and indicating that it cannot be
identified as an earthquake according to agreed
criteria.
Second, it will be necessary to arrive at agreement
on the scientific criteria which would be used to
determine whether an event had been located and could
not be identified as natural in origin. Past negotia-
tions with the Soviet Union resulted in considerable
agreement in that area, and we ask the Soviet repre-
sentative to reaffirm the points of agreement reached
earlier and to work out understandings on the points
not previously agreed upon.
Third, we believe that after the country in whose
territory a designated event has taken place has had
an opportunity to present additional data concerning
the event, and there has been an opportunity to con-
sider the data obtained from the automatic stations,
the other nuclear side should make the decision
whether to select the event for on-site inspection
within the quota of inspections.
Fourth, we have proposed that the area to be in-
spected be an ellipse with the semi-major axis of not
more than 15 kilometres and an area of not more than
500 square kilometres.
Fifth, we have proposed that certain important
functions of inspection teams be performed by tech-
nical experts from the nuclear side in order to maximize
the deterrent and confidence building effect of in-
spection. In addition, we have outlined what operations
the team might actually perform within the inspection
area.
Sixth, we have proposed various safeguards for the
security of the host country including exclusion of
sensitive defense installations from the inspection
area and provisions to ensure that members of inspec-
tion teams or foreign personnel visiting unmanned
seismic stations do not have the opportxinity to engage
in improper activities.
Seventh, we have indicated that a discussion of all
these points, not in minute detail but in broad out-
line, will be of assistance ia arriving at a parallel
agreement on another main issue; the actual number of
on-site inspections. "^^2
Soviet Views on the Control Organization . Also, at





summarized the current status of the negotiations and the
Soviet concept of the control organization*
He stated that the actual situation is charac-
terized by the fact that the positions of the two sides
have drawn closer together. First, he said, by the ad-
mission of the United States "that national systems are
adequate for control over agreement." This, he argued, is
supported by the fact that the United States will accept
agreement on prohibition of tests in the atmosphere, outer
space and underwater. In regards to underground explosions,
he added, this problem could have been solved the same way.
However, he said, the United States put forward demands
for inspection of suspicious seismic events. To facilitate
agreement, the Soviet representative declared, the Soviet
Union agreed to two to three inspections per year although
they are not necessary. However, the Soviet concession to
the United States, he remarlced, has not h&en accepted, and
the deadlock continues.
As to the control organization, he said, it now con-
tains eight components:
(1) The national observation networks of the
Nuclear Powers.
(2) The national observation networks of other
non-nuclear Powers, that is socialist countries and
countries forming part of the V/estern military blocs.
(3) The national networks of the non-aligned
countries
.
(4) The network of United States seismic stations
scattered over foreign countries, mainly around the
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(5) The inatallation of three seismic stations
each on the territory of the Soviet Union and the
territory of the United States.
(6) The installation of seismic stations on the
territory of countries adjacent to the Soviet Union
and the United States.
(7) An international centre for collecting and
processing data received from national observation
systems and automatic seismic stations.
(8) An agreement on two to three on-site inspec-
tions a year on the territory of the nuclear powers.
The Soviet representative continued that the control
system "taken as a whole, is sufficiently many sides and
reliable to ensure confidence that a nuclear test ban
treaty is being complied with."
In regards to the United States insistence that
discussion of technical details and its exposition of its
views on this aspect, the Soviet representative said, "we
shall not go along that path and shall continue to Insist
113
on the solution of the question of the inspection quota."
United States Analysis of the Soviet Position . At
the 119tb meeting of the Conference on April 8tiJ, the United
States representative analyzed the soviet position and
their arguments to support it. He said that the Soviet
representative had followed three major lines of argument
in the support of the Soviet position. These he outlines
as: first, sought to defend the procedural stand on the
basis that "the West wished to avoid agreement by engaging
the Conference in what he frequently termed as a morass of
technical details"; second, he has alleged that the West
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actually proposed the numbers upon which the Soviet Union
now insists "we must agree if there is to be a nuclear test
ban treaty"; and third, the Soviet representative and his
allies have dredged up numerous misrepresentations of
previous Western positions on the technical and scientific
basis for on->site inspection, to seek to undetrcut the
importance of scientific factors in the question of on-site
inspections*
The United States representative continued that the
Soviet maneuvers had failed because of several factors:
first, they have not shown what they have sought to show,
that the V/estern position ignored the scientific and tech-
nical factors which make it possible to form a realistic
Judgment about the size of the quota of on-site inspections
and the effectiveness of such a quota; second, their ex-
tensive quotation from Western scientific sources gave
credence to the Western position that there will be a
number of unidentified events which can De laentified only
by on-site inspections; and third, they have not produced
any new Soviet scientific data to support their case*
The United States representative in concluding his
statement asked the Soviet Union to review its own position
to see if there is not some "small flexibility which we in
114the West have shown."
ea?
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Soviet Union defends its position * The Soviet rep-
resentative in replying to the United States representa-
tive's analysis of the Soviet position and argumentation
simply stated that the statement had not disproved the
Soviet position. He added that it only managed to refute
the statements of prominent scientists and officials in the
United States, He repeated his previous arguments that the
only course to follow was to settle the main issue and this
115had been greatly aided by the Soviet compromise proposals
•
Soviet aunalysis of the United States position. At
the 126tl> meeting of the Conference on April 29tt, the
Soviet representative summarized the Soviet interpretation
of the United States position. He summarized it as:
Having admitted the effectiveness of national
m«ans of control in regard to underground nuclear
explosions, the United States lapsed into an obvious
inconsistency in its position, an inconsistency which
has in fact led our negotiations on this question
once more again into an impasse. The point is that,
having recognized the effectiveness of national
systems of control in regard to underground nuclear
explosions, the United States ought to have abandoned
completely all claims in respect of on-site inspec-
tions. At the present time the demand for on-site
inspections is untenable and unnecessary from the
stauidpoint of control. ^^^
United States defense of its position . At the 131st
meeting on May 13ti), the United States defended the United
States position. He said the statement by the Soviet
representative lead to the following conclusions: first,
the West must agree with the Soviet position or the
svi.
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conference was Just a "waste of time"; second, "the Soviet
representative appears to be laying the foundation for
another grand retreat along the lines of the last grand
retreat of the Soviei: union from the principle ot on-site
inspection on November 28, 1961"; and third, the failure
of the Soviet Union to spell out the arrangements under which
it would dccepc inspections raises "real doxibts about
whether the Soviet Union has re-accepted the principle of
on-site inspection*"
In conclusion, the United States representative
said,
unfortunately, the Soviet representative seems
intent on diverting our attention from our main
effort, which should be to discuss and agree upon
the main portions of a treaty which would ensure
the effective cessation of nuclear weapon testing.
He has used arguments which add up to an ultimatum,
and then attempted to place the burden for lack of
progress on the 'West. He has claimed that his
positions are purely political, but he has tri
distort the statement of eminent Western scion u.- .^
in order to somehow technically to prova his case*
In each of those instances he has, of course, tried
to divert the attention of the Conference from the
weakest part of the Soviet position, which is the
absolute lack of flexibility showri bore by the Soviet
union and completes failure of the Soviet Uhion to put
forward concrete positions on most of the outstanding
issues of a nuclear test ban treaty.H
7
Soviet Union reaffirms the Soviet position . At the
145ti> meeting on June 17tt, the Soviet representative con-
tinuea to argue the Soviet case that national systems alone
•re capable of detecting nuclear explosions and there is
no need for international control and on-site inspection.
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He repeated the pledge of the Soviet Union that she would
faithfully comply with its obligation not to test after
agreement and that all inspections teams would conclude
after inspection of an event in the Soviet Union would be
"that an earthquake had occurred."
He continued to argue that the demand for inspec-
tion by the Western Powers was not based on scientific
fact but was just a desire to gather intelligence informa-
tion within the Soviet Union.
He further accused the West of replacing the ques-
tion of cessation of nuclear weapon tests with the question
of inspection.
In conclusion he said,
an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear
weapon tests forever can be signed without delay.
Control over compliance with this agreement can
be fully ensured, by national means for the de-
tecting of underground nuclear explosions. In
addition a limited number of automatic seismic
stations can be used. All this represents a
reliable guarantee for the purpose of discovering
any possible attempt to violate an agreement on
the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Here we
have the basis which enables us to conclude an
agreement immediately. We are ready to sign such
an agreement. It is now up to the Western
Powers .lis
African Members Submit Memorandum on the Test Ban Issue
At the 142nd meeting or\ June 10^9, the representatives
of Ethiopia, Nigeria, and the United Arab Republic intro-
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weapon tests* This memorandum put forth the following
suggestions and considerations for the Nuclear Powers:
• • • that direct contacts between the nuclear
Powers, for example on the Foreign Ministers level,
and p>ossibly direct cononunications and contacts between
the Heads of the Nuclear States and Governments, may
prove of great value in reaching a quick and adequate
solution of the problem.
• • • Various non-aligned delegations to our Com-
mittee, during the last three months produced many
valuable ideas and thoughts which are well-known to
the nuclear Powers, and which aimed at breaking the
deadlock in the Geneva test-ban negotiations about
the number of inspections as well as about the method
of discussing the quota figures in relation to the
study of the modalities of inspections. The three
African delegations earnestly appeal to the nuclear
Powers to give attention to those non-aligned ideas
and thoughts as well as to their continued attempts
at finding practical, honourable and equitable com-
promises, which, in the last analysis, may prove to
be good and lasting solutions to the test ban problem.
• • • Chaiimzui Khrushchev and President Kennedy's
exchange of letters in December and January on the
cessation of tests has given proof of the existence,
on both sides, of a welcome spirit of constructive
compromise and mutual accommodation and above all,
of courage and goodwill.
... It may very well be that science may, in the
future, show beyond doubt that on-site inspections
may no longer be needed to identify suspicious seismic
events or to adequately control a test ban treaty.
For the time being, however, the three African dele-
gations recognize that three, four or sO| yearly
truly effective inspections may be needed to dispel
mutual suspicions, to help build up confidence be-
tween the nuclear Powers, and no less importantly,
to facilitate their reaching a practical political
settlement.
... After having maintained that there was no
need for any obligatory inspections, Mr. Khrushchev's
offer last December of two or three on-site inspec-
tions must therefore be taken as a sign of moral
courage aind good faith. In a like manner, the current
British-American demarches at Moscow, and their offer
of the possibility of further compromise, should be













• • • The three African delegations are convinced
that they speak not only for their own peoples and all
the African peoples, but for the whole world, when
they \irgently appeal to the nuclear Powers to give
more proof of a much needed sense of practicality and
of a necessary spirit of constructive compromise and
goodwill. The world will hail and appreciate any
show of compromise as evidence of great moral courage,
political acumen and love for peace. On the other
hand, the world cannot but consider their failure to
compromise over the last few remaining differences
as unwillingness on their paurt to end nuclear testing
and the nuclear armaments race, essential conditions
for any constructive and realistic discussion of
general and complete disarmament.
... Since there is general agreement, however,
that the number of on-site inspections is less rele-
vant than the terms of the modalities or conditions
for the adequate and effective conduct of such on-
site inspections, the three delegations therefore
exhort the nucleeu: Powers to rise above quaurrelling
on an unsignificant difference of one or two inspec-
tions and to accept a reasonable compromise-quota of
inspections contingent upon adequate and effective
modalities on inspection.
... Agreement on the latter should be sought
inter alia in these illustrative areas:
( a
)
The location of the epicentre of the seismic
event
;
(b) Criteria for the eligibility of the seismic
event for inspection;
(c) Composition of the International Scientific
Committee and its role in the establishment of the
criteria and the supervising of their proper applica-
tion;
(d) Agreement on the initiation of inspection
according to agreed criteria and to the data submitted
to the International Committee}
(e) The composition of the inspection teams in
such a way as to obviate self-inspection and to
ensure the effectiveness and adequacy of the visit.
(f Agreement on the criteria and relevant details
of the actual conducting of the inspection;
(g) Agreement on the shape and size of the inspec-
tion area;
(h) Safeguards against abuse and against the
utilization of such facilities and inspection per-
sonnel in any manner that might be extraneous to the
purpose of identifying the event concerned or that
might endanger the security of the receiving State. 119
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Announcement of Moscow Talks
At the 143rd meeting of the Conference on June 12tt,
th« Indian representative in his capacity as Chairman in-
troduced the statement of President Kennedy which he made
at The American University on June lOtfe in Washington, D. C«
where he said,
• • • , Chairman Khrushchev, Prime Minister Macraillan
and I have agreed that high level discussions will
shortly begin in Moscow looking toward early agreement
on a comprehensive test ban treaty. 0\ir hopes must
be tempered with the caution of history but with our
hopes go the hopes of mankind ,120
The Indian representative added that this agreement
between the President of the United States, the Chairman
of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union and the
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, "shows their joint
determination and will to reach agreement on the test ban
issue - an agreement which has been under consideration
121for five years at Geneva."
The United States representative commented further
on President Kennedy's speech in reference to the test ban
issue; he quoted the President as saying, "a fresh start
is badly needed." He continued,
not only would this first step measure mark a turning
point in the upward spiral of the arms race, but it
would also be a measure to begin to meet head-on the
problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In
addition, an effective nuclear test ban would also
end whatever harmful effects there may be frc»n the
radioactive fallout resulting from nuclear testing.

















United States President in his speech had also pointed out
two steps that had been taken towards ensuring renewed
efforts to reach agreement* First, that the United States
would not conduct tests in the atmosphere if other States
do not do so. "We will not be the first to resume," he
quoted President Kennedy as saying. Secondly, the United
States announced that it had agreed with the Soviet Union
and the United Kingdom to hold high level talks in Moscow
to work towards reaching final agreement on a comprehensive
test ban agrecanent. Thus, he concluded, the United States
is taking steps to assure the best climate and the highest
priority to reaching an agreement on a comprehensive nu-
122
clear weapon test ban.
At the 144to meeting on June 14tl», the Soviet repre-
sentative briefly referred to President Kennedy's speech
When he said.
President Kennedy's speech inspires the hope that the
effort being made both within and outside our Com-
mittee to improve the international situation, to
create an atmosphere of confidence among countries,
and to embark upon practical implementation of dis-
armament measures, will not be in vain.
He added, however, that "all of us are waiting for Presi-
dent Kennedy's thoughts and views on peaceful coexistence
to be put into practice." He emphasized in this regard
that the United States can rely on the full support and
123
cooperation of the Soviet Union.







The 147th meeting on June 21st brought this period
to a close. The closing statements of the members of the
Committee indicated a general feeling of optimism particu-
larly by the non-aligned members.
The Swedish representative commented that the
Moscow negotiations will be "the centre of our attention
and our hopes." He continued, "we hope that the nuclear
Powers now at long last will succeed in reaching a test
ban treaty, indeed, we more than hope, we expect that they
124
will succeed."
The Burmese representative suggested that it might
perhaps be useful for the Moscow conference negotiators to
review the suggestions offered, jointly or singly, since
February in this Conference by the non-aligned members,
including the latest joint racanorandum by the African dele-
gations. In conclusion, he said that reflection on these
suggestions and proposals should not interfere, conflict
or intrude upon the Moscow talks. And he added, "today a
125test ban is timely, tomorrow it may be too late."
The Nigerian representative commenting on the test
ban issue
... considerations of a technical, military and
economic nature ... have made it not only a neces-
sity but almost a sine qua non that agreement of a
test ban must be reachea now. It is therefore,
our hope that the impending high level talks between
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the nuclear Powers in Moscow will bear the much
awaited fruits .^^^
The Indian representative commented that the latest
African memorandum should be given favorable consideration
at the Moscow talks* He said in conclusion, "we here in
the Committee, and the world at large, therefore look for-
ward with great expectation to the success of these
talks. "^^^
The Western and Soviet bloc representatives con-
fined their comments to the problem of general and com-
plete disarmament which indicated that the issue of the
test ban agreement had been reserved for the forthcoming
high level talks in Moscow on July 15th,
Summary
Thus, the fourth period of the Conference of the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament came to a close
on June 21, 1963, after fifty-two plenary sessions.
Although the nuclear weapon test ban issue was
given wide discussion, there was no change in the basic
positions of the Western Powers or the Soviet Union. The
Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear
Weap>on Tests was not reconvened during this period al-
though the United States had repeatedly requested it.
A great amount of time of the initial meetings was
occupied with the problem of procedures, and it was fi*i*
nally resolved that the Monday meetings would be devoted
nv
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to discussion of the nuclear weapon test ban Issue, but a
delegation could discuss whatever it wanted at any meeting,
Therefore, during this period there was much more debate
on other issues of disarmament and the time used on the
nuclear weapon test ban issue was spent in using old argu-
ments to support deadlocked positions particularly by the
Soviet Union and its allies.
The United States did attempt to get technical de-
tails of inspection discussed and did put forward compre-
hensive views on this subject, but the Soviet Union re-
fused to discuss these issues until acceptance of the
Soviet position on on-site inspections of two to three a
year.
The period ended on somewhat of an optimistic note
with the zmnouncement of the high-level talks between the
Nuclear Powers on the nuclear weapon test ban issue
scheduled for mid-July. However, the last Soviet state-
ments in the Conference did not indicate any change in the
Soviet position in reference to the main stumbling block—
the problem of inspections.
The Conference was recessed following the meeting
on June 21 and was scheduled to reconvene on July 30, 1963.
VI. SUMMARY OF THE EIGHTESN-NATION
COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
On June 21, 1963, the Conference of the Eighteen-
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Nation Committee on Disarmament recessed after one hundred
and forty-seven plenary meetings had been held. This
brought to a close the investigation of the nuclear weapons
test ban negotiations. However, the Conference has not
been adjourned and is scheduled to reconvene on July 30,
1963.
During these one hundred and forty-seven meetings of
the Conference which had their beginning on March 14, 1962,
numerous discussions have been held, many proposals have
been made, but no agreement on a nuclear weapons test ban
could be reached*
The establishment of the Subcommittee for a Treaty
on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests on March 21,
1962, provided a forum for the three Nuclear Powers, but
after fifty meetings they could not reach agreement and
since December 18, 1962, no further meetings have been
held*
The positions of the two sides have undergone some
change, but the problems of technical details and inspec-
tion still are keeping the Nucleatr Powers trom finally
reaching agreement*
The non-aligned members of the Committee put forward
numerous suggestions and proposals on how the Nuclear
Powers should proceed to reach agreement but none were







on April 16, 1962, as a compromise solution provided a
great deal of discussion because of differences of inter-
pretation, but no agreement*
Thus the Conference of the Eighteen-Natlon Committee
on Disarmament did provide a forum for the continuing
search for agreement on a nuclear weapons test ban after
the adjournment of the Conference on the Discontinuance of
Nuclear Weapon Tests on January 29, 1962.
ICf
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UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION NUCLEAR
WEAPONS TEST BAN POSITION
1 JULY 1963
Introduction
The position of the United States and the Soviet
Union as of 1 July 1963 in reference to the nuclear weapons
test ban agreement has undergone extensive change from
the original positions they put forth in the earlier part
of the negotiations when they began in 1958. These posi-
tions have evolved from the negotiations, increased
scientific and technological knowledge, and the changing
international situation.
For purposes of analysis, the positions can best be
reviewed if taken in three but interrelated elements.
First, the position in reference to atmospheric, outer
space and underwater tests; second in reference to under-
ground tests; and third, in reference to the verification
system.
The United States Position
Atmospheric, outer space and underwater tests . The
United States position on a test ban on atmospheric, outer
space and underwater tests is basically that national
systems of detection and identification are adequate for
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the detection of explosions in these environments. This
current position has evolved from a comprehensive system
of extensive control posts, on<-8ite inspections and air-
craft sampling flights* The main reason for the evolution
of this position to reliance on national systems was the
increase in technological knowledge, particularly in the
field of long-range seismology, satellites, and instru-
mentation. This is particularly true because explosions
in these environments, with the possible exception of
extreme outer-space, evider;ce of them cannot be confined
to the limits of any particular country* The possibility
of non-detection in extreme outer space is also very small
because of the increased capability of launching satellites
and in instrumentation which both nuclear sides possess*
The specific elements of the United States national
detection system have not been made public and remain
classified, but Senator Humphrey indicated in a speech he
made in the Senate on March 7, 1963, "the fact is that our
detection capability is much greater than the press has
led us to believe on the basis of the information it has
received from the United States government*" Senator
Clark also stated that
as the art has progressed, our country has con-
structed additional stations and has trained addi-
tional men in the art, so that as of today • • •
it is almost universally admitted that tests in
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outer space can be detected without establishing
within the Soviet Union any stations or means of
control*
2
It was on the basis of this capability to detect
and identify nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, under
water and outer space that prompted the United States to
propose on April 13, 1959, the phased treaty concept. The
proposal recognized the agreement over detecting explo-
sions in the three elements while negotiations continued
toward reaching settlement in the other area—underground
testing*
The latest proposal was submitted by the United
States and the United Kingdom jointly on August 27, 1962,
as an alternative treaty if a comprehensive test ban
treaty could not be agreed upon* This proposal covered
the banning of all tests in the atmosphere, outer space
and under water without international control, and each
side would rely on their own national detection and iden-
tification systems to police the ban. However, the United
States position remained that it would not accept a mora-
torium on underground testing in conjunction with the
partial or limited test ban, a position it has held since
September 1961 when the Soviet Union broke the three year
moratorium on testing*
Thus the latest United States position on banning
tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater would
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ban nuclear weapon tests in or above the atmosphere and in
territorial waters or high seas; bind the signatories to
refrain from encouraging or participating in such nuclear
explosions by any other State; permit explosions pre-
scribed in the treaty for peaceful purposes under condi-
tions specified in the treaty; not require any inter-
national verification machinery; provide a cut-off date
for testing; and, contain provision for withdrawal, after
notice had been given, if a party deemed the treaty had
been violated or that a State not a party to the treaty
had tested and if the party also deemed this jeopardized
its national security.
Under(iround tests . The real area of disagreement
and difference in position has revolved around the issue
of detection and identification of underground tests* The
basic united States position has remained fundamentally
the same since the negotiations began. That is, namely,
that no technical means is presently available that will
distinguish positively, in all cases, between a nuclear
explosion and an earthquake* Therefore, there will always
be a certain number of unidentified events that can only be
positively identified by on-site inspection at the source
of the event.
Technological progress has succeeded in lowering
the number of unidentified events but not of identifying
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th«a all* The problem is one of detection because it is
conceived that national systems have the capability of
detecting events but not of identifying them.
Because of this basic principle, a certain amount
of control is necessary to police this aspect of a compre*
hensive ban* The United States position thus is that as
long as there is no technical means or method to identify
positively an event as an earthquake or explosion then the
only method of determining whether an event was an earth**
quake or explosion is by on-site inspection* Further, the
position has remained that the number of inspections must
be correlated to the number of unidentified events in
order to act as a positive deterrent against cheating.
Additionally, decoupling and dampening techniques
of muffling the explosion by various methods have been put
forward by the United States to demonstrate a means of in-
creasing the size of the explosion but decreasing the
signal strength thus iucri«asing the military value of the
explosion and complicating detection and identification*
Therefore, because of the technological problems and the
military value of underground tests, a comprehensive test
ban in all elements requires a much greater verification
system than that considered necessary for a limited or
partial ban in the other three environments*
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problems of distinguishing between earthquakes and nuclear
explosions of small yield used in underground testing, the
United States has always put forth the position that ef-
fective control requires a verification system that will
remove most elements of doubt and provide reasonable
assurance against cheating*
The latest position has evolved through the course
of the negotiations and improvements in technological
knowledge and instrumentation* The system proposed is
built around the nucleus of national manned and operated
detection stations* To supplement this system, a number
of automatic seismic stations would be established in each
of the nuclear countries to increase the capabilities of
the national systems and to supplement the information
furnished by the national detection systems* To verify
those events that cannot be identified as earthquakes the
system calls for s yearly quota of on-site inspections*
Thus, the United States position on the verification
system is one of national detection stations, automatic
seismic stations and on-site inspection*
Additionally, an international scientific commission
is proposed that would operate as a clearinghouse for data
received from national systems and automatic stations which
would be passed from one side to the other* This cc»amis-

















commission In the collection of data from the automatic
stations, deliver, place and pickup the sealed equipment
at the automatic stations, and maintain and calibrate the
equlfunent In conjunction with the Nuclear Powers*
The position on Inspections Is that once an event
has been detected and which, after the application of cer-*
tain prescribed criteria cannot be Identified as an earth-
quake, the other Nuclear Powers concerned can call for
on-site Inspections at the location of the event to deter-
mine whether it was an earthquake or nuclear explosion*
The inspection teams would be i ade up, in the case of an
inspection in the Soviet Uhion, of fourteen United States
or United Kingdom technicians plus fourteen representatives
of the international commission so long as they are not
nationals of the NATO or i^arsaw Pact countries. The number
of inspections which the United States considers necessary
in relation to the estimated number of unidentified events
that will occur witiixn um joviet Union each year is
seven, provided that national seismic stations and auto-
natic seismic stations are properly equipped and located*
The system is built upon the premise that there
should be an agreed sequence and orderly procedure for the
carrying out of an on-site inspection* This procedure, as
envisaged by the United States, would work as follows:
First, an event would be detected by national
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seismic stations, this data would be analyzed and discussed
by officials of the national system and would also be
transmitted to the international ccxnmission and to the
other side*
Second, a State would have sixty days from the time
of the seismic event to designate the event as subject to
on-site inspection*
Third, the procedure involved to requ rit inspection
would be:
(a) The designating side would send a statement
to the commission and through it to the country in which
the event took place* This statement would indicate the
location of the event and time of its occurrence*
(b) The designating side would then forward data
from at least four seismic stations by v^ich the event was
located* This data would have to provide for location
when seismic signals whose frequencies, amplitudes, dura-
tions and velocities arc v.u asistent with those of waves
from earthquakes or explosions are recorded at a sufficient
number of stations to establish the approximate time and
position of the event* Requires a minimum of four sta->
tions
•
(c) The designating country roust declare that the
event located is not an identifiable earthquake on the

















(1) Its dttpth of focus is not established as
below sixty kilometers;
(2) its epicentral location is not established
to be in the deep open ocean.
(3) it is not established to be a foreshock
of a seismic event of at least magnitude six which has been
clearly identified as an earthquake*
(4) it is not established to be an aftershock
of a seismic event of at least magnitude six which has
3been clearly identified as an earthquake
«
(d) The State on whoii^e territory the event took
place should have one week to provide all supplementary
information which it had and wished to make available about
the event* This information would be given to the com-
mission and through it to the designating ^tate.
<•) During this week for furnishing supplemental
information, the designating State would have the oppor-
tunity to examine wae aacci collecT:ed by the automatic
seismic stations in the country where the ^vent occurred.
The retrieval should be accomplished by personnel from the
designating State and the international commission.
(f } The designating side should be given an
additional week to analyze the data from the country con-
cerned and the automatic seismic :.t;ai;ions.
(g) Before the lapse of this additional week,
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thm designating State would hav« to submit another state*
iMuit requesting on<->site inspection* If the period lapses
without requesting inspection, the event would no longer
be eligible for inspection. This statetnent requesting on<-
site inspection should include information on the location
and boundaries of the area selected for inspection* The
area would be a maximum of 300 square kilometers* Further,
the statement must include the proposed tisie and place of
the arrival of the inspection team*
(h) The host State would have five days from the
date of the request for on-site inspection to indicate
arrfiingements for receptioxi and transportation of the in-
spection team to the inspection site* Also, during this
time, the host State can file a report with the Commission
indicating the presence of a sensitive defense installation
in the inspection area* The designating State could then
continue the ins^ -ct^ici; excluding the sensitive area or
cancel the inspection and retain the quota nuausfer for
futiire use*
Fourth, the inspection process ^ The inspection team
would consist of twenty-eight members, fourteen of them
from the nuclear side opposite the one being inspected*
The other members of the team would be selected by the
commission from the non-aligned countries* The host State






institute any safeguards it considers necessary for its
national security* However, these safeguards cannot inter-
fere with the timely arrival of the team at the inspection
site* The team would normally include specially trained
scientists arvi technicians* All the equipment for the
teen would be furnished by the team except for heavy
transportation equipment; such as, trucks and helicopters*
The inspection team would have a maximum of six %#eelcs to
complete their examination of the inspection area* The
time could be extended by mutual agreezi^nt* The physical
inspection would include low level helicopter flights for
visual and photographic survey, access aufid inspection to
any sub-<:avities and drilling, if necessary, but this must
be requested within five weeks from the start of the in-
spection* The team leader must siUinait a report on the
findings of the inspection to all concerned not later than
thirty days after completion of the inspection*
'
Summary * Thus the Uhitcsd States position in ref-
erence to a comprehensive test ban covering all four ele-
ments—atmosphere, outer space, underv,ater and underground-
would consist of a treaty banning all tests in any environ-
ment and a verification system consisting of national
detection and identification system, an international
commission, automatic seismic stations and a quota system
of on-site inspections*
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The national stations would be located, equipped,
operated and supervised by the nuclear side concerned.
The international commission would be composed of
fifteen members, four from the West, four from the Soviet
bloc, and seven from the non-aligned countries. The
primary duties of the commission would be: to act as a
clearinghouse for data received from the national systems
and the automatic seismic stations and pass this data from
one side to the other; assist in the automatic seismic
station delivery, placement and pickup of the sealed
equipment furnished by the Nuclear Powers; and to furnish
assistaunce for the inspection process.
The United States proposes seven automatic seismic
stations to be located within each nuclear country. The
location of the sites to be mutually agreea upon. Equip-
ment for these stations would be furnished by the nuclear
countries and would be nicked up and delivered a maximum
of eight times yearly by representatives of the nuclear
side concerned and representatives of the international
commission. The purpose of these stations is to add to
the capabilities of the national systems and to supplement
the information furnished by the national systems to the
commission and to the other side.
The acceptance of obligatory on-site inspection
remains the keystone of the United States verification
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system* They presently propose a quota of seyrGH jinspec—
tions in the nuclear countries per year provided that
national stations and automatic stations are properly
located and equipped*
Although the United States has indicated that it
wants a comprehensive test ban treaty, five years of nego-
tiations have failed to overcome the disagre tr ent over the
verification system* Therefore » the United States has
also indicated that it would accept an alternative limited
test ban treaty banning tests in the atsiosphere, outer
spjnce, and underwater without any international control
organization or on-site irispection and would rely on
national systems for detection and policing the ban in
these elements* However, the Unit«Ki States position has
remained that it will not accept a moratorium on testing
in the other element, underground testing, in conjunction
with a treaty banning tei'ts in the other three elements*
The Position of the Soviet Union
Atmospheric, outer space and ui-derwater tests * The
Soviet Union has long contended during the course of the
negotiations that national detection and identification
systems were adequate for the policing of a ban on testing
in the atmosphere, outer space and undervjater* Their posi-
tion remains that international control is not necessary
for the detection of explosions in these elements* However,
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they have not been willing to accept a limited ban cm
testing in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater
without a moratorium on testing in the other element
»
underground, while negotiations continue toward reaching
an acceptable solution in this area*
Underground tests * The Soviet position in regards
to underground tests is that national systems have the
capability of detecting and identifying even.:s in this
element also* However | th«y hftve not furni^hi^ any scien-
tific proof as requested by the Western Powers and have
agreed to a limited number of automatic seismic stations
and a small quota of on-site inspections* Their position
remains that they will acc&pt three automatic seismic
stations on their soil and will allow the ^^estern Powers
up to three on-site inspections yearly* Their continued
position is that these are not necessary but are put for-
ward in an effort to reach agreement as a concession to
the West* They h vc- u;X.^ stated that because they are a
concession to the desires of the ;Vest they are firm and
not negotiable.
Verification syst#ia* The latest Soviet position in
reference to a verification system remains unclear because
of the Soviet insistence that the West must accept their
numerical number of automatic seismic stations and their
proposed quota for on-site inspections before they will
i^se
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discuss the technical details of a verification system.
They have accepted the eight nation proposal for an inter-
national scientific commission but have refused to spell
out any details in reference to it. However, a review of
the past negotiations indicates that there would be very
few areas of disagreement with the latest Western pro-
posals for a verifxcation system.
>>maRiary . Thus the Soviet position in reference to
a nuclear weapons test ban is the use of national dctec*
tion systems; acceptance of a small scientific coxiuaxsslon
whose duties and functions ti.ey have not defined; accept-
ance of three automatic seismic stations in the Soviet
Union; and, the acceptance of three on-site Inspections
per year. Xn regards to a limited test ban, they have
refused to accept a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere,
outer space and underwater without a moratorium on tcstoj^g
underground while negotiations continue on a comprehensive
agreement.
Comparison of the Positions
A comparison of the two positions reveals that they
both accept national detection and identification systems,
automatic seismic stations to supplement national systems,
a limitei international commission, and on-site inspections.
The difference lies in the technical and political
aspects of the problem of control.
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The United States position is based on the minimum
acceptable amount of control, based on the latest scien-
tific and technical data, to ensure effective control and
to act as a deterrent against cheating. Therefore, their
position requires, based on the latest scientific evalua-
tion, seven automatic seismic stations within each nucl&ar
country and seven on-sita inspections per year*
The Soviet position, on the other hand, is based on
strictly political considerations, whereby she conceaes to
the V7estern Powers three automatic seismic stations in
each nuclear country and a ma^cimum of three on«»site inspec-
tions per year as a political concession to facilitate
agreement. The basic position the Soviet Union continues
to argue is that insnection is not scientifically neces-
sary and the path to agreement JLies only in reaching a
strictly political solution to the differences.
Thus, on th<^ surface, the positions appear to be
similar but underneath there remains differences in prin-
ciple*
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:ubert H. Humphrey » "A Nuclear Test 3an and Na-
tional Security," Congressional Record, Proceedings and
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'^Ibid., p, 4,
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Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests*
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tative outlined in detail the technical details of the





KUTUAX ADVANTAGES FOR DISCONTINUANCE OF
NUCLEAR WBAi^ONS TESTING
!• INTRODUCTION
Why have the nuclear weapons test ban negotiations
b«en going on for five years? The history of the negotia-
tions has been one of moving from one deadlock to another
but somehow they get going again and the differences
separating the two sides from agreement becomes less and
less I until they have reaches the point where the separa-
tion is a matter of numbers. For major powers to spend
the time and expense to continue these negotiations, there
must be advantages that are mutually acceptable to both
sides even though each is not willing to take the extra
small step to bring about final agreement*
There are four basic reasons why these negotiations
are so important to both sides. First, for humanitarian
reason to rid the atiftosphere of t^e scoouge ox radioactive
fallout and its unknown effects on tne human race* Second,
the reaching of agreement is viewed as one means of slow-
ing down the arms race, particularly in the field of
nuclear weapons* Third, there is a better chance for
agreement in this area than any other area in relation to
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CK^sidered as a first step in that direction, Fourthf
reaching agreement on a test ban can stop the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons to coiintries that do not now hold
then*
Sach of the ai>ove ergtiaents has advantages to both
sides; however, there are opposing arguments that have
kept the Nuclear Powers from reaching agreement. These
arguments revolve around the ccmcept of how much would
this agreement affect the national security of the country
concerned as opposed to the benefits to b^ derived if
agreement is reached*
The question can also be asked whether the argu-
ments that have been expounded above for the continuation
of negotiations would be valid if agreement was reached on
the basis of the latest positions outlined in the previous
chapter*
II. HUKANXTARIAN REASONS
One of the main arguments put forth not only by the
nuclear Powers but by the Non-nuclear Powers is that
nuclear weapons testing must be halted to stop the pollu-
tion of the atmosphere. This argument has been the chief
plank of the platform of the eight non-aligned meitfbers
of the Sighteen-Nation Committee* Similarly, it has been
the basis for most of the tftiited Nations resolutions on
it
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the subject of nuclear weapons testing* There is a dif-
ference of opinion in the scientific field about the
effects on the hwsaan race caused by nuclear testing*
The Committee on the Genetic Effects of Atomic
Radiation of the united States National Research Council «•
National Academy of Sciences said in their report
any radiation is genetically undesirable, since any
radiation induces harmful mutations* Further, all
presently available scientific information leads
to the conclusion that the aenetic harm is propor-
tional to the total dosage*^
Dr* Linus Pauling estimates that testing at the
1958 testing rate of ten megatons fission per year will
lead to an increase of 1 per cent in the number of defec-
tive births* This, he said, will amount to 15,000
seriously defective children who will be born each year
whose defect can be attributed to the bomb tests*
In conclusion, Dr« Pauling says on the subject that
perhaps the estimate that bomb testing at the present
rate is producing a one percent increase in mutation
rate is wrong* There is a possibility that it is ten
times too large* Also there is a possibility (because
our knowledge is incomplete) that it is ten times too
small* /ft& continued^/ the geneticists are sure that
no cme caii claim that the genetic effect does not
exist* We must all accept the fact that the testing
of nuclear weapons is carried out at the expanse of
the lives of children as yet unborn.
2
Dr* Pauling's arguments againsc nuclear cesiiojig for
humanitarian reasons are typical of the scientists that
believe that any increase in radiation in the atmosphere
is a crime agauisr numanlty*
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Dr. Teller is typical of the opposite school of
scientists that believe that the amount of radiation added
to th« atmosphere is so minute that it is negligible and
is far less of a factor than ttm normal changes in radia-
t;ion levels caused by natiiral means* Dr* Teller sayst
There is no rea»<n why a scientist or an informed
layman should consicier radiation a mystery* Our
scientific ]cnowledge about radiation is firm and
detailed in mcjiy ways* We know f-^ -".-,ple, that
all types of radiation produce re in the hinman
body that are almost alike* We knuvv tiie levels at
which radiation becomes a danger to humans, and we
can predict the effects of certain kinds of radiation
at certain levels with considerabl<ut precision* We
have clear evidence that present levels r^ -^ ation
in our atmosphere from natural source
radioactive fallout of nuclear tests are, at best
completely safe for h- "'s or, at worst, are causing
exceedingly little du. , .
He continued,
compared to massive do^es of radiation that can
cause illness or even deaUi, radiation from world-
wide test fallout is exceedingly small* The bones
of himan throughout the world today are getting an
average of about 0*002 roentgens a year from Strontium
90 in the fallout. The rest of the body is being
exposed to eibout the same amount of radioactivity,
mostly froti^ the fallemt*s Cesium 137* In certain
areas there is a greater accumulation of fallout,
but it would be difficult to imagine that anyone
in the world could receive a lifetime doso of more
than four or five roentgens of radiation from fall-
out* This still is less than the radiation received
from cosmic rays alone • • • • People living at
sea level hi th^ UnLt^i Jtates are exposcKi to 0*034
roentgens of radiation from cosmic rays each year*
This is seventeen times the amount obtained frcam the
Strontium 90 in the world«-wide fallout* Sxposure to
cosmic rays in D^nvor, about 5000 feet above sea
level, is 0*05 roentgens a year* If such small dcses







if we consider radioactive fallout objectiveiy
rather than emotionally, we know that it ia not asdangerous as living in Denver rather than San
Francisco, that it is aot IDcely to induce cancer
as smoking a pack of cigarettes a day, that it is
not as likely to give iise to soiae harmful effects
as are many unsuspected chemicals in the food we
eat or in the air we breathe, that it is not as aptto produce mutations as wearing trousers. It isin other words, not worth worrying about. ^ '
Regardless whether Or. Pauling or ^»., Teller is
rigiit, the fact remains that the question of radioactive
pollution of tne atmosphere by nuclear tests has been very
instrumental in keeping the .^&^Q-cxs^lon& go^.^ isy the
Nuclear Powers in an effort to reach an agreement on ban-
ning tests*
III, SLOW Domi 'mz arms race
Another factor that has been put forth by both sides
during the course of the negotiations and by statements of
officials of both sides is that a nuclear weapons test ban
would slow down the anas race*
The argument goes soiaething li>;e this, Uiat by
putting a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons you slow
down the arms race because: you stop the further sophis-
tication of present nuclear weapons | decrease the chances
of a major breakthrough by one side which would upset the







Both sides have stated that the increase in the
arms race, which has shifted from quantitative to qualita-
tive development of armasMmt systems, would eventual ly
lead to a nuclear exchange between the two sides by either
accidental or other reasons*
Secretary of Defense MacNamara aptly described what
the eventual outcome of the arms race would be if it was
not halted when he said, "As the arms race continues and
the weapons multiply and become more swift ana deaaiy the
possibility of a global catastrophe, either by miscalcula-
tion or design, becomes ever more real,'***
Thus this argument because of the mutual devastating
consequences of a nuclear exchange v/hich will be brought
•bout if the arms race continues, has been Instrumantal in
keeping the negotiations going, i-'urtnar, i-c n^z^ been a
chief argument of the Soviet union for not accepting a
partial or limited ban an testing in i he atmosphere, outer
space and underwater v/itiiout a moratorium on underground
testing because they claim it will not slow down the arms
race but could, in fact, speed it up*
TV, .-^^ALL STCF FORWARD
Another chief argument for the continuation of
negotiations for agreement on a nuclear weapons test ban










promise of being an area where agreeiaent can be reached
and will lead to bigger and more coiRprehensive arras con-
trol and disarmament agreements*
Boti* the V^estern Powers and the Soviet Union have
moved throughout the course of tl^ disarmament r.c yotiations
that have been held since 1945 from searching for partial
small step agreements to comprehensive all incltislve phased
general and complete diseurmament schemt^s. The I^ited
States finally agreed to treat the test ban as a separate
and distinct issue separate from a broad disarmament agree^-
BSttnt in 1959 1 accepting the view held by the Soviet Union
at that time. However, in 1961, the Soviet Union again
linked the test ban issue with the comprehensive general
and complete disarmament issues as tl-ie only way to make
progress in the field where control could be accepted in
relation to its effect on the national security interests
of the Soviet Union. They also gave for its reason for a
shift back to the comprehensive general and complete dis-
armament approach the reason that the United states had
not fully accepted the small step princlrle. They con-
tended that the United States was deinanciiJij a control
system that could be used as a model for later disarmament
agreements and this was out of context .'ith the amount of












test ban, which they argued was not dlsamanent and, there-
fore, req\iired little or no control.
There are arguments for ajid against this small sfcc
principle, but it caniiot ii^ts u&n^«£ci that this search xoi: »
position on which agreement can be reached has had an
active part in keeping the negotiations going.
V. PROLIFERATION OF NUCLSAR WEAPONS
One of the major arguments that the Uhited States
has used to support i^s position to continuf^ negot.lations
and to continue to search for agreement is the belief that
a test ban agreement would stop the proliferation of
nuclear weapons* The proliferation of nuclear weapons to
other countries that can develop the capacity and the
desire to possess them can constitute a threat to the
national security of the united iitates and the Soviet
Union*
The statement has he^n repeatedly made that the time
is rapidly running out that if agreement is not reached it
will be too late to stem the distribution of the w. .3
throughout the world. This would increase the chances of
a nuclear war which would have devastating effects on coun-
tries as well as the course of history*
The present state of the art of development of







delivery systems very costly. However, many contend that
with increased experimentation and testing a pure fusion
b<xab can be developed which would he easicur and cheaper to
make and would be within the reach of any country to manu-
facture and deploy for military use»
However, if a test ban agreement is reached, while
not all countries are expected to adhere to it, at least
it would limit the number of countries that could join the
nuclear club and make control of these weapons much easier
to acccanplish than otherwise would be possible. Further,
if the major Nuclear Powers did reach an agi it, the
weight of world opinion would have a dampenii^y <jxi*i's,t oa
those countries that did continue to refuse to adhere to
the treaty*
VI. SUl'IMARy
Thus, there are four malor reasons v.'hy the Nuclear
Powers have cy*iuinu*ju at,<jox:ici.T;ioa3 m eji a'ctierapx: t,o reach
a nuclear weapons test ban agreement. That is, for humani-
tarian reasons, to slow down the cirras race, to search for
a first step agrecuierit, aii.. uo st-op zno proliferation oi
nuclear weapons. These arguments have been inst-xumental
in keeping the negotiations qoing for five years: however.
they have not Jyeen strong enougn for trie i'iuc:lear irowers to
reach agreement.
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The course of this investigation has been through
the naze of the negotiations on a nuclear weapons test ban
out of which evolved the latest positions of the Nuclear
Powers* The reasons why these negotiations continued,
when at times in the negotiations it looked like they had
reached the saiae iapasse that plagued all previous con-~
ferences in the disarmaraent field, were also looked into*
All this was directed towards an attempt to reach some
conclusions in reference to the title of this paper, "To
Test or Not to Test*" This was qualified in the intro<-
duction to nean, what is the course of these negotiations,
will they go the way of all other disarmament negotiations,
or is the mutual advantages strong enough to bring about
agreement? A further question that must be answered is
will an agreement bring about the conclusions that have
been continuously put forward for continuing the negotia-
tions in the light of the final positions of the United
States and the Soviet Union?
The negotiations had their beginning with the Con-
ference of Experts from July 1 to August 21, 1958* It was
truly a technical conference on the surface, but it also






















at the later political conference* On the basis of the
successful conclusion of the Conference of Experts that it
was technically feasible to police a nuclear weapons test
ban within certain capabilities and limitations , a poll-*
tical conference was convened to wrap up the final agrees
mmt*
The political conference, called the Conference on
the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, met from
October 31, 1958, to January 29, 1962, and failed to reach
agreement because of the basic differences of opinion over
the eliiiiient of effective control* The negotiations managed
to continue with the convening of the Sighteen«>Hation
CoRimittee on Disarmament on Karch 14, 1962, and they have
continued as a part of this conference until the Conference
recessed on June 21, 1963* This marked the end of the
period of investigation for this paper but not the end of
the negotiations*
Out of these negotiations evolved a United States
position that would ban tests in all environments and ef-
fective control would rest on a national detection system,
automatic seismic stations, an international scientific
commission and obligatory on-site inspection*
The Soviet Union's position as it evolved was for
banning all nuclear weapon tests in all enviroxunents and
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detection system, automatic seismic stations, an inter-
national scientific commission, and a quota system of on-
site inspection.
It would appear that agreement had been reached be-
cause they both are talking about the same basic system; the
difference is a disagreement in degree. The United States
proposes seven automatic seismic stations and seven on-site
inspections per year. The Soviet Union proposes three
automatic seismic stations and three on-site inspections per
year and refuses to budge or consider any other items until
acceptance of these figures. To support their stand, they
contend that national systems are adequate for policing a
ban in all the environments and their agreement to three
automatic seismic stations and three on-site inspections is
a concession to the West and is not negotiable. The western
position, on the other hand, is viewed as the minimum number
of seismic stations and on-site inspections based on the
latest scientific evaluation which will ensure effective
control and act as a deterrent against possible violations.
Throughout the course of the negotiations, it ap-
peared that an unbreakable deadlock had been reached, only
to somehow be broken, usually by correspondence between heads
of governments. This has indicated a tremendous interest of
the heads of governments to use every means available to con-
tinue the negotiations. Why one might ask is this so?
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There are four chief reasons why this topic of
nuclear weapon testing is so inportant to be of prime
interest to the heeuls of the lluclear Powers*
First, there has been a constant world pressure to
stop the testing because of the radiation hazards to
hunanity* There is a difference of opinion as to what this
hazard is, but it has been instrumental in keeping the
pressure of world opinion «i the Nuclear Powers to continue
to search for agreement*
Second, each of the Nuclear Powers has realistically
stated what the tragic results would be if the arms race
is allowed to c<mtinue* The test ban is viewed as one way
of 9 at least, slowing down this race*
Third, there is the fact that thcure must be some
start towards reaching agreement between the Ni^lear Powers
to reduce the risk of nuclear war and to strive towards
positive arms control and disarmament measiires* The test
ban is viewed as one issue where there is the best chance
of reaching agreement and thus being the small step that
is needed to start the ball rolling*
Fourth, there is the problem of proliferation of
nuclear weapons and its resulting increase in international
instability and the prospects of nuclear war* The time is
ripe now for the stopping of this proliferation when
testing is a crucial part of any nuclear \ v^apons
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dcveXopoent prograra for any nation that has not developed
the weapon*
II. COHCLUSION
This brings us up to the point where the question
can be asked, where do we 90 from here?
With the negotiations going on for the last five
years under the same advantageous conditions in a world
that is constantly changing, will the time be reached when
agreement is no longer possible because of the prolifera-
tion of the weapons or the discovery of a cheap and simple
bomb or a major breakthrough which would upset the military
balance?
The history of the negotiations has shown that one
cazmot be overly optimistic or pessiJEdLstic. Although the
Soviet Union has held to the present position since
January, 1963, the final sessions indicated a possible
shift in the Soviet position of some nature in the future*
The announcement of the forthcoming talks in Moscow indi-
cate that an agreement is close because the separation
between the sides keeping them from reaching agreement is
small* Further, practically all of the major progress in
the negotiations has been made in private talks or corres-
pondence* However, the Soviet stand in relation to the
question of inspection, put forth by the ooviet
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representative at the last few aeetings, could indicate,
as the United States representative pointed out, a possible
reversal of the Soviet position on inspections*
Although this study covered the period of negotia-
tions from July 1, 1958, to July 1, 1963, a period of five
years, subsequent events make it necessary to bring thero
into this paper. The three Power meetings that were
scheduled for July IS, 1963, in Koscow were successful in
bringing the negotiations to a partial conclusion with the
signing of a limited test ban treaty on August 5, 1963,
banning tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under-
water with reliance on national detection and identifica-
tion systems for policing the ban* The Soviet Union
accepted this agreement without a moratori\im on underground
testing reversing their long advanced position in relation
to partial test ban treaties*
With the signing of this limited test ban, the
chances of a comprehensive ban are very slim* This shift
in the Soviet position indicated that she was not willing
to accept the principle of inspection* The positions on a
comprehensive test ban were very close and would have
required a very small move on the part of the Soviet Union
to have reached agreement on a comprehensive test ban*
However, as the speeches in the latter part of the negotia-
tions of the Cighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and
no ;^ i»v«-a







«ui the United States representative indicated, the Soviet
Uhion was giving second thoughts to the principle of in-
spection* It appears that the Soviet Union wanted a test
ban just as the West desired one, but she was not willing
to accept on-site inspections*
What effect does this liiaited ban have on the mu-
tual advantages that have kept the negotiations plodding
on for over five years?
In relation to the humanitarian arguiaent. It conn*
pletely satisfies this argument because it will ensure
against the contamination of the atmosphere by radioactive
fallout*
As to the argument that an agreement would slow
down the arms race this conclusion is not at all certain.
First, with the continuation of underground testing ana
the arms race shifting to a sophistication of present
weapon systems, it v/ould not have an effect on the further
development of small sophisticated weapons* Further, the
Soviet Union had stated that they would not conduct under-
ground tests because they did not think these tests were
necessary. However, there is no doubt that the Soviet
TTnion will, or has already, started a program of under-
ground testing. Therefore, this agreement on a limited
ban could shift the arms race from one eleamnt of nuclear
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weapons » large megaton weapons, to another, small sophis-
ticated nuclear weapons.
Only time will tell if the agreement will be signi-
ficant enough to bring about further accommodation between
the Nuclear Powers* It is of tremendous significance as
it is the best that could be derived out of the series of
negotiations and it is what the eight non-aligned nations
of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had been
advocating since the last deadlock developed in January,
1963,
As to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, there is
no doubt that by the number of countries that have signed
the Treaty already that it will have a great effect on
this problem* A country could develop an underground
testing capability, but the cost and the state of the art
are such that it is not probable that they would choose to
do so* There remains a special problem with respect to
France and China as both have refused to adhere to the
Treaty* This refusal could have repercussions in other
aspects if they continue to test in the atmosphere thus
aligning world public opinion against them* For Coonunist
China, v^ich is trying to build up its prestige in the
underdeveloped coxmtries, it could effectively tie her
hands auid force her to move towards underground testing
and development* This would increase the expense of the
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development, require longer periods of time to develop any
capability and reduce the overall capability of the
finished weapon system*
In the final analysis, it can be said t^at the
history of the negotiations indicates that there was bound
to have been an agreement of some sort due to the importance
of the issue and the mutual advantages to the Nuclear Powers
if common ground for agreement could be found*
The Nuclear Powers have answered the question "To
Test or Not to Test" as it affects their national security
interests by saying, to test in the atmosphere, outer space
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AGREED PARTS OF THE DRAFT TREATY ON THE
DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS
Agreed text of Preamble
The Parties to this Treaty
Pursuing the aim of reducing incernarxonai competition
in armaments and in the development of new weapons of war:
Endeavouring to take a practical step towards the achieve-
ment of the objectives of the United Nations in the field
of disarmament including the eventual elimination and pro-
hibition of nuclear weapons under effective international
control and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes
only;
Desirous of bringing about the permanent discontinuance
of nuclear weapons test explosions;
Recognizing that the establishment and continuous opera-
tion of effective international control is essential to
the achievement of this objective;
Hoping that all other countries will also join in under-
takings not to carry out nuclear weapons tests and to ensure
the satisfactory operation of that control throughout the
world;
Confident that a discontinuance of such tests under ef-
fective control will make possible progress toward agreement
on measures of disarmament have agreed as follows:
Texts of Agreed Dreift Articles
Article 1
Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes, subject
to the provisions of this Treaty and its annexes:
(a) to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of nuclear
weapons test explosions at any place under its jurisdiction
or control; and
(b) to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way
participating in, the carrying out of nuclear weapons test
explosions anywhere.
Article 2
(a) For the purpose of assuring that the obligations
A XiaM3<i<SA
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Assumed In this Treaty are carried out by the Parties there
is hereby established a Control Organization upon the terms
and conditions set forth in this Treaty and the Annexes
thereto;
(b) Each of the Parties agrees to co-operate promptly
and fully with the Control Organization established under
paragraph (a) of this Article and to assist the Control
Organization in the discharge of its responsibilities
pursuant to the provisions of this treaty and the pro-
visions of any agreement which the Parties shall have con-
cluded with the Control Organization
•
Article 3
1, The Control Organization established under Article 2
of this Treaty shall consist of: a control Commission,
hereinafter referred to as "the Commission"; a Detection
and Identification System, hereinafter referred to as the
"System"; a Chief Executive Officer, hereinafter referred
to as "the Administrator"! and a Conference of Parties to
the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as "the Conference."
2* The Headquarters of the Control Organization shall
be located at Vienna.
Article 4
1. The C<Mnaission shall consist of one representative
from each of the follov/ing States:
(a) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and
the United States of America, as original Parties to this
Treaty} and
(b) four other Parties to the Treaty elected by the
Conference
•
2* The States referred to in paragraph Kb) of this
Article shall be elected and shall serve for a period of
two years, and shall be eligible for re-election.
3. The representatives elected to the first elected
Commission shall serve from the time of their election
until the end of the third regular session of the Conference.
The representatives elected at the third regular session of
the Conference, and biennially thereafter, shall serve
from the end of the Conference at which they are elected
until the end of tJie Conference which elects their suc-
cessors.








INSTALLATION AND OPERATION OF THS SYSTEM
IN PARTIES' TERRITORIES
Bach of the original Parties auKi all other Psirties to
this Treaty agree to accept on territory under their
jurisdiction or control components of the System which is
established on the basis of the report of the Conference
of Experts to Study the Methods of Detecting Violations of
a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests
and shall be installed and shall operate in accordance v/ith
the provisions of this Treaty an<^ its Annexes*
UNDERTAKINGS CONCERNING CO-OPERATION
V/ITH THE SYSTEM
1, Z-pch of the Parties undertakes to assure that adequate
and expeditious transportation is available from the point
of entry, or within its territory to the site of any ele-
ment of the System or any area where an on-site inspection
is to be conducted,
2, Each of the Parties undertakes to enter into appro-
priate arrangements with the Commission for the utilization
of existing meterorological and commercial aircraft flights
over ocean areas for routine air-sampling purposes.
3, Each of the Parties imdertakes to enter into appro-
priate arrangements with the Cormnission to have aircraft
immediately available for special flights, carried out
pursuant to the provisions of , over territory under its
jurisdiction or control or to permit special flights by
aircraft forming part of the system,
4, Each of the Parties undertakes to enter into appro-
priate arrangements with the Commission for the utilization
of existing weather or geophysical exploration vessels for
use as components of the System,
5# Each of the Parties undertakes to give inspection
groups, despatched piureuant to the provisions of ,
immediate and undisptited access to the area in v/hich an
on—site inspection is to be conducted, to refrain from
interference with any operation of an inspection group and
to give such groups the assistance they may require in the
performance of their missions.
6* (Paragraph 6 will be drafted to make provision for














Parties to the Treaty shall meet in regular annual session
and in such special sessions as shall be convened by the
Administrator at the request of the Conunission or a majority
of Parties to the Treaty. The sessions shall take place
at the headquarters of the Organization unless otherwise
determined by the Conference,
2. At such sessions, each Party to the Treaty shall be
represented by not more than three delegates who may be
accompanied by alternates or advisers The cost of attend-
ance of any delegation shall be borne by the State con-
cerned •
3. The Conference shall elect a President and such other
bfficers as may be required at the beginning of each ses-
sion. They shall hold office for the duration of the
session. The Conference, subject to the provisions of this
Treaty, shall adopt its own rules of procedure. Each Party
to the Treaty shall have one vote. Decisions on budgetary
matters shall be made pursuant to Article
^^^^^
and decisions
on amendments pursuant to Article . Decisions on other
questions, including the determination of additional
questions or categories of questions to be decided by a
two-thirds majority, shall be made by a simple majority of
the Parties to the Treaty present and voting.
4. The Conference may discuss any questions or any
matters within the scope of this Treaty or relating to the
powers and functions of any organs provided for in this
treaty and may make recommendations to the Parties or to
the Commission or to both on any such question or matters.
5. The Conference shall:
(a) Elect States to serve on the Commission in
accordance with Article 4;
(b) consider the annual and any special report of the
CcMnmission;
(c) approve the budget recommended by the Commission
in accordance with paragraph
^^^_^
of Article ;
(d) approve reports to be sulwaitted to the United
Nations as required by any relationship agreement between
the Organization and the United Nations; or return them to
the Commission with the recommendations of the Conference;
(e) approve any agreement or agreements between the
Organization and the United Nations or other organizations
as provided in Article
^_^_^__
or return such agreement with its





approve amendments to this Treaty in accordance
with Article
.
6. The Conference shall have the authority;
(a) to take decisions of any matter specifically
referred to the Conference for this purpose by the Commission
j




















Ccxnmisslon and request from the Commission reports on any
matter relating to the functions of the Commission.
PERIODIC REVIEW OF THE SYSTEM
1. Two years after the coming into force of this Treaty,
the Commission shall review the System established under
this Treaty in order toi
(a) evaluate its effectiveness for verifying ccwn-
pliance with the obligations set forth in Article 1 and
^^____^
of this Treaty;
(b) determine in the light of experience and scien-<
tiflc progress whether any specific improvements should be
made or new elements added to the System;
(c) consider such measures to improve or maintain
the effectiveness of the System as may be proposed by any
Party to the Treaty in the light of experience in the opera-
tion of the Treaty.
2. The System may be reviewed by the Commission annually
thereafter for the same purpose upon request of the Con-
ference or any of the original Parties.
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
The privileges and immunities which the Organization,
its staff and the representatives of Parties shall be
granted by the Parties, and the legal capacity which the
organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of the
Parties, shall be as set forth in Annex II of this treaty,
RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
1. The Commission, with the approval of the Conference,
is authorized to enter into an agreement or agreements es-
tablishing an appropriate relationship between the Organi-
zation and the United Nations,
2, The Commission, with the approval of the Conference,
shall arrange for the Organization to be brought into an
appropriate relationship with any international organiza-
tion which may in the future be established among the
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The Annexes to this Treaty form an integral part of this
treaty.
PARTIES TO THE TREATY
The Parties to this Treaty shall be:
1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United
States of America, referred to herein as the "original
Parties",
2. (Item 2 will contain provision for other States to
become parties to the agreement. Although there is agree-
ment in principle on this part, language has not yet been
worked out among the three negotiating powers.)
SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION, ACCEPTANCE AND ENTRY INTO FORCE
1. This Treaty shall be open for signature on
_____
by





shall remain open for signature by those States for a
period of six months.
2. The signatory States shall become Parties to this
Treaty by deposit of an instrument of ratification.
3. Instruments of ratification by signatory States and
instruments of acceptance by States referred to in para-
graph 2 of Article
__^ shall be deposited with the Govern-
ment of , hereby designated as the depositary
Government
.
4. Ratification or acceptance of this Treaty shall be
effected by States in accordance with their respective
constitutional processes.
5. This Treaty shall enter into force when all the
original Parties have deposited instruments of ratification
in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article, Instru-
ments of ratification and instruments of acceptance deposited
hereafter shall take effect on the date of their deposit.
6. The depositary Government shall promptly inform all
States signatory to the Treaty of the date of each deposit
of ratification and the date of entry into force of the
Treaty. The depositary Government shall promptly inform
all signatories and Parties to the Treaty of the dates on


















I* This Treaty shall b« rogistared by the depositary
Government piirsuant to Article 10^ of the Charter of the
united Nations*
2« Agreements between the Organization and any Party to
this Treaty or any other State or piiblic international
organization shall be submitted for registration by the
Coamission with the United Nations.
DURATION
This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely subject
to the inherent right of a Party to withdraw and be re«*
lieved of obligations hereunder if the prcv^ ions of the
Treaty and its Annexes, including those providing for the
timely installation and effective operation of the control
system I are not being fulfilled and observed.
AMSNDMSNTS
Amendments to this Treaty and its Annexes shall enter
into force for all Parties to the Treaty when they have
been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the Hembers of the
Conference and ratified in accordance with their respective
constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Parties to
the Treaty, including the original Parties*
AUTHENTIC TEXTS
This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of
the depositary Governiaent* i^uly certified copies of this
Treaty shall be transmitted by the depositary Governiaent
to the Governments of the other signatory States and to the








day of , one
thousand nine hundred and •
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(1) The expression "representatives of Parties to this
Treaty" includes representatives on or to any organ of the
Organization established under the provisions of this
Treaty, including the Conference, together with the members
of their official staffs.
(2) The expression "representatives of Parties to this
Treaty on the Control Commission" includes all members of
the official staffs of such representatives except those
whose duties are clerical. For the purpose of this Annex
such clerical personnel shall be deemed to come within the
class of persons referred to in sub-paragraph (1) of this
Article.
(3) The expression "members of the Organization staff"
includes the Administrator and all employees of the Or-
ganization.
(4) The term "expert" shall mean an individual performing
a mission on behalf of the Organization either at the head-
quarters of the Organization or in the territory of a
Party to this Treaty.
(5) The term "host government" shall mean the government




A. The Organization shall possess juridical personality.
It Siall have the capacity (a) to contract, (b) to acquire
and dispose of property (c) to institute and defend legal
proceedings.
B. The Organization may provide for suitable identifica-














PROPERTY, PtJNDS AND ASSETS
A. The Organization, its property and assets, wherever
located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from
every form of legal process except in so far as in any
particular case the Commission, on behalf of the Organiza->
tion, has expressly waived this immunity, but such express
waiver of iiwnunity shall not extend to any measure of execu-
tion or detention of property.
B. The premises of the organization shall be inviolable.
The property and assets of the Organization, wherever located
and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, requisi-
tion, confiscation, expropriation and any form of
interference, whether by executive, adminio -_:„,ive, judicial
or legislative action.
C. The archives of the Organization and all documents
belonging to it or held by it or by the staff or experts
on its behalf shall be inviolable wherever located*
D. The Organization, without being restricted by financial
controls, regulations or moratoria of any kind, may, subject
to the obligation to give effect as far as is practicable
to representations made to it by any Party, exercise the
following rights:
(1) to hold currency of any kind and operate accounts
in any currency;
(2) to transfer its funds freely from, to, or within
any country Party to this Treaty and convert any currency
held by it into any other currency.
E. The Organization, its assets, income and other property
shall be:
(1) Exempt from all direct taxes except those taxes
which are in reality a charge for specific services;
(2) Exempt from all customs duties, prohibitions and
restrictions on imports and exports in respect of articles
imported or exported by the Organization for its official
use; articles imported under such exemption shall not be
disposed of, by sale or by gift, in the country into which
they are imported except under conditions approved by the
Government of that country;
(3) Exempt from all customs duties, prohibitions and
restrictions on imports and exports in respect of its publica-
tions •
F. The Organization shall be exempt from taxes imposed
directly on its expenditure transactions but not exempt
from those tcixes which are in reality a charge for specific
services.
vi'jiixA.
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while in the territory of another Party in the discharge
of their official duties and during their journey to and
from the place of meeting, the following privileges and
immunities
:
(1) Iinmunity from arrest, detention or any legal
process with respect to words spoken or written and acts
done by them in their official capacity;
(2) Inviolability for all their official papers
and documents;
(3) The right to use codes, couriers, and sealed bags
in coinmunicating with their Governments, their staffs and
with the Organization;
(4) The same exemption in respect of themselves and
their spouses from immigration restrictions, aliens* regis-
tration and national service obligations OlB is accorded to
ccHBpcucable categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;
(5) The same facilities with respect to currency or
exchange restrictions as are accorded to comparable cate-
gories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;
(6) The same immunities and facilities with respect
to their personal baggage as are accorded to comparable
categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;
(7) The right to import free of duty their furniture
and effects as the time of first arrival to take up their
posts in the territory of a Party and, on the termination
of their functions there, to re-export such furnitiure and
effects free of duty; furniture and effects so imported
shall not be disposed of, by sale or by gift, in such terri-
tory except under conditions approved by the Government
thereof*
Dm A representative to whom this Article applies shall,
during any period when he is present in the territory of
another Party for the discharge of his duties, be exempt
from taxation on his official salary and emoluments, and
where the legal incidence of any other form of taxation
depends upon residence, any such period shall, for the
purposes of determining his liability to taxation, be
treated as not being a period of residence in that terri-
tory.
S. The Administrator shall communicate to the Parties
concerned the names of the representatives and members of
their official staffs to whom paragraph B of this Article
applies and the probable duuration of their stay in the
territories of such other Parties*
F. The privileges and immunities accorded under paragraphs
A, B, and C are not for the personal benefit of the indivi-
duals themselves, but in order to safeguard the independent
















A. Each Party shall take appropriate steps necessary to
ensure that its domestic and international telecommunication
services accord to telecommunications of the Orgauiization
treatment at least equal to government telecommunications
with respect to priority of tuansraisriion, and accord these
telecommunications higher priority, i#e#, special priority
as accorded to the United Nations Organization in emer-
gencies, when requested, and that rates charged shall be
no higher than minimum government rates. Postal communica-
tions shall be handled in the most expeditious manner pos-
sible,
B. No censorship shall be applied to the Official
correspondence and other official communications of the
Organization.
C. The Organization shall have the right to use codes
known to all Parties and to despatch and receive by courier
or in sealed bags only official correspondence, other
official communications and objects intended for official
use. Such couriers and sealed bags shall have the same
immunities and privileges as diplomatic couriers and bags.
D. Nothing in paragraphs B and C. of this Article shall
be construed to preclude the adoption of appropriate secu-
rity precautions to be determined by agreement between a
Peurty and the Organization.
Article 5
REPRESENTATIVES OF PARTIES TO THIS TREATY
A. Representatives of Parties to this Treaty on the
Control Commission shall enjoy in, the territory of the
host government, the same privileges and immunities as the
host government accords diplomatic envoys accredited to it.
3. Representatives of Parties to this Treaty on the Con-
trol Commission shall enjoy, while present in the territory
of another Party in the discharge of Commission duties, the
same privileges and immunities as the Party accords diplo-
matic envoys accredited to it.
C. Representatives of Parties to this Treaty shall enjoy,
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Consequently, a Party not only has the right, but is under
a duty to saive the immunity of its representatives and
their staffs in any case where, without prejudice to the
purposes for which the immunity is accorded*
G. The provisions of Paragraphs A to £ above shall not
require any Party to grant any of the privileges and imrauni*
ties referred to therein to any person who is its national
or any person who is its representative or is a member of
the staff of such representative.
Article 6
Organization Staff and Experts
A. The AdmiivLstrator and the deputies of the Administra-
tor shall be accorded the privileges and immunities normally
accorded to diplomatic envoys.
B. All other members of the Organization staff shall be
accorded the following privileges and immunities:
(1) Inanunity from arrest or detention whenever assigned
to a control post, an inspection group, or a routine or
special flight; and at all times inaRunity from arrest,
detention or any legal process with respect to words spoken
or written and acts done by them in the performance of their
official functions;
(2) The same facilities with respect to currency or
exchange restrictions as are accorded to comparable cate-
gories of the steut'fs of diplomatic missions;
(3) The same immunities and facilities with respect
to their personal baggage as are accorded to comparable
categories of the staffs of diplomatic missions;
(4) The same exemption from immigration restrictions,
aliens* registration and national service obligations for
themselves, their spouses and members of their immediate
fjunilies residing with them and dependent on them as is
accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplcwnatic
missions:
(5) The same repatriation facilities in time of inter-
national crisis for theinr-elves, their spouses and members
of their immediate families residing with them and dependent
on them, as are accorded to comparable categories of the
staffs of diplomatic missions;
(6) The right to import free of duty their furniture
and effects at the time of first arrival to take up their
xabAU ft
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posts in the territory of a Party and, on the termination
of their functions there, to re-export such furniture and
effects free of duty; furniture and effects so imported
shall not be disposed of, by sale or by gift, in such
territory except under conditions approved by the Government
thereof.
C. Every expert performing a mission for the Organization
either at the headquarters of the Organization or in the
territory of a Party shall be accorded the following
privileges and immunities;
(1) Immunity from arrest or detention;
(2) Immunity from legal process in respect to words
spoken or written and acts done by him in the performance
of his official functions;
(3) The same exemption from immigration restrictions,
aliens* registration and national service obligations as is
accorded to comparable categories of the staffs of diplomatic
missions;
(4) Immunities and privileges specified in items (2)
and (3) of paragraph B of this Article.
D. Svery member of the Organization staff and every
expert shall be exempt from taxation on the salaries and
emoluments paid him by the Organization.
E. The Administrator shall keep the Parties currently
informed as to each individual to whom any of the fore-
going paragraphs of this Article is applicable. A Party
shall always be entitled to notification of the name and
responsibility of any such individual before his arrival
for official duties in the territory of that Party, so that
it may have an opportunity to comment to the Administrator
upon the proposed assignment of such expert or member of
the Organization staff.
F. Privileges and immunities are granted to members of
the Organization staff and to experts in the interests of
the Organization and not for the personal benefit of the
individuals themselves. The Administrator shall have the
right and the duty to saive the immunity of any such indivi-
dual in auiy case where the immunity would impede the course
of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the in-
terests of the Organization. In the case of the Adminis-
trator his immunity may be waived by the Commission provided
the Commission finds the immunity would impede the course
of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the
interests of the Organization.
G. The provisions of paragraphs A to D inclusive above
shall not require any Party to grant any of the privileges
and immunities referred to therein to any person who is its
nationel , except
:
ix) Immunity from arrest, detention or any legal











done by him in the performance of his official functions
for th« Organization;
(2) Facilities with respect to currency or exchange




A, The Organization shall at: all tiroes cooperate with
the appropriate authorities of Parties to facilitate the
proper administration of justice, secure the observance of
police regulations, and prevent the occurrence of an abuse
of the privileges and iramxmities set out in this Annex*
B, If any i. arty considers that there has been an abuse
of the privilege of residence in its territory or of any
other privilege or immunity granted by this Annex, the
following procedure shall be adopted:
(1) In the case of an abuse by the Administrator,
consultations shall be held between the Party and the Com-
mission to determine the action to be taken*
(2) In the case of an abuse by any individual referred
to in paragraphs (1) or (2) of Article 1, the Party which
considers that there has been an abuse may, after consulta-
tion with the Party whose representative is concerned amd
in accordance with the diplomatic procedures applicable to
diplomatic envoys accredited to the former Party, require
the representati\^e to leave its territory*
(3) In the case of an abuse by any individual referred
to in paragraph B and C of Article 6, the Party which con-
siders that there has been an abuse may, after cor tion
with the Administrator and, in the event of disagr^^. .t,
with the Comraission, require the Administrator to arrange
for an iiaatediate replacement*
.\rticle 8
LAISSS2-PASSBR
A* Members of the staff of the Organization and experts
on missions on behalf of the Organization shall be entitled
to use a special laissez-passer procedure modelled on the
United Nations laissez-passer procedure, to be evolved by
the Administrator pursuant to regulations approved by the
Conmission*
B* Parties shall recognize and accept the Organization
laissez-passer issued to membcjrs of the staff of the Organi-
zation and to experts on missions on behalf of the Organi-
zation aa valid travel documents*
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C* Members of the staff of the Organization and experts
travelling on the Organization laissez-passer on the
business of the Organization, shall be granted the sane
facilities for travel as are accorded to comparable cate-
gories of the staffs of diploioatic missions*
Article 9
INTERPRETATION AND SUPPLSMSNTARY AGREEMENTS
A. The provisions of this Annex shall be interpreted in
the light of the fiinctions with which the Organization is
entrusted by the Treaty and its annexes,
3, The provisions of this Annex shall in no way limit
or prejudice the privileges and immunities which have been,
or may hereafter be, accorded to the Organization by a
State by reason of the location, in the territory of that
State, of the headquarters or other components and agencies
of the Organization. The Organization may conclude with
any Party or Parties agreements supplementing the provi-
sions of this Annex, so far as that Party or those Parties
are concerned*
Text of Agreed Draft Annex III
THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION
A, A Preparatory Commission, consisting of one repre-
sentative from each of the original Parties to the Trcrty,
shall come into existence on the day after this Treaty
shall have J^emi signed by all the original Parties, The
Preparatory Joraiaxssion shall remain in existence until the
Control Commission has he&n elected in accordance with
Article 4 of this Treaty.
B, iJxcept as provided in Section Z of this .\nnex, the
Preparatory Commission shall take decisions by agreement
among the three original parties, adopt its own rules of
procedure, meet as often as necessary and determine its own
place of meeting. It shall appoint an executive secretary
and such staff as shall be necessary, who shall exercise
such powers and perform such duties as the Preparatory
Commission may determine,
C, The expenses of the Preparatory Commission may be met
by a loan provided by the United Nations or by advances
from governments. The repayment of loans shall be included
as an item in the budget for the Control Organization's first
financial period. The Preparatory Commission shall make
the necessary arrangements with the appropriate authorities
OwC
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of the United Nations for repayment of the loan. Advances
from governments may be set off against assessments of the
governments concerned levied in accordance with the pro-
visions of Article .
D, Pending deposit of instruments of ratification of
the Treaty by all the original Parties, the Preparatory
Commission shall:
1. Coi^uct preliminary technical studies and con-
sultations with regard to the location, installation, and
equipping of control posts aind other components of the
Congrol Organization, including:
(a) geological and topographic snap studies of
geographical areas of the world where control posts are to
be located;
vb) consultations with technical representatives
of the original Parties for the purpose of adopting standard
construction designs for control posts and regional offices
and of choosing types of equipment for each of the four
basic methods of detection
|
(c) studies of the surveys which will be required
for selecting sites for control posts;
(d) studies of communication requirements;
(e) consultations with the original Parties for
equipping and utilizing their aircraft for routine flights
and vessels to be stationed in accordance with the I'reaty
and its Annexes;
(f) studies of requirements for standard time
transmission and reception to ensure accurate relative time
at all control posts and other components of the Control
Organization.
2* Draw up detailed requirements and regulations for
the staffing of the Organization and invite applicat-^ons
for posts to be filled during the initial operations of the
organization;
3, Draw up requirements and invite applications for
the post of Administrator;
4, Recommend the site in Vienna of the permanent
headquarters of the Organization; draw up recommendations
for the provisions of a headquar-ters agreement defining
the status of the Organization and its rights and relation-
ship with the host country;
5» Draw up detailed plans for the day-to-day tech-
nical and administrative operations of the Organization;
6» Draw up for sulwnission to the Conference the
budget for the Organization's first financial period and a
recommended scale of assessments in accordance with Article
.____^
of this Treaty;
7* In conjunction with the United Nations, initiate
the preparation of a draft agreement which waid be in











^' « . «^ .J. A
J
370
8« Make arrangements for the convening of the first
Conference, to be held not later than six months from the
date of instruments of ratification have heen deposited by
all the original Parties.
£• 1. On the day after deposit of instruments of rati-
fication of the Treaty by all the original Parties, or as
soon thereafter as possible, the Preparatory Commission
shall be enlarged, to consist of one representative from
each of the original Parties to this Treaty and one repre-
sentative from four other States, chosen by agreement
between the three original Parties from among those states
which at that time have deposited instruments of ratifica-
tion of the Treaty.
2. The Preparatory Commission thus enlarged shall
exercise the powers conferred upon the Control Commission
by the Treaty, in accordance with the procedures therein
specified for the Control Commission. After the Prepara-
tory Commission has been enlcurged and pending the appoint-
ment of the Administrator, the executive secretary of the
Preparatory Commission shall exercise the powers conferred
upon the Administrator by the Treaty.
3. Pending the enlargement of the Preparatory Com-
mission pursuant to paragraph (1) of this Section, the
Preparatory Commission shall continue to exercise only
those functions listed in Section D. of this Annex.
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To test or not to test.
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